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Abstract  
An atypical recognition of facial expressions of emotion is thought to be part of the 
characteristics associated with an autism spectrum disorder diagnosis (DSM-5, 2013). 
However, despite over three decades of experimental research into facial expression 
recognition (FER) in autism spectrum disorder (ASD), conflicting results are still reported 
(Harms, Martin, & Wallace, 2010). The thesis presented here aims to explore FER in ASD 
using novel techniques, as well as assessing the contribution of a co-occurring emotion-
blindness condition (alexithymia) and autism-like personality traits. 
Chapter 1 provides a review of the current literature surrounding emotion perception in 
ASD, focussing specifically on evidence for, and against, atypical recognition of facial 
expressions of emotion in ASD. 
The experimental chapters presented in this thesis (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) explore FER in 
adults with ASD, children with ASD and in the wider, typical population. In Chapter 2, a 
novel psychophysics method is presented along with its use in assessing FER in 
individuals with ASD. Chapter 2 also presents a research experiment in adults with ASD, 
indicating that FER is similar compared to typically developed (TD) adults in terms of the 
facial muscle components (action units; AUs), the intensity levels and the timing 
components utilised from the stimuli. In addition to this, individual differences within 
groups are shown, indicating that better FER ability is associated with lower levels of ASD 
symptoms in adults with ASD (measured using the ADOS; Lord et al. (2000)) and lower 
levels of autism-like personality traits in TD adults (measured using the Autism-Spectrum 
Quotient; (S. Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001)). Similarly, 
Chapter 3 indicates that children with ASD are not significantly different from TD children 
in their perception of facial expressions of emotion as assessed using AU, intensity and 
timing components. Chapter 4 assesses the contribution of alexithymia and autism-like 
personality traits (AQ) to FER ability in a sample of individuals from the typical 
population. This chapter provides evidence against the idea that alexithymia levels predict 
FER ability over and above AQ levels.  
The importance of the aforementioned results are discussed in Chapter 5 in the context of 
previous research in the field, and in relation to established theoretical approaches to FER 
in ASD. In particular, arguments are made that FER cannot be conceptualised under an 
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‘all-or-nothing’ framework, which has been implied for a number of years (Harms et al., 
2010). Instead it is proposed that FER is a multifaceted skill in individuals with ASD, 
which varies according to an individual’s skillset. Lastly, limitations of the research 
presented in this thesis are discussed in addition to suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 1 General Introduction 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a common neurodevelopmental disorder that is 
characterised in part by difficulties with social communication and interaction. It has long 
been thought that a core part of these social difficulties is the recognition of one’s own 
emotions and those of others. A particular focus of the research in this field has been on the 
recognition of facial expressions of emotion in other people. However, the scientific 
literature is equivocal about the nature of how, and the extent to which, facial expression 
recognition (FER) in individuals with ASD differs from that of typically developed (TD) 
individuals. Hence, there is a demand for a better understanding of exactly how FER 
manifests in individuals with ASD. 
This introductory chapter will provide a description of ASD and the particular issues that 
are intrinsic to ASD research. Then, facial expression recognition, and how this skill 
manifests itself in individuals with ASD, will be discussed with reference to literature in 
the field. Next, the ‘Autism Spectrum Quotient’ (AQ) will be described and its role in ASD 
research will be evaluated, followed by a discussion of the theories of facial expression 
recognition in ASD. Lastly, an overview of the experimental chapters of this thesis will be 
outlined.  
1.1 What is Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD)?  
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fifth edition 
(DSM 5), ASD is characterised by a dyad of ‘impairments’: 1) ‘impairments’ in social 
communication and interaction and 2) restricted, repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests, 
or activities (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). As suggested by its name, ASD is a 
spectrum disorder, meaning that within the diagnosis of ASD there is large variability in 
the ‘severity’ of the symptoms from one individual to the next (Wing, 1988).  
Changes in the diagnostic criteria for ASD have, over recent years, changed how we think 
about the definition of ASD. The DSM moved from its 4th edition to its 5th in 2013, 
bringing with it several changes to the diagnostic criteria for ASD. Under DSM-IV, 
Pervasive Developmental Disorder (PDD) was an umbrella term used to denote the sub- 
categories: Autistic Disorder, Asperger’s Disorder, Childhood Disintegrative Disorder 
(CDD), Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS) and 
Rett’s Disorder. During this time Autistic Disorder, Asperger’s Disorder and PDD-NOS 
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were also collectively referred to using the informal term ‘Autism Spectrum Disorders’. 
The DSM updated its classification from Pervasive Developmental Disorder to the all-
encompassing term Autism Spectrum Disorder in its 5th edition. In addition to this the 
DSM-5 introduced a new classification of ‘Social (Pragmatic) Communication Disorder’ 
(SCD), which applies to those who do not meet all necessary criteria for a diagnosis of 
ASD. The removal of Asperger’s Disorder from DSM criteria has, however, been met with 
mixed reactions from the autism community. One major criticism has been that individuals 
who would have previously been diagnosed with Asperger’s Disorder may no longer meet 
requirements for ASD or SCD and so miss out on the support services they may have 
otherwise been entitled to (Volkmar & Reichow, 2013). 
Despite contentions that have emerged out of recent changes in the DSM diagnostic 
criteria of ASD, it is important to note that the DSM is only one of two major 
internationally recognised diagnostic criteria manuals. The DSM-5 is used predominantly 
in the USA, whereas the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related 
Health Problems, 10th edition (ICD-10) is used in the rest of the world. This becomes 
problematic as the ICD-10, although quite well harmonised with DSM-IV, uses different 
diagnostic criteria for ASD compared to the DSM-5. For example, the ICD-10 still 
recognises the separate conditions Asperger’s Disorder and Childhood Autism, although an 
update to the ICD diagnostic criteria (ICD-11) is expected to be published in 2018 (see 
www.who.int/classifications/icd/revision/en/).  
The DSM and ICD provide detailed classifications that are central to ASD diagnostic 
procedures, largely administered using standardised behavioural observation techniques. 
The Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS) and the Autism Diagnostic 
Interview (ADI) are generally considered ‘gold standard’ for diagnosis when administered 
by a trained clinician (Falkmer, Anderson, Falkmer, & Horlin, 2013). There are, however, 
several accepted practices in research for obtaining a confirmation of a participant’s 
diagnosis of ASD. The procedure that is considered to be the best in ASD research is a ‘re-
diagnosis’ of ASD using the ADOS and/or ADI, administered by a qualified individual. 
This allows the researcher not only to confirm that the participant reaches the required cut-
off score for ASD, but also to obtain sub-scores on different components of the ADOS and 
ADI that might not be accessible from the individual’s medical records. Often researchers 
work alongside clinicians, in which case ADOS and ADI assessments can be obtained as 
part of a multidisciplinary team. In cases where there is no multidisciplinary team, 
members of a research team can be trained on the ADOS or ADI, but they must meet 
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‘research accreditation’ standard before they are allowed to administer the ADOS or ADI 
as part of a study that may go on to be published in a scientific journal. In cases where it is 
not feasible to re-administer the ADOS to ADI for diagnosis verification, the original 
ADOS or ADI documentation can be referred to in order to verify that the participant has a 
diagnosis of ASD.  
A topic of current debate is the large increase in prevalence of ASD over the past twenty-
five years. The term ‘autism’ was only first recognised under DSM diagnostic criteria in 
1980 (DSM III), previously termed as ‘schizophrenic reaction, childhood type’ (DSM I, 
1952) and ‘schizophrenia, childhood type’ (DSM II, 1968). However, the first study to 
assess the prevalence of autism-like behaviour in children was conducted in the UK in 
1966 (Lotter, 1966), reporting a prevalence rate of 4.5 per 10,000. Subsequent studies 
reported a prevalence rate of between 4 and 5 per 10,000 (Brask, 1972; Wing, Yeates, 
Brierley, & Gould, 1976; Wing and Gould 1979). In the 1980s thirteen studies reported 
prevalence rates which varied from 2.5 to 16 per 10,000 (for full review see Wing (1993)). 
In the 1990s prevalence rates continued to increase, through the 2000s and 2010s reaching 
a high of 147 per 10,000 in 2014, as reported by U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Wingate et al., 2014). Exactly why 
there has been such a large increase in autism diagnosis over the past 25 years is not fully 
understood. In some cases the rise in prevalence of autism has been termed an ‘autism 
epidemic’ (Cave, 2008; Gillberg, Cederlund, Lamberg, & Zeijlon, 2006; Leonard, Annaz, 
Karmiloff-Smith, & Johnson, 2011; Liu, King, & Bearman, 2010). Many researchers reject 
the notion of an ‘epidemic’, proposing that there is no ‘real’ increase in autism prevalence 
at all, only changes in understanding, awareness and better diagnostic tools (Gernsbacher, 
Dawson, & Goldsmith, 2005; Wazana, Bresnahan, & Kline, 2007).  
Lastly, another topic that has prompted much discussion in the field of ASD is the greater 
number of males diagnosed with ASD compared to females. ASD has typically been 
regarded as affecting four times as many males as females (Rutter, 1978), with more recent 
reports suggesting that it many affect five times as many males as females (Wingate et al., 
2014). There has been significant debate about this, a consistent argument being that ASD 
presents differently in females and, therefore, many females with ASD are overlooked or 
misdiagnosed, contributing to the apparent lopsided male to female ratio (Frazier, 
Georgiades, Bishop, & Hardan, 2014; Head, McGillivray, & Stokes, 2014).  
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The complexities associated with the diagnosis of ASD (as outlined above) have 
implications for how research is conducted in this field, as well as the way in which 
findings from research studies can be interpreted. The next section will outline some 
prominent issues intrinsic to ASD research.  
1.2 Issues associated with ASD research 
There is current debate over the terms that are used to describe individuals with ASD. The 
majority of recent, peer-reviewed publications have adopted the terms ‘individuals with 
autism spectrum disorder’ or ‘individuals with autism spectrum condition’. However, 
evidence suggests that individuals with ASD may prefer the terms ‘autistic’ or ‘person on 
the spectrum’ (Kenny et al., 2016). The person-first perspective of ‘individuals with ASD’ 
was, however, found to be a term in which several stakeholders (i.e. professionals, parents, 
caregivers and people on the spectrum) agreed to represent the condition. Henceforth, the 
terms ‘individuals with ASD’, ‘children with ASD’ and ‘adults with ASD’ will be used to 
describe the participants who took part in the research presented in this thesis. 
Additionally, in certain sections of data analysis, participants with ASD may be described 
collectively as the ‘ASD group’ in order to make parallels with typically developed control 
participants who will be described as the ‘TD group’. It is hoped that using these terms will 
be acceptable to all relevant stakeholders, and that these terms are deemed appropriate, 
insofar as they are descriptive and clear in the context of this thesis.  
Another contested issue in ASD research is the proposition that the majority of ASD 
research reflects only a minority of individuals with ASD, largely from the ‘higher’ end of 
the spectrum (i.e. average or above average IQ, with no co-morbid learning disabilities). 
The key reason for this is that most ASD research is designed for individuals who have 
typical IQ levels, rather than those who have IQs in the Learning Disabled (LD) range (< 
70; sometimes called ‘low functioning’ though this term has been soundly rejected by the 
ASD community (Kenny et al., 2016)). Research with lower IQ groups is complicated by a 
combination of practical and ethical issues. Practical issues include ensuring that the task is 
not distressing to the participants and that the demands of the task are appropriate to the IQ 
level of the participant group. Ethical issues include ensuring that the participant is able to 
give truly informed consent and that they are willing to take part in the research. 
Consequently, studies that examine complex cognitive skills are restricted by who is 
appropriate to take part in the experiment. This means that certain areas of ASD research, 
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such as complex cognition, often only reflect the abilities of a subset of the wider ASD 
population.  
As well as being mindful of the issues described thus far, a feature that is essential for 
successful ASD research is the provision of an adequate control group. A control group is 
necessary in ASD research in order to have a reference with which participants with ASD 
can be compared. Several characteristics must be taken into account when selecting 
controls for ASD research, in particular: age, gender and level of education. It is also 
common for research studies to screen their control participants for autism-like personality 
traits, ensuring that all participants have no signs of having ASD. FER studies similar to 
those presented in this thesis (but in the typical population) have suggested that there is a 
difference in FER ability relative to ethnicity (Jack, Caldara, & Schyns, 2012b; Jack, 
Garrod, & Schyns, 2014). Hence, although recording information about ethnicity is not 
always routine in ASD research (Pierce et al., 2014) in the studies presented in this thesis, 
ethnicity was also recorded. 
1.3 Typical perception of facial expressions of emotion 
The human face contains highly mobile features that allow an individual to send many 
social signals such as gestures (e.g. nodding), indications of where the person is directing 
their attention and patterns of gaze and movement that regulate turn taking in face-to-face 
interactions. The most highly researched of these signals, however, is facial expressions of 
emotion, regarded as a fundamental source of information about a person’s current 
emotional state (Ekman, 1992). The earliest scientific exploration into facial expressions of 
emotion was by Duchenne in 1862 who found that it was possible to stimulate the 
independent movement of individual facial muscles on a participant who had lost the 
ability to move the muscles in his face due to nerve damage. Subsequently, Darwin (1872) 
hypothesised that certain facial expressions of emotion were universally recognizable, i.e. 
across all countries in the world facial expressions of emotion are universally recognized 
and easily interpreted through specific facial movements. Ekman et al (1992) built on this, 
providing a more specific case for ‘basic facial expressions of emotion’ suggesting that 
happy, surprise, fear, disgust, anger and sadness are universally represented using the same 
combination of facial movements in across the world. There have been arguments against 
this theory, however. For example, Russell (1994) questioned the reliability of the basic 
emotion concept, concluding that the association of facial expressions and labels is likely 
to vary across cultures. These sentiments are backed up by Jack, Caldara, and Schyns 
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(2012a) who found differences in the perception of happy, surprise, fear, disgust, anger and 
sadness in Eastern Asian participants compared to Western Caucasian participants. 
Research has also suggested that the six emotions (claimed by Ekman et al (1992) to be the 
‘basic’ facial expression of emotion) do not provide a sufficiently exhaustive explanation 
of basic emotion perception (Jack, Sun, Delis, Garrod, & Schyns, 2016). Jack et al. (2016) 
suggest instead that, because of an overlap in components of emotion perception in 
surprise and fear, and disgust and anger, four facial expression of emotion are the true 
‘basics’.  
Typical development of facial expression recognition begins in early infancy and develops 
rapidly throughout the first year of life (Grossmann, 2010). Although some evidence of 
facial expression perception has been reported in neonates (i.e. < 4 weeks old; Farroni, 
Menon, Rigato, and Johnson (2007), there is a general consensus in the research literature 
that infants begin to recognise facial expressions around 7 months of age (Caron, Caron, & 
Myers, 1982; Nelson, 1987; WalkerAndrews, 1997).!Given this, it is difficult to surmise 
whether reactions to facial expression at this young age reflect recognition of emotion per 
se or whether reactions to facial expression stimuli are merely recognition of affect in 
general. Nelson, 1987 notes that, even by the age of 5, the ability to correctly identify a 
range of facial expressions of emotion is only rudimentary. The neural processes involved 
in the perception of emotional faces are thought to develop in a staggered fashion from 
childhood to adulthood (Batty and Taylor, 2006). ERPs recorded in 82 children aged 4 to 
15 years during an implicit processing task with emotional faces revealed that as 
participants increased with age, ERPs signals changed. For example, ERPs of P1 were 
found in the youngest participants and slowly changed with increasing age until N170 
(associated with FER in adulthood) emerged in adolescence. Note, this was a cross-
sectional study not a longitudinal study so individual differences may have had an impact 
on the results. It is, nevertheless, apparent that FER in typical individuals matures as 
individuals transition from childhood to adulthood. 
 
1.4 The ‘enigma’ of facial expression recognition (FER) in 
ASD: assessing conflicting literatures 
It was a sustained ‘impairment’ of social communication and interaction with others that 
first led Kanner (1943) to define autism as a "disturbance of affective contact". However, 
the cause and presentation of the characteristics associated with this continues to puzzle 
researchers to this day. Hence, ASD has been described as an ‘enigma’ (Uta Frith, 1989), 
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and despite huge advances in an evidence-based understanding of ASD, many aspects of 
the condition are still not well understood.  
Visual perception is one area of ASD that, despite being extensively researched, presents 
very few universally agreed findings. Results range from impairments in some aspects, 
through to superior abilities in others, but often no differences are found compared to TD 
individuals (Dakin & Frith, 2005; Simmons et al., 2009). The perception of faces is 
generally thought to be ‘special’ to the typical visual system, as compared to other classes 
of objects (Gould, 1994). Because of this and the social difficulties associated with ASD, 
researchers have long been interested in the perception of faces in individuals with ASD, 
with several reviews published on this topic alone (Golarai, Grill-Spector, & Reiss, 2006; 
Jemel, Mottron, & Dawson, 2006; Weigelt, Koldewyn, & Kanwisher, 2012). Much 
research has suggested that, in individuals with ASD, faces do not have the same ‘special’ 
status as that found in the visual system of the typical population. This claim is not, 
however, universally accepted in the field and still continues to be debated (Simmons et 
al., 2009).  
A specific aspect of visual/facial perception research in ASD that has sustained debate for 
several decades is the perception of facial expressions of emotion (Harms et al., 2010; 
Simmons et al., 2009; Uljarevic & Hamilton, 2013). This area of research has given rise to 
over 140 research papers varying greatly in the method, design and participant variables. 
However, all are essentially asking the same question: are individuals with ASD ‘impaired’ 
at recognising facial expressions of emotion? The aim of this section is to assess evidence 
of an atypical manifestation of facial expression recognition (FER) in individuals with 
ASD. 
1.4.1 Early research 
The first major research study to assess FER in individuals with ASD used schematic 
drawings and photographs of facial expressions of emotion and asked children to pair these 
with videotapes of emotional gestures, showing the body only (Hobson (1986a)). Hobson 
(1986a) reported that children who were ‘autistic’ (at this point, the term ‘ASD’ was not 
yet established) were significantly less accurate than mental-age-matched controls at 
recognising what expressions corresponded to the gestures. Hence, he concluded that 
‘autistic’ children were impaired in the recognition of emotions and subsequently ratified 
this finding by repeating the study with schematic drawings of gestures (Hobson, 1986b). 
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Subsequent to this, Hobson and colleagues found that adolescents and young adults with 
ASD were worse than verbal-age matched controls at matching facial expressions of 
emotion, despite having a superior ability in matching photographs of upside-down faces 
(Hobson, Ouston, & Lee, 1988). Following on from these seminal studies, a succession of 
research papers were published using similar methods as seen in (Hobson, 1986a) using 
static images of facial expressions (Braverman, Fein, Lucci, & Waterhouse, 1989; 
Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1990). In particular, stimuli of black and white static 
facial expressions (now regarded as ‘classic’ stimuli) from the resource ‘Pictures of Facial 
Affect’ were used (POFA; P. Ekman and W. V.  Friesen (1976); (Macdonald et al., 1989; 
Tantam, Monaghan, Nicholson, & Stirling, 1989)). Note, the POFA stimuli depict only 
what Ekman and Friesen (1978) regard as the six ‘basic’ facial expressions of emotion: 
happy, surprise, fear, disgust, anger and sadness. Research on FER in ASD flourished in 
the 1990s, with several studies ratifying the indications of the seminal papers that FER is 
atypical in individuals with ASD (Bormannkischkel, Vilsmeier, & Baude, 1995; Capps, 
Yirmiya, & Sigman, 1992; Celani, Battacchi, & Arcidiacono, 1999; Davies, Bishop, 
Manstead, & Tantam, 1994; Feldman, Mcgee, Mann, & Strain, 1993). However, a 
significant number of papers indicated no FER atypicality in individuals with ASD as 
compared to TD individuals (S. Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997; Buitelaar, 
Van der Wees, Swaab-Barneveld, & Van der Gaag, 1999; Fein, Lucci, Braverman, & 
Waterhouse, 1992; Loveland et al., 1997; Prior, Dahlstrom, & Squires, 1990). Hence, this 
phase of research gave rise to conflicting conclusions about whether individuals with ASD 
are impaired in FER, which has reverberated throughout the research field to the current 
date.  
After 1990, over 100 studies were published in this field, all of which were aiming to 
ascertain whether FER in ASD is fundamentally different from the typical population. 
Uljarevic and Hamilton (2013) aimed to address the confusion within the FER ASD 
literature by conducting a meta-analysis across a large number of studies in this area. 
Meta-analysis is a tool used to obtain information about the effect size of a particular 
phenomenon by evaluating data from a series of research studies (Cooper, Hedges, & 
Valentine, 2009). Uljarevic and Hamilton (2013) performed a systematic literature search 
for all studies published on FER in ASD before December 2011. They performed a meta-
analysis on a selection of data from this period, aiming to report an overall effect size of 
the results. They revealed a large negative effect size between groups (-0.80), indicating 
that participants with ASD were, on the whole, less accurate at FER than TD participants. 
They also report that there was a large amount of heterogeneity across studies, indicating 
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that despite finding an overall negative effect size, the effect sizes of each study are 
considerably variable. In addition to this, they assessed the contribution of IQ and age on 
FER scores, finding no overall contribution of either construct. In addition, they indicated 
that task (i.e. which task was used in the study) did not contribute to effect size. This 
finding is interesting given the argument from Harms et al (2010) that task demands were 
particularly liable to influence FER outcomes. Uljarevic and Hamilton (2013) also assessed 
differences between individual emotions and reported that the recognition of surprise, fear, 
disgust, anger and sadness were all significantly poorer in ASD individuals. They reported 
an effect for happy, however they indicated that this is marginal, and so not reliably 
different between the ASD and TD groups. However, the data used for the meta-analysis 
conducted by Uljarevic and Hamilton only reflect a proportion of the data available. For 
example, if participants completed more than one FER task, Uljarevic and Hamilton chose 
only one task result to include in the meta-analysis and discarded the remaining data. Their 
reasons were understandable insofar as they did not want to introduce multiple comparison 
effects due to using the same sample of participants more than once. However, the 
downside to this is that a large proportion of the data, which was potentially meaningful to 
the meta-analysis, was excluded. On top of this, Uljarevic and Hamilton indicated that they 
actively chose certain studies over others: studies with static stimuli were chosen over 
those with dynamic stimuli and studies assessing basic emotion labelling tasks were chosen 
over other types of task. Selecting specific tasks in this way may have introduced an 
element of bias into the meta-analysis. No further analysis was conducted with the 
discarded tasks, hence, Uljarevic and Hamilton provide no confirmation to the reader that 
the meta-analysis results would have remained the same given the inclusion of the other 
data. The inclusion of certain participant groups was also selective in the meta-analysis 
because, when two or more control groups were used (for example one group matched on 
verbal IQ and another group matched on non-verbal IQ), they were selective to the data 
they chose, opting for data that was compared to verbal IQ controls over non-verbal IQ 
controls. Another area of concern in this meta-analysis was the bias toward static stimuli. 
For example, in studies that reported both dynamic and static FER tasks, Uljarevic and 
Hamilton excluded the dynamic task that is arguably more ecologically valid. Since 
differences in static and dynamic emotion processing has been reported in this field 
(e.g.Philip et al. (2010)) it would have been useful to have a clearer picture of the influence 
of dynamic stimuli of effects size. Lastly, the data included in this meta-analysis inclusive 
of studies published until December 2011 and so do not reflect the advances in 
methodology presented in this area of research over past 5 years. The pertinent questions 
raised by the early research, as discussed in this section, is further reviewed below.  
  
10 
10 
1.4.2 Components of FER processing 
1.4.2.1 Timing: comparison of FER in static and dynamic stimuli 
Since the seminal research papers on FER in ASD were published, researchers have aimed 
to increase the ecological validity of facial expression stimuli. However, results remain 
mixed with regard to whether, when stimuli are more ‘life-like’, clearer differences in FER 
will emerge. Apart from efforts to use videotaped facial expressions in Hobson (1986a), 
Loveland et al. (1997) conducted the first study to use dynamic stimuli (as opposed to 
photographs or drawings) to assess FER in individuals with ASD. They presented children 
with video clips of actors conveying happy, sad and angry facial expressions. The study 
offered a complex assessment of FER ability in children with ASD because they tested 
accuracy of FER both verbally and non-verbally, as well as assessing FER based on an 
emotive or neutral face (i.e. the actor producing the facial expression) paired with an 
emotive or ‘flat’ sentence (i.e. the actor saying, for example, “I am happy I am going to the 
zoo”). They found that there was no difference between children with ASD and TD 
children in their accuracy at labelling facial expressions of emotion in all conditions. 
However, it could be argued that because children were provided with a ‘trigger’ word 
while the stimuli were presented (i.e. in the sentence vocalised by the actor) the children 
may have been relying more on verbal content of the utterance than visual content of the 
face and hence it is possible that the recognition of facial expressions of emotion per se 
may not have been directly measured using this method. Gepner, Deruelle, and Grynfeltt 
(2001) built upon this initial dynamic stimuli study by assessing FER using two-second 
videos of actors performing facial expressions of surprise, happy, sadness and disgust, 
which were presented to children with ASD and mental-age matched controls. As in 
Loveland et al. (1997), results revealed no difference between children with ASD and TD 
children. However, Gepner et al. (2001) asserted that task performance improved with 
chronological age in the TD children, while task performance remained unchanged in the 
children with ASD. Hence, although overall findings suggested no significant difference 
between children with ASD and TD children, slight ‘improvements’ in FER could be 
found in the TD group as a function of age. Taken broadly, the findings of these initial 
studies of FER using dynamic stimuli gave rise to the notion that dynamic stimuli are 
somewhat more difficult for individuals with ASD to recognise than static stimuli.  
Advances in methodology that were implemented after this period (as discussed further in 
section 1.4.4) gave rise to greater sensitivity to measuring FER ability. For example, Philip 
et al. (2010) assessed FER, measuring the accuracy of participants’ ability to recognise 
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emotions from photographs of facial expression of emotion (P. Ekman & W. V. Friesen, 
1976) that morphed from neutral expressions to a full emotion expression. Participants 
were required use the emotion labels ‘happy’, ‘surprise’, ‘fear’, ‘disgust’, ‘anger’ and 
‘sadness’ to categorise stimuli that differed in the extent to which they express the 
emotion. Philip et al. (2010) found a significant difference in FER accuracy between adults 
with ASD and TD adults. A succession of papers reflected similar results. For example, 
when ‘morphed’ facial expression stimuli were presented at varying speeds to children 
with ASD, Sato, Uono, and Toichi (2013) found that children with ASD were significantly 
more likely than typical children to rate slow-moving morphs as ‘natural’ looking. Sato et 
al. (2013) suggested from these data that dynamics are not only part and parcel of effective 
FER, they are what underlie poor FER in individuals with ASD. In addition to this, Lerner, 
McPartland, and Morris (2013) indicated that ‘social information processing speed’ 
underpinned emotion recognition from faces and voices. It is, therefore, tempting to 
conclude that it is a difficulty with processing the temporal aspects of facial expressions of 
emotion that is integral to understanding FER abilities in individuals with ASD. Lerner et 
al. (2013) found that children with ASD who were less accurate in a basic FER labelling 
task had slower N170 latency (the event-related potential response associated with face 
perception). However, this result has not always been replicated. For example, Gold et al 
(2013) found that adults with ASD were equally proficient at detecting facial expressions 
of emotions from static faces as compared to dynamic faces. Further to this, Enticott et al. 
(2014) argued against a ‘broad advantage of using dynamic faces’ after finding that adults 
with ASD had improved accuracy at labelling disgust and angry faces when stimuli were 
dynamic, as compared to static. Thus, taken together, the majority of evidence suggests 
that individuals with ASD are hindered in FER when stimuli are dynamic and arguably 
more ‘life-like,’ but further research is needed in order to convince all researchers in the 
field.  
1.4.2.2 Amplitude: Do ‘intense’ stimuli improve FER accuracy in individuals 
with ASD? 
Another component of FER that has been attributed to FER ability in individuals with ASD 
is intensity of the facial expression. For example, Law Smith, Montagne, Perrett, Gill, and 
Gallagher (2010) found that, for the emotions ‘surprise’ and ‘fear’, FER accuracy was 
directly linked to the intensity of the stimulus, where individuals with ASD were 
significantly less accurate than TD individuals at detecting fear and surprise when the 
stimuli were less intense. Similarly, G. L. Wallace et al. (2011) found that adolescents with 
ASD required more intense stimuli in order to accurately recognise basic facial expressions 
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of emotion. Tell, Davidson, and Camras (2014), on the other hand, indicated that intensity 
did not make a significant difference to FER accuracy. Thus, while few studies have 
assessed the contribution of intensity to FER ability, it is clear that mixed conclusions have 
arisen from the evidence presented in the literature thus far. 
1.4.2.3 Are difficulties with FER specific to the eye region? 
An atypicality in eye-contact is a behaviour that is indicative of the ASD diagnostic 
criterion ‘deficits in nonverbal communicative behaviors used for social interaction’ 
(DSM-5, 2013). In a lab setting, this atypicality has been ratified, with research indicating 
an avoidance of the eye region when viewing images of social scenes (Klin, Jones, Schultz, 
Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002) and faces (Joseph & Tanaka, 2003; Pelphrey et al., 2002). 
Research has reported that the avoidance of the eye region is also present when viewing 
facial expressions of emotion (Gross, 2008). Crawford, Moss, Anderson, Oliver, and 
McCleery (2015) conducted an experiment in which adults with ASD, adults with Fragile-
X syndrome (FXS; a genetic disorder similar in symptomology to ASD) and TD adults 
passively viewed images of neutral, happy and angry faces (note, there were always two 
faces on the screen and one of these was always neutral). They used eye tracking to gauge 
where the participants ‘spontaneously looked’, finding that the ASD and FXS participants 
were relatively similar to TD, but the FXS participants spent less time looking at the eyes. 
However, the extent to which this helps explain FER in individuals with ASD is still 
unclear. For example, the first study to assess the independent contribution of the eye and 
mouth regions to FER accuracy in individuals with ASD indicated that the whole face was 
more informative than the eyes or mouth alone for both ASD and TD groups (S. Baron-
Cohen et al., 1997). This was, however only the case for basic facial expressions of 
emotion, and S. Baron-Cohen et al. (1997) reported poorer FER in adults with ASD when 
participants were asked to label ‘complex’ facial expressions of emotions (for example 
‘admiration’ and ‘thoughtfulness’). Similarly, Rutherford and Towns (2008), found that 
both ASD and TD groups looked significantly longer at the eyes than the mouth when 
asked to label photographs of basic emotions (as measured by eye-tracking equipment), 
and neither overall ‘looking time at eyes’ nor ‘first fixation on the face’ was found to 
distinguish the groups. Nevertheless, they did report a significant lack of fixation on the 
eye area in individuals with ASD compared to the control group when viewing complex 
emotions. Peterson, Slaughter, and Brownell (2015) found, on the other hand, that children 
with ASD were significantly worse at basic and complex versions of the ‘Reading The 
Mind In The Eyes’ task (S. Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) 
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compared to TD children. Research has also assessed the relative contribution of the mouth 
region, hypothesizing that individuals with ASD will pay more attention to the mouth 
region in FER (Evers, Kerkhof, Steyaert, Noens, & Wagemans, 2014). Hence, despite 
there being some evidence that atypical use of the eye information influences FER 
abilities, this does not appear to be a core indicator of an FER difficulty. Hence, further 
research is needed to more accurately understand how information obtained from the eye 
regions of faces influences FER in individuals with ASD.  
1.4.2.4 Are difficulties with FER specific to certain emotions?  
The majority of studies in ASD FER have focussed on the so-called ‘basic’ emotions: 
happy, surprise, fear, disgust, anger and sadness (Ekman and Friesen, 1976). Overall, there 
is evidence to suggest that ‘happy’ is the emotion that individuals with ASD have least 
trouble with as compared to the other emotions. For example, Uljarevic and Hamilton’s 
2013 meta-analysis of 48 studies in ASD FER literature reported an overall negative effect 
size (i.e. the ASD group were less accurate than the TD group) for FER of surprise, fear 
disgust, anger and sadness but not happy. These overall findings have led some to propose 
that individuals with ASD have a general difficulty with negative emotions. However, 
there is mixed evidence as to whether FER ability is less accurate in individuals with ASD 
for specific emotions only. For example, research studies have indicated there may be a 
particular difficulty with fear (Corden, Chilvers, & Skuse, 2008; Humphreys, Minshew, 
Leonard, & Behrmann, 2007), disgust (S. Wallace, Coleman, & Bailey, 2008), sadness 
(Boraston, Blakemore, Chilvers, & Skuse, 2007), anger (Ashwin, Chapman, Colle, & 
Baron-Cohen, 2006) and surprise (Baroncohen, Spitz, & Cross, 1993). On the other hand, 
studies have also reported no difficulty with negative emotions (e.g Lacroix, Guidetti, 
Roge, and Reilly (2009) and Piggot et al. (2004)) and some have found differences 
between ASD and TD groups in FER of happy too (Philip, 2010, Humphreys et al 2007). 
Hence, evidence for particular emotions being disproportionately difficult for individuals 
with ASD is currently somewhat mixed. 
1.4.2.5 Conclusion about components of FER processing 
The research reviewed thus far suggests that, despite a wide range of research on FER in 
ASD, the specific cause of atypical FER in individuals with ASD, should it exist at all, 
remains unclear. It is notable from the research that, although individuals with ASD may 
perform in a similar manner to control individuals at recognising facial expressions from 
the 1-dimensional components of the face (i.e. the presentation of a full expression given in 
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a static photograph), greater difficulties appear to arise with other components of facial 
expressions, such as timing and intensity. Hence, these research findings give rise to a 
demand for a greater understanding about the multi-dimensional components of facial 
expressions and how these contribute to FER differences between ASD and TD 
populations. Despite this thirst for knowledge, and a mandate to assess these components 
of FER, few studies have extended methodological designs past 1-dimensional static 
photographs of facial expression and hence the methodology commonly used in this area 
of research has not yet caught up with the questions that are being asked (discussed further 
in section 1.4.4). Further to this, there are complications in this area of research that 
contribute to the complex findings reported in the literature, namely the heterogeneity 
within participants, which will now be discussed.  
1.4.3 Contribution of participant sample characteristics 
1.4.3.1 Are individual differences and ‘sub-groups’ overlooked in FER 
research in ASD? 
The studies described in section 1.4 have indicated that there are conflicting results in the 
FER ASD literature, however it could be argued that the majority of these papers describe 
results in terms of between group analyses only, neglecting the possibility of within group 
differences. As described in section 1.1, ASD is, by its very nature, a heterogeneous 
disorder and so it is likely that differences in FER could be apparent within a group of 
participants with ASD. The existence of sub-groups within participant samples of 
individuals with ASD could, therefore explain the conflicting findings present in the FER 
ASD literature because, by grouping all individuals with ASD together at analysis stage, 
findings may reflect broad differences compared to TD individuals in some cases and no 
difference in others. For example, Lerner et al. (2013) found an overall poorer FER 
accuracy in children with ASD (as compared to typical children) but typical FER accuracy 
in a subgroup of children with ASD. Back and Jordan (2014) argue for ‘individual 
differences’ as an important factor in FER in the typical population. Although this study 
does not relate specifically to individuals with ASD, results revealed large individual 
differences in labelling dynamic facial expressions of emotion. Hence, Back and Jordan 
(2014) provide a ‘cautionary note’ to researchers conducting studies in FER, advocating 
that individual differences may play a bigger role than is currently assumed in the FER 
literature. For example, individual differences in language ability, verbal IQ, intellectual 
ability, or perhaps the ‘severity’ of ASD characteristics themselves may play an important 
part in the ability to accurately recognise facial expression of emotion. There is however, a 
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need for more evidence to support this argument, which is compounded by limitations in 
terms of methodological possibilities (discussed further in section 1.4.4). These data 
provide useful insight into the contribution of individual differences in FER, which, despite 
being understudied, may be particularly important for accurate understanding of FER in 
ASD due to the heterogeneous nature of the condition. This argument is complicated by 
the fact that the majority of research in the field of FER in ASD samples only from 
individuals with average or above average IQ, a complication that is now discussed in 
more detail.  
1.4.3.2 Is FER linked to ‘severity’ of ASD symptoms? 
Research has suggested that scores on ASD diagnostic tests (such as the ADOS (Lord et 
al., 2000)) may predict outcomes on FER tasks, indicating that individuals who have 
higher levels of ASD symptoms (and hence have more profound difficulties and complex 
needs) are less accurate at FER. For example, Uono, Sato, and Toichi (2013) found a 
significant correlation between social dysfunction and FER ability in adults with ASD, as 
measured by accuracy scores of labelling photographs of facial expressions. However, this 
was only apparent for the expression of fear (not happy, surprise, disgust, anger or 
sadness). It is also evident here that there may be some circularity to the argument that 
social dysfunction level predicts FER ability, i.e. poor FER may also have a causal effect 
on social dysfunction level. This finding was also reflected in a study by Lerner et al. 
(2013), which assessed event-related potential (ERP) activity in children with ASD in 
relation to their ability to recognise facial expressions in a behavioural photo-labelling 
task. Results revealed that children with ASD made significantly more errors in FER, 
which correlated significantly with latency of the N170 ERP. However, they reported large 
variability within the ASD group in terms of their FER ability, indicating that the top 
quartile performed at least a standard deviation above the mean of the control group and 
the bottom quartile performed at least 3 standard deviations below the control mean. B. T. 
Williams and Gray (2013) reported that autism ‘severity’ (as assessed using the ADOS) 
was linked to the ability to recognise emotions in a basic FER labelling task. B. T. 
Williams and Gray (2013) did, however, find this connection only for expressions of anger 
and fear (not happy, surprise, disgust or sadness) and only in an emotion recognition task 
(no connection was found in an emotion matching task with the same children). Hence, the 
number of studies assessing individual differences is very small in the FER ASD literature 
and of those that assess it, results are somewhat divergent.  
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There are two factors which further compound the issues related to individual differences 
in FER ASD research: 1) very few studies report results on individuals with below-average 
IQ, learning disabilities or complex needs (Harms et al., 2010) and so there is a bias in the 
literature towards participants who have higher cognitive ability and 2) individuals with 
ASD with higher cognitive ability may process facial expressions of emotion in an atypical 
way but perform well in lab-based FER tasks because they have developed rule-based 
strategies to ‘work-out’ what the components of the face represent, for example ‘an 
upturned mouth = happy’ or ‘a downturned mouth = sad’ (Rutherford & McIntosh, 2007; 
Walsh, Vida, & Rutherford, 2014). In light of the points raised in this section, it could be 
argued that mixed findings emerge from this area of literature, which are further 
compounded by a biased sampling from individuals with ASD who have higher cognitive 
ability. This, in turn, is complicated by the potential use of rule-based strategies to decode 
emotions.  
1.4.3.3 FER in the typical population: the case for Alexithymia 
Alexithymia is a condition which was first described as a ‘relative constriction in 
emotional functioning, poverty of fantasy life and inability to find appropriate words to 
describe emotions’ (Sifneos, 1973). The term alexithymia derives from the Greek terms ‘a’ 
(meaning lack), ‘lexis’ (meaning word) and ‘thymos’ (meaning emotion; Taylor (1984)). 
Hence, alexithymic individuals are thought to “1) have a marked difficulty in expressing 
feelings in words and 2) not have fantasies appropriate to (or expressive of) feelings, their 
thought content being dominated by details of events in their external environment” 
(Nemiah, 1977). However, in more recent times, alexithymia is often simply referred to as 
‘emotion-blindness’, and as a ‘difficulty in identifying and understanding one’s own 
emotions and the emotions of others’ (Mateos, 1993). Although the aetiology of 
alexithymia was recognised prior to Sifenos 1973, it was not until it was given its title that 
it was recognized as a phenomenon in its own right. Alexithymia is a concept that has 
emerged from the field of health research, in particular somatoform disorders (for review 
see Koch et al. (2015)). Evidence suggests that alexithymia measures can be used as an 
indicator of mental ill health (Hartwig et al 2014) and has been noted to accurately assess 
general psychological distress disorder and not just alexithymia (Leising et al 2009). In 
addition to this, Dongues and Suslow (2017) revealed that there are deficits in the 
automatic processing of emotional stimuli in alexithymia at a behavioural and 
neurobiological level. Hence, alexithymia is a concept that has been established in several 
different disciplines and has weaved a narrative through medical, psychiatric, 
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psychosomatic and cognitive research domains (Zackheim, 2007). Because of this, much 
of the early research conducted on alexithymia approached the concept from a medical 
perspective, in particular in the context of psychosomatic medicine. Over the past 20 years, 
the assessment of alexithymia has expanded into several wider areas of research, especially 
clinical and experimental psychology.  
The first demographic assessment of Alexithymia was in Finland by Salminen (1999). 
Which has been reported as being stable across time (Hiirola et al 2017). Alexithymia is 
thought to be found in around 10% of the typical population (Salminen, Saarijarvi, Aarela, 
Toikka, & Kauhanen, 1999). It has been suggested that 50% of people with an ASD 
diagnosis have alexithymia (Berthoz & Hill, 2005). Despite this, there is limited 
experimental evidence about the contribution of Alexithymia to FER ability in individuals 
with ASD. Research has found that alexithymia is significantly higher in individuals who 
have difficulty attributing mental states to others (but not ASD per se; Moriguchi et al. 
(2006)). Alexithymia was first assessed in relation to emotion perception in individuals 
with ASD by E. Hill, Berthoz, and Frith (2004), who concluded that individuals with ASD 
had significantly higher alexithymia levels compared to TD, individuals assessed using the 
Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS; Bagby, Parker, and Taylor (1994)). 
Cook, Brewer, Shah, and Bird (2013) found that FER ability could be predicted by 
alexithymia score (using the TAS) over and above ASD severity, concluding that 
alexithymia, not ASD, is the source of FER difficulties. Further, Bird and Cook (2013) 
asserted that FER difficulty is not necessarily a symptom of ASD per se, but, since FER 
difficulty can be found in the typical population as alexithymia, the sub-group of 
individuals with ASD who have FER difficulty would be better defined as individuals with 
ASD and co-occurring alexithymia. This extends previous research that found that 
individuals with ASD are more likely to have alexithymia (Fitzgerald & Bellgrove, 2006). 
However, Nishimura et al. (2009) caution that the subjective difficulties with describing 
and identifying emotions are associated with empathetic and linguistic abilities; therefore 
using a self-report questionnaire (such as the TAS) to assess alexithymia requires 
particularly careful delivery and administration. Although Nishimura et al. (2009) do not 
identify ASD specifically in this cautionary note, it is apparent that the issues described 
would be applicable to individuals with ASD. 
Alexithymia, as assessed using the TAS-20 has been evaluated in many contexts. For 
example, scores of alexithymia have been subject to meta-analysis in the field of 
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depression (Li, B., Guo, & Zhang, 2015) post traumatic stress disorder (Frewen, Dozois, 
Neufeld, & Lanius, 2008) and criminal offenders (D. Jolliffe & Farrington, 2004). 
However, the efficacy of the TAS-20 as an alexithymia measure has not been assessed on 
this scale in individuals with ASD. There are also intrinsic issues with self-report and 
measuring alexithymia. In other words, the ability to accurately reflect on one’s own 
feelings and behaviours (as is necessary in order to complete the TAS-20), may be 
hampered by having the very traits that alexithymia is testing (i.e. issue with ‘describing 
feelings and emotions’, ‘identifying feelings and emotions’ and ‘externally-oriented 
thinking’). Therefore, the field of ASD moves forward tentatively with the measurement of 
alexithymia, and more research is needed in order to provide reliable evidence that 
alexithymia can be measured effectively in individuals with ASD. 
The contribution of alexithymia to better understand emotion perception in ASD is gaining 
traction (Ketelaars, In't Velt, Mol, Swaab, & van Rijn, 2016; Livingston & Livingston, 
2016; P. Shah, Hall, Catmur, & Bird, 2016), however, further evidence is needed to ratify 
the notion that FER may be a co-occurring condition to ASD in the form of alexithymia. 
1.4.4 Experimental methods used to assess FER in individuals 
with ASD 
The most enduring conceptualization of human perception of facial expressions of emotion 
comes from Ekman and Friesen (1978) who argue that there is a universal ‘language’ 
evoked by facial expressions of emotion that can be boiled down into six basic 
components: happy, surprise, fear, disgust, anger and sadness (Ekman, 1992). There are, 
however, several accounts of facial expression perception that do not agree with this 
theory, e.g. (Cohen, 2005; Jack et al., 2014; Jack et al., 2016). Within ASD research, the 
majority of emotion research is rooted in the theory proposed by Ekman and Friesen 
(1978) and hence, though this thesis is not directly testing the validity of Ekman and 
Friesen’s theory, the research methodologies described in the experimental chapters stem 
from the conceptualization of emotion based on Ekman and Friesen’s theory.  
Measuring the perception of emotions in individuals with ASD has, since the seminal 
research in this area, proven to be difficult e.g. Hobson (1991). These difficulties are often 
due to intrinsic factors related to ASD research (as discussed in section 1.1), such as 
limitations regarding methodological techniques when designing research studies that are 
appropriate to individuals with ASD that have complex needs or lower-than-average 
cognitive functioning.  
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There has been a demand within the literature for a development of more advanced, novel 
techniques in order to satisfy questions regarding inconclusive findings in the FER in ASD 
literature (Harms et al., 2010; Uljarevic & Hamilton, 2013), with a particular demand for 
rigorous, psychophysical methods to be utilised (Dakin & Frith, 2005; Simmons et al., 
2009). The majority of methods employed to assess FER in individuals with ASD use 
static photograph images of actors evoking high intensity (i.e. full-expression) emotions, 
most notably using the battery of images from P. Ekman and W. V.  Friesen (1976), 
schematic drawings, or cartoon representations of facial expressions. Some recent studies 
have taken a different approach. For example, a study by Eack, Mazefsky, and Minshew 
(2015) look at the precise confusions between facial expressions of emotion in ASD 
(although the stimuli were still static photographs), reporting that adults with ASD have 
most difficulty differentiating neutral expressions from emotional expressions at different 
intensity levels. Another study that pushed the boundaries of basic FER methodology was 
conducted by Evers, Steyaert, Noens, and Wagemans (2015). They assessed facial 
expression perception in ASD using stimuli that were not only high quality and dynamic, 
but that also varied in intensity (here they had ‘medium’ which was a morph from 0% 
emotion to 50% of the full emotion and ‘high’ which was a morph from 0% emotion to 
100% of the emotion). They also controlled for response bias, finding that there was a 
significant difference in emotion perception accuracy between children with ASD and 
children who were typically developed. Overall, advances in methodologies used in the 
field of FER in ASD research have largely been made by introducing either: 1) a timing 
component or 2) an intensity component. What remains difficult in this area of research is 
the trade-off between ‘life-like’ (and, hence, more ecologically valid) facial expressions 
and control over stimulus features. For example, videos of actors displaying facial 
expressions of emotion are very life-like insofar as they have high ecological validity for 
everyday life experiences; however, videos allow for very little manipulation of the stimuli 
and do not allow for sensitivity of measurement (participants can be measured only on a 
single response). Methods presented in this thesis introduce a novel technique for 
measuring FER (Yu, Garrod, & Schyns, 2012) and apply this to measuring FER in 
individuals with ASD.  
Despite a call for more rigorous psychophysical methods to be applied to FER ASD 
research (Dakin & Frith, 2005), few studies have employed these methods. There are 
intrinsic aspects of ASD research that limit the scope of these types of methods with a 
participant sample of individuals with ASD (such as level of ASD symptoms; discussed in 
section 1.2). Spezio, Adolphs, Hurley, and Piven (2007b) used a novel psychophysical 
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method called ‘bubbles’ (Gosselin & Schyns, 2001) to reveal information about eye 
movement patterns when participants with ASD look at faces. Adolphs, Spezio, Parlier, 
and Piven (2008) utilised a similar method to assess FER strategies in parents of children 
with ASD. Therefore, it is evident that novel techniques are required for better 
understanding of the complex findings currently presented in the FER ASD literature and 
although advances have been made, this area of research would benefit from further 
research utilizing novel methodologies.  
1.4.5 Summary of FER research 
Thus far, the research reviewed in section 1.4 highlights that there are conflicting 
evidence-based arguments as to whether individuals with ASD have atypical FER. 
Employing a multi-dimensional assessment of FER (e.g. looking at intensity and dynamics 
of realistic facial expressions) has provided a greater depth of evidence and greater detail 
about the atypicalities in FER in individuals with ASD. However, it is also apparent that a 
complex web of factors may impede this, such as heterogeneity of presentation of ASD, 
‘severity’ of ASD symptoms and alexithymia.  
1.5 Role of the ‘Autism Spectrum Quotient’ in FER ASD 
research 
Research has explored the scope of ASD heterogeneity, suggesting that ASD can also be 
considered in terms of a continuum between autism and typicality that extends beyond the 
boundaries of clinical diagnosis. In other words, individuals who do not have a clinical 
diagnosis of ASD may exhibit traits of autism-like cognitive style and behaviour. The idea 
of ASD as a continuum arose firstly from Wing (1988) and was later extended by S. 
Baron-Cohen (1997). To test the idea of an autism-trait continuum, the Autism-spectrum 
Quotient (often abbreviated to ‘AQ’) was developed by S. Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Skinner, et al. (2001). This is a measure that can be applied to any adult with average or 
above average IQ (i.e. no learning disability). The AQ is a fifty-item self-report 
questionnaire that probes information about the level of autism-like traits an individual has. 
Responses are given in terms of a four-point Likert scale (‘definitely agree’, ‘slightly 
agree’, ‘slightly disagree’ or ‘definitely disagree’). The questions target five subscales, 
which are thought to be characteristic of an ASD diagnosis: willingness of adequate social 
interaction and interest, degree of repetition, imagination, degree of empathy and attention 
to detail. S. Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al. (2001) claimed that, at the time the 
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study was conducted, 80% of people with an ASD diagnosis had a score of between 32 and 
50, whereas in a control group (typically developing) only 2% had a score this high.  
Some research has indicated comparable results between high AQ scorers and those with 
diagnosed ASD. Reed et al (2011), for example, found comparable results on the Navon 
letters task (Navon, 1977) and Grinter et al. (2009) reported that participants with high AQ 
scores performed similarly to individuals with ASD on an embedded figures task. 
Robertson and Simmons (2013) found that increased levels of sensory sensitivity 
correlated with increased AQ scores. In the context of facial expression perception, Poljac, 
Poljac, and Wagemans (2013) showed that FER accuracy is reduced in individuals with 
high AQ as opposed to individuals with low AQ scores. S. Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Skinner, et al. (2001) argue that the AQ is a valuable instrument for ‘rapidly quantifying’ 
where any given individual is situated from ‘autism to normality.’ Whilst there are other 
methods for quantifying autism-like trait levels such as the Social Responsiveness Scale 
(Constantino & Todd, 2003) and there have been strong criticisms of the use of AQ score 
as a proxy diagnosis (Gregory & Plaisted-Grant, 2013), it remains a commonly used and 
well-validated instrument for use with typical populations (Ruzich, Allison, Chakrabarti, et 
al., 2015; Ruzich, Allison, Smith, et al., 2015).  
1.6 Theoretical context 
Several theories have been established in an attempt to explain the cognitive mechanisms 
that underlie the ASD phenotype (Pellicano, 2011). The most prominent cognitive models 
of ASD are Theory of Mind (S. Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985), Executive 
Dysfunction (U. Frith, 1972) and Weak Central Coherence (Happe & Frith, 2006) as 
reviewed in Pellicano (2011) and Rajendran and Mitchell (2007). Additionally, ASD has 
been conceptualised using a ‘fractionated’ approach (Brunsdon and Happe, 2013) as well 
as the ‘Enactive Mind’ theory (Klin 2003), the Bayesian theory (Pellicano & Burr, 2012)  
and the ‘Social Motivation’ theory (Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012). 
Neural theories have also been presented such as the Amygdala theory (Schultz, 2005) and 
Neural Noise theory (Simmons, et al 2009). In relation to the research presented in this 
thesis, two cognitive theories are particularly relevant to FER: 1) Theory of Mind (Baron-
Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) 2) Weak Central Coherence (Happe & Frith, 2006). 
Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and to others 
(sometimes termed ‘mentalizing’ (Uta Frith, 2003)) and was first established in Dennett 
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(1978). Applied in an experimental format to children with ASD, S. Baron-Cohen et al. 
(1985) found that children with ASD were significantly less able in a task that involved 
attributing a mental state to another person (the ‘False Belief Task’) compared to TD 
children. Subsequent to this, many research studies have provided evidence to support this 
finding (see Tager-Flusberg, 2007 or Baron-Cohen et al 2000 for a review of this topic). 
However, although this theory is useful in explaining some aspects of ASD characteristics, 
it does not provide an exhaustive answer to the cognitive aspects of ASD (Pellicano, 2011). 
In terms of FER, ToM is informative because accuracy in social information processing 
requires an element of ‘reading’ another person’s mind. It could be argued that skills in 
ToM may be directly related to skills in FER, for example, individuals with ASD who have 
particularly good ToM skills compared to other individuals with ASD may be particularly 
good at FER. However, does FER really require effective skills in ‘metalizing’?. It could 
be argued that FER is a skill that can be improved via learning visual cues (e.g. (Golan et 
al., 2010) and hence FER difficulties may be a social-specific as opposed to facial-specific 
(Weigelt, Koldewyn, & Kanwisher, 2013). 
Central Coherence theory (CC), initially described as ‘Weak Central Coherence’ (WCC), 
refers to a specific cognitive ‘style’ used by individuals with ASD which favours thinking 
about things in the smallest possible parts as opposed to seeing the ‘bigger picture’ (Uta 
Frith, 1989; Happe & Frith, 2006). This theory was particularly useful in helping explain 
findings from visuo-spatial tasks in which children with ASD, were found to perform 
better than TD children in tasks which involved searching for embedded shapes within 
images (T. Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; A. Shah & Frith, 1983). Hence, the ‘weak’ 
aspect of WCC was used to explain visual processing in ASD as an impairment (or 
‘weakness’) in global processing of visual information (i.e. the ‘bigger picture’) which, in 
turn, causes a greater focus on smaller parts of the visual scene, and hence results in better 
performance in visual search tasks (Uta Frith, 1989; Happe & Frith, 2006; Pellicano, 
Gibson, Maybery, & Durkin, 2003; Pellicano, Gibson, Maybery, Durkin, & Badcock, 
2005). However, the idea that superior processing of small parts of a visual scene is due to 
a ‘weakness’ in processing the bigger picture has been challenged in favour of the idea that 
superior processing of small parts exists alongside intact processing of the whole scene, 
sometimes referred to as ‘Enhanced Perceptual Functioning (EPF; (Mottron, Burack, 
Iarocci, Belleville, and Enns (2003); (Mottron, Dawson, Soulieres, Hubert, & Burack, 
2006)). Hence, the term ‘Central Coherence’ has been adopted as a more fitting term to 
describe this theory (Chan & Naumer, 2014). Central Coherence theory suggests that it 
would be difficult for individuals with ASD to group ‘local’ features into meaningful 
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wholes. Consequently, it might be expected that judgements involving complex visual 
stimuli, like faces, may be compromised due to the necessity of grouping local features 
across space and time (Campatelli, Federico, Apicella, Sicca, & Muratori, 2013; Weigelt et 
al., 2012). In contrast to ToM, CC theory helps account for the visual aspect of FER, i.e. 
CC would explain FER improvements due to learning compensatory strategies via visual 
cues. CC does not, however, provide an all-encompassing account of FER because it does 
not explain convergent literature of FER ability in ASD. In other words, if the CC theory 
were correct, all individuals with ASD would have a clear FER impairment, even with 
static photographs of facial expressions, which is not the case (Harms et al., 2010). Hence, 
both of these prominent theories of cognition in ASD are useful in understanding FER in 
this population, however, neither provide a comprehensive account. The implications of 
the results presented in this thesis for theoretical approaches understanding ASD will be 
discussed further in Chapter 5.  
1.7 Aims of the thesis 
The aim of this thesis is to assess the extent to which FER is atypical in individuals with 
ASD as compared to TD individuals. This will be assessed in adults, children and in the 
typical population (measured using autism-like traits). A secondary aim of this thesis is to 
assess the contribution of alexithymia to FER. The research presented in this thesis is, 
primarily, exploratory in nature, however some more specific hypotheses are presented at 
the beginning of each experimental chapter.  
1.8 Overview of chapters 
In Chapter 2, a novel, psychophysics measure of FER is introduced. Then, results from a 
research experiment using this novel technique in adults with ASD is presented. The 
purpose of this study is to investigate the subtleties of FER that may have been overlooked 
in previous ASD research. Namely, this study assesses: individual differences in FER (as 
allowed by this particular method), the specific pattern of facial muscle components 
(action units) utilised from the stimuli, the intensity of stimuli favoured by individuals with 
ASD and the relative timing of the action units (AUs). The impact that these factors have 
on FER ability between ASD and TD groups is then discussed. 
Chapter 3 presents a novel technique, similar to that presented in Chapter 2, now applied to 
children with ASD in order to ascertain FER abilities from participants at a younger age as 
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compared to age and IQ matched controls. The aim of the study presented in this chapter is 
to model FER in children with ASD in detail, by assessing the use of AUs, intensity and 
timing of facial expression stimuli that were utilised to categorise emotions. The data 
presented in chapter 3 are critiqued in relation to current literature surrounding FER in 
ASD, as well as compared to results reported in Chapter 2.  
The aim of Chapter 4 is to assess FER in relation to alexithymia and autism-like 
personality traits in the typical population. This adds to the current debate in the literature 
that FER may be better defined in terms of co-occurring alexithymia (Bird & Cook, 2013). 
This also contributes to research assessing the extent to which FER atypicalities extend 
beyond clinically diagnosed ASD, into autism-like personality traits in the typical 
population.  
Chapter 5 brings the aforementioned chapters together, in an evaluation of the results in the 
context of previous research and theoretical conceptualizations of FER in ASD. The 
implications of these findings are then reviewed, followed by a discussion of the 
limitations of the research presented in this thesis and projections for future research.  
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Chapter 2 Facial Expression Recognition in 
Adults with ASD  
2.1 Introduction 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental disorder that is characterised 
by difficulties in social interaction and social communication (DSM-5, 2013). Because of 
these particular characteristics, researchers have been interested in how individuals with 
ASD perceive facial expressions of emotion. This interest is evident in the large number of 
research papers published on the topic, spanning over thirty years (Harms et al., 2010). 
Hence, because facial expressions are deemed intrinsic to effective and meaningful social 
communication, researchers have long hypothesised that difficulty reading and 
understanding another person’s facial expression may be integral to the social difficulties 
experienced by people with ASD. Alas, despite the logical and somewhat ‘common sense’ 
nature of this hypothesis, research evidence indicates an impairment in FER in individuals 
with ASD in some instances, and no impairment in FER others (Harms et al., 2010; Jemel 
et al., 2006; Simmons et al., 2009). Hence, this hypothesis may be a much more 
complicated story than first assumed. See section 1.4 for a full review of the FER literature 
in ASD.   
Researchers have suggested that, among other factors, limitations in the methods used to 
measure FER are likely to contribute to the confusing results in the ASD FER literature 
(Uljarevic & Hamilton, 2013). For example, many studies use static (photograph) images 
of facial expressions to measure FER in an ASD population. While static facial expression 
images serve well to assess a) the ability to recognise an emotion at its peak ‘amplitude’ 
(i.e. peak expression of the emotion) and b) the ability to recognise an emotion without the 
interference of timing, they do not allow for measurement beyond these boundaries. 
Having said this, there are discernible reasons for using these methodologies. Firstly, it is 
very difficult to assess ‘real life’ facial expression recognition in a quantitative manner and 
secondly, there are methodological difficulties which are incidental to conducting research 
with individuals with ASD (as discussed in Section 1.2). There is evidence, however, that 
measuring FER using dynamic stimuli (as apposed to unmodified, static images) reveals 
more pronounced FER difficulty in participants with ASD (Harms et al., 2010). For 
example, Sato et al. (2013) reported that individuals with ASD found slow presentations of 
the 6 basic emotions to be ‘natural’, whereas typically developed individuals found faster 
presentation of emotion stimuli to be ‘natural’. From this, they suggested that the dynamics 
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of facial expressions are important for accurate FER in ‘real life’ and hence, the lack of 
dynamic stimuli in the literature is partly to blame for the heterogeneous findings. Law 
Smith et al. (2010) found that when facial expression content was manipulated using a 
series of different morphs (i.e. stimuli were displayed from 0% to 20% emotion; 0% to 
30% emotion and so on until 0% to 100% emotion), participants with ASD were less 
accurate at labelling the emotions than TD individuals. This suggests that the emotional 
intensity of a facial expression may be an important predictor of FER ability in participants 
with ASD. Law Smith et al. (2010) did, however, find this difference only in surprise, 
disgust and anger, out of the 6 basic emotions. Enticott et al. (2014), on the other hand, 
argue against the idea that FER difficulties would become more distinct in individuals with 
ASD when presented with dynamic stimuli. Instead, they reported that accurate recognition 
of some emotions improved when the stimuli were dynamic as compared to static. Hence, 
the present study aims to address the contribution of dynamics, as well as the basic muscle 
components of the face, to FER ability in individuals with ASD. In addition to this, the 
contribution of factors such as amplitude and timing are assessed in order to ascertain if 
these components help to better explain FER in adults with ASD. 
Researchers have also suggested that poorer FER ability in individuals with ASD can be 
explained by a particular difficulty with the eye region of the face (Simmons et al., 2009). 
For example, studies have suggested that individual with ASD find it difficult to accurately 
categorise facial expressions when the eye region only is presented (S. Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001; S. Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). However, a study by Leung, 
Ordqvist, Falkmer, Parsons, and Falkmer (2013) found that adults with ASD used the eye 
information just as much as the typical adults when asked to work out the correct facial 
expression based on stimuli that depicted fragments of the face. Hence, there is still 
confusion about whether perception of specific parts of the face influences FER ability in 
individuals with ASD and so the present study assesses the relative contribution of the eye 
and mouth regions.  
In addition to methodological limitations, the heterogeneity of research findings in FER in 
ASD research has also been explained by the inconsistency of individual participant 
variables. For example, variables which have been indicated as contributing to FER ability 
include levels of autism-severity (B. T. Williams & Gray, 2013), levels of autism-like traits 
(Poljac et al., 2013) and alexithymia, a condition of ‘emotion-blindness’, which effects 
typically developing individuals as well as those with ASD (Bird & Cook, 2013; Cook et 
al., 2013). Therefore this study sought to be mindful of individual differences within ASD 
  
27 
27 
and TD groups when assessing FER ability by examining data not only at a group level but 
also at an individual level.  
This study utilises dynamic stimuli that can be manipulated on several levels: specific 
muscles of the face, amplitude and timing. Because of this, a rich tapestry of data is formed 
for each individual, providing a complex and comprehensive portrait of the action units 
(AUs; i.e. the muscle movements on the face), the amplitude and the timing components 
that are meaningful to each participant, represented in an individual ‘model’. Hence, the 
major aim of this study was to apply this novel technique in order to assess FER ability in 
adults with ASD. Although this study is therefore somewhat exploratory in nature, the 
following hypotheses can be drawn from the literature: 1. The pattern of AUs in the ASD 
models will be atypical compared to the TD group. 2. The amplitude of the AUs will be 
higher in the ASD group 3. The timing of the AUs will be atypical in the ASD group and 
4. The ASD group will use information from the mouth area of the face in favour of 
information from the eyes. 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Instruments for characterising participants 
2.2.1.1 Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) 
The Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ; S. Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al. 
(2001)) is a 50-item, self-report questionnaire that probes information about the level of 
autism-like traits an individual has. Questions in the AQ target five subscales, which are 
thought to be characteristic of an ASD diagnosis: 1) social skills 2) attention switching 3) 
attention to detail 4) communication and 5) imagination. Responses are given in terms of a 
four-point Likert scale (‘definitely agree’, ‘slightly agree’, ‘slightly disagree’ or ‘definitely 
disagree’) to statements which target the above 5 ASD characteristics. For example, 
statements include: “I enjoy social chit-chat.” (social skills; reverse score), “I usually 
notice car number plates or similar strings of information” (attention to detail; regular 
score), “When I’m reading a story, I can easily imagine what the characters might look 
like.” (imagination, reverse score). A response of ‘definitely agree’ or ‘slightly agree’ was 
scored as a ‘1’ and ‘slightly disagree’ or ‘definitely disagree’ as a ‘0’, and the opposite for 
reverse scored items. A total score on the AQ consists of a sum of all 50 items (i.e. with 
some questions reversed scored), hence, higher scores indicate higher levels of autism-like 
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traits. This follows the typical scoring technique for this questionnaire (S. Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001).  
2.2.1.2 The twenty-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) 
The 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; (Bagby, Parker, et al., 1994; Bagby, 
Taylor, & Parker, 1994)) is a self-report questionnaire that investigates an individual’s 
ability to understand their own, and other people’s emotions. Having alexithymia is 
sometimes referred to colloquially as having ‘emotion–blindness’. The TAS-20 has 3 
subscales: ‘describing feelings and emotions’, ‘identifying feelings and emotions’ and 
‘externally-oriented thinking’. Items are statements regarding the above 3 subscales, for 
example “I am able to describe my feelings easily” (describing feelings and emotions, 
reverse score), “When I am upset, I don’t know if I am sad, frightened, or angry” 
(identifying feelings and emotions, regular score), “Looking for hidden meanings in 
movies or plays distracts from their enjoyment.” (externally-oriented thinking, regular 
score). Participants responded to the statements using a 5-point Likert scale: 1 = ‘Strongly 
Disagree’, 2 = ‘Disagree’, 3 = ‘Neither Disagree or Agree,’ 4 = ‘Agree’ and 5 = ‘Strongly 
Agree’. For each participant all 20 items are summed (note, 5 items are reverse scored in 
which their responses are scored as follows: ‘Strongly Disagree’ = 5, ‘Disagree’ = 4, 
‘Agree’ = 2 and ‘Strongly Agree’ = 1). The sum of the items indicates the participant’s 
total TAS score, and therefore, higher TAS scores indicate higher levels of alexithymia.! 
2.2.2 Participants 
Eleven adults with ASD and eleven typically developed adults participated in the study. 
Participants were recruited through the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) and 
the University of Glasgow. Eleven adults with ASD and seven TD adults were recruited at 
Caltech: the remainder of the TD adults (n = 4) were recruited at the University of 
Glasgow (see limitation section for discussion of this recruitment technique). Typically 
developed participants were matched on age, verbal IQ (VIQ), performance IQ (PIQ) and 
full-scale IQ (FSIQ) at a group level (see section Error! Reference source not found.). 
All participants in the study were educated to a high school or greater level. Participants 
with ASD underwent ADOS-II (Module IV) and MINI (Mini-International 
Neuropsychiatric Interview) administration from a trained practitioner at California 
Institute of Technology. Only individuals who met diagnostic threshold in ADOS-II and 
MINI were admitted to the experiment. Participants were also administered the WASI 
(Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence), AQ (Autism Quotient Test; S. Baron-Cohen, 
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Wheelwright, Skinner, et al. (2001) and TAS-20 (Toronto Alexithymia Scale- 20; Bagby, 
Taylor, et al. (1994). In order to take part in the study all participants were also required to 
have normal or corrected-to-normal vision. This was self-reported at the stage of signing 
up for the experiment.  Participants were compensated for their participation at the rate of 
£6 per hour in UK and $20 per hour in USA. These payment levels reflect the standard 
participant payment for their respective institutions. All participants gave written, informed 
consent to participate and the study met ethical approval at both the University of Glasgow 
and the California Institute of Technology.  
2.2.2.1 Demographics and descriptive Information 
Demographic and descriptive information for all participants can be found in Table 2-1, 
Table 2-2 and Table 2-3. Independent samples t-tests indicated no significant difference 
between the two groups in age (t(20) = 0.37, p = 0.71), verbal IQ (VIQ; t(20) = 0.44, p = 
0.67), performance IQ (PIQ; t(20) = 0.75, p = 0.46) and full-scale IQ (FSIQ; t(20) = 0.98, p 
= 0.34). The ASD group was found to be significantly different from the TD group on AQ 
score (t(20) = 6.25, p < 0.01) and also on TAS-20 score (t(20) =  2.97, p < 0.01). Due to 
tight restrictions on matching IQ and age, difficulties were met when trying to meet the 
high number of male ASD participants. Hence, slight differences are found in gender ratio 
between groups. Gender ratio was, however, not significantly different between the groups 
X2 (1, N = 22)  = 0.78, p = 0.62.  
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Table 2-1 Demographics of ASD and TD participants (n = 22)  *p < 0.01 
 
ASD (n = 11)   TD (n = 11)  
 
 
Count Percentage 
 
  Count Percentage 
 
  
 
Gender 8 male 73%    6 male 55%     
 3 female 27%    5 female 45%    X
2 (1, N = 22)  = 0.78, p = 0.62 
            
 Mean SD Range   Mean SD Range   T-test 
Age (years: months) 31.5 12.4 20-60   33.4 10.4 20 - 53   t(20) = 0.37, p = 0.71 
Verbal IQ 102.6 22.7 50-131   106.0 11.5 85-119   t (20) = 0.44, p =  0.67 
Performance IQ 110.9 11.3 99-128   114.4 10.4 102-133   t(20) = 0.75, p = 0.46 
Full Scale IQ 108.5 13.7 91-126   111.5 8.1 97-122   t(20) = 0.98, p = 0.34 
AQ 29.0 7 17-38   13.3 4.5 4 - 19   t (20) = 6.25, p < 0.01 
TAS-20 55 8.2 44 - 63   45 6.5 36 - 56   t(20) = 2.97, p < 0.01 
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Note, the AQ is a measure of autism-like traits where higher scores indicate higher levels 
of traits. Scores on the AQ can be between 0 and 50, where scores over 32 have been 
suggested to be a useful cut-off point, at which a clinical diagnosis of ASD is likely (S. 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001). The TAS is scored between 20 and 100, 
where low scores indicate low levels of alexithymia and high score indicate high levels of 
alexithymia. According to Bagby, et al., (1994) a score on the TAS-20 that is equal to or 
less than 51 indicates ‘no alexithymia’, 52 to 60 indicates ‘possible alexithymia’ and 
scores equal to or greater than 61 indicates ‘alexithymia’. 
Table 2-2 Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (2nd Edition) Score for ASD Participants 
 
Module 
ADOS 
A 
 ADOS 
B 
ADOS 
C 
ADOS 
D 
ADOS 
Total 
ASD 1 4 3 6 0 1 14 
ASD 2 4 2 6 1 4 17 
ASD 3 4 4 11 2 0 21 
ASD 4 4 2 7 0 2 15 
ASD 5 4 5 11 0 1 21 
ASD 6 4 4 9 1 0 18 
ASD 7 4 6 11 1 0 22 
ASD 8 4 7 13 1 3 28 
ASD 9 4 7 14 1 3 29 
ASD 10 4 5 10 2 0 21 
ASD 11 4 3 7 1 0 15 
 
Note, here that ‘module 4’ of the ADOS-2 is specifically designed for adults or adolescents 
that have fluent speech. ADOS A refers to scores on ‘Communication’ subset, ADOS B 
‘Reciprocal Social Interaction’ subset, ADOS C ‘Imagination and Creativity’ and ADOS D 
‘Stereotyped Behaviours and Restricted Interests’. All eleven participants who were 
assessed on the ADOS-2 met cut-off criteria for an autism spectrum classification.  
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Table 2-3 Autism Spectrum Quotient Score (AQ) and Toronto Alexithymia Scale Score (TAS) 
 
AQ score TAS score TAS Cut-Off 
ASD 1 29 52 Possible Alexithymia 
ASD 2 20 70 Alexithymia 
ASD 3 31 60 Possible Alexithymia 
ASD 4 37 63 Alexithymia 
ASD 5 17 46 No Alexithymia 
ASD 6 34 58 Possible Alexithymia 
ASD 7 30 57 Possible Alexithymia 
ASD 8 21 46 No Alexithymia 
ASD 9 28 48 No Alexithymia 
ASD 10 38 44 No Alexithymia 
ASD 11 34 55 Possible Alexithymia 
        
TD 1 14 56 Possible Alexithymia 
TD 2 11 55 Possible Alexithymia 
TD 3 9 50 No Alexithymia 
TD 4 16 48 No Alexithymia 
TD 5 18 45 No Alexithymia 
TD 6 14 44 No Alexithymia 
TD 7 10 38 No Alexithymia 
TD 8 18 42 No Alexithymia 
TD 9 19 41 No Alexithymia 
TD 10 13 41 No Alexithymia 
TD 11 4 36 No Alexithymia 
 
2.2.3 Stimulus generation 
Stimuli used in this study were developed by Yu, Garrod and Schyns (2012) following 
several steps: 
2.2.3.1 Facial Action Unit Coding System (FACS)  
Firstly, four actors who were trained in the Facial Action Unit Coding System (FACS; 
Ekman and Friesen (1978)) were recruited to pose as ‘actors’ for the development of the 
stimuli. FACS is a taxonomy of the muscle groups found in the face that create facial 
movements. These muscle groups are defined as ‘action units’ (AUs). For example, AU 12 
codes for the muscle group ‘zygomaticus major’, which is defined as ‘lip corner puller’ in 
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FACS and appears as a smile. Likewise, AU 2L codes for activation of left ‘frontalis, pars 
lateralis’, which is defined as ‘left outer brow raiser’ in FACS and appears as the lifting of 
the left eyebrow. FACS consists of approximately 40 AUs along with several non-facial 
movements such as eye and head movements. Actors trained in FACS movements had 
undergone training to enable them to move each AU on their face (as specified in FACS) 
independently. The four actors were recorded making each AU movement in a 4D stereo 
imaging system (DI4D Facial Motion Capture System; Dimensional Imaging Limited, 
Glasgow) located in the Institute of Neuroscience at University of Glasgow. The 4D stereo 
imaging system captured videos of actors making facial movements in a 3-dimensional 
space (the term ‘4D’ here indicates a 3D image across time). Hence, each AU created on 
the actor’s face was recorded as a motion 3D picture. This resulted in four templates of all 
FACS AUs in 4D format. These templates were averaged to form one ‘basic’ template of 
the FACS AUs, thus providing a model for all the muscle groups that can be active in the 
face for any given facial expression of emotion. Stimuli used in this study were developed 
by the Schyns laboratory (Yu et al., 2012) and adapted for use in the current study.  
2.2.3.2 Synthesis of facial expression stimuli 
The basic template produced from the actor data (described above) was then applied to 
other faces captured in the 4D stereo imaging system. The actor template provided a 4D 
map of AUs in the face, consequently any face that was captured in the 4D stereo imaging 
system could be manipulated using this map. For example, if an individual has their face 
captured in the 4D stereo imaging system, although the resulting image is of their neutral 
face, the image can be manipulated to produce any of the FACS AUs and any combination 
of these AUs. In addition to this, the timing and intensity of the combination of AUs that 
are produced in the image can also be varied across seven parameters: action unit, peak 
amplitude, peak latency, onset latency, offset latency, acceleration, deceleration. 
Therefore, this stimulus generation technique is unparalleled in the control that can be 
exerted over the resultant stimulus. 
2.2.3.3 Generating random facial expressions  
For the purposes of this experiment random facial expression stimuli were used.  Figure 2–
1 illustrates the generation of a single stimulus, where a combination of AUs (in this 
example AU 9, AU 10L and AU 17), each with their own timing and intensity trajectory, 
were combined to create a single, ‘random’, facial expression. A dynamic figure of how 
the stimuli are generated can be found in Appendix 1. The resulting facial expression that 
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is created is essentially ‘random’ in that it combines an arbitrary set of AUs and 
timing/intensity parameters, however a ‘Generative Face Grammar’ (GFG) was applied in 
order to avoid producing facial expressions that do not ‘make sense’. The GFG is an 
established concept (Edelman, 2003) but was applied to the generation of these stimuli by 
Yu et al. (2012) and serves to ensure that the stimuli that were generated were constrained 
in such a way that they produced only physiologically plausible facial expressions. In the 
present study, 2400 different, random facial expressions, produced across 25 male and 25 
female western Caucasian facial identities, were used. These same stimuli have been used 
in previous experiments such as Jack, Garrod, Yu, Caldara, and Schyns (2012), Jack, 
Caldara, et al. (2012a), Jack et al. (2014), Gill, Garrod, Jack, and Schyns (2014), Richoz, 
Jack, Garrod, Schyns, and Caldara (2015). 
 
Figure 2–1. Random facial expression synthesis. Figure taken from Yu, Garrod and Schyns 
(2012) p153.  
2.2.4 Procedure 
A total of 52,800 stimuli were categorised into emotion (happy, surprise, fear, disgust, 
anger, sadness, other) and intensity (very strong, strong, medium, weak, very weak) by 22 
participants (11 ASD; 11TD). A step-by- step run through of the experiment is described 
below:  
Step 1. Participants were briefed about the experiment and asked to complete a consent 
form. They logged into the experiment with help from the lab assistant and viewed the 
following instructions. Please note, these instructions were given in addition to an 
information sheet and verbal direction from the experimenter.   
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1. Watch the facial animation – it will only be played once. 
2. Select the emotion you think the facial animation represents- choices are happy, 
surprise, fear, disgust, anger, sadness or other. 
PLEASE NOTE: It is important that you are confident with your answer: If you think the 
face contains no emotion or you cannot accurately describe the facial animation using the 
available options, please click ‘other’. 
 
PLEASE NOTE: there is no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answer- we are interested in your personal 
opinion about the facial animation 
3. Rate the intensity of the emotion you are seeing from very strong to very weak 
by selecting the desired option with the mouse. 
DO NOT listen to music during the experiment or distract yourself in any other way. 
DO NOT alter the equipment 
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to ask the experimenter. 
 
Figure 2–2. Online instructions at the beginning of the experiment. Please note these 
instructions were given in addition to an information sheet and verbal direction from the 
experimenter.  
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Step 2. Participants viewed 2400 randomised stimuli each, separated over 4-6 different 
sessions. Stimuli were presented on a computer monitor at a viewing distance of 60cm. 
Participants were given instructions to sit still during testing. Although no head restraint or 
chin-rest was used, participants were instructed not to move their head during testing. Each 
stimulus video was displayed in the central viewing field for 1.25 seconds and remained on 
screen until the observer responded. Response options appeared on the right hand side of 
the screen after the stimulus video finished playing. After 50 trials participants were 
offered a break and were reminded of the task instructions upon beginning the next set of 
stimuli. Participants completed the first session (around 600 trials) in the lab and the rest of 
the sessions were completed at home. Participants were given full instructions on how to 
conduct the experiment at home. This included set up instructions (including strict 
instructions for viewing the experiment at home, as described above) and contact 
information for the experimenters i.e. Caltech lab assistant (Catherine Holcomb) and 
University of Glasgow researcher (Kirsty Ainsworth). The experimenters were on-hand via 
email to help the participant if they encountered any issues. All participants reported that 
they followed the instructions accurately and had encountered no problems with the 
experiment. The following screenshots depict a visualization of this step:  
 
Figure 2–3. Snapshot of dynamic stimulus as viewed by the participants, which was 
displayed in the central viewing field for 1.25 seconds (snapshot taken at the middle of the 
time course). Participants viewed the stimuli 60cm away from the screen. 
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Figure 2–4. Snapshot of the categorization options as viewed by the participant. The 
stimulus (neutral) stayed on the screen until the participant selected their option.  
 
Figure 2–5. Snapshot of the break instructions as viewed by the participant after periods of 
50 stimuli. 
Step 3.  On completion of the experiment participants were invited back into the lab where 
they were debriefed and paid for their time (£6/$20 per hour). Participants were given an 
opportunity to ask any questions about the experiment and they were thanked for their 
time.  
2.2.5 Analysis  
Reverse correlation analysis is a technique that reveals a precise ‘model’ of the information 
used to categorise the stimuli i.e. the signals within a stimulus which are considered most 
indicative of fitting a given categorization label. This technique was developed by 
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Ahumada and Lovell (1971) who investigated the acoustic properties of auditory stimuli 
by asking participants to categorise a 500-Hz signal tone bursts as either present or absent. 
Reverse correlation has been applied to various areas of low-level vision such as motion 
perception (Borghuis et al., 2003), surface recognition (Gosselin, Bacon, & Mamassian, 
2004) and depth perception (Neri, Parker, & Blakemore, 1999). The technique was first 
applied to face perception by Gosselin and Schyns (2001) using a stimulus classification 
task termed ‘bubbles’. In this task participants were presented with images of faces that 
were covered with a mask so that only partial areas of the image could be seen. The 
participants categorised two identities via thousands of images that showed only partial 
information. From this, reverse correlation analysis revealed which information was 
continually used (i.e. could be seen through the mask) to categorise each identity. 
Therefore, information that was useful for identity categorization was revealed for each 
participant. Reverse correlation has been applied to several subsequent vision tasks that 
have specifically assessed visual processing of facial expressions of emotion: Uddenberg 
and Shim (2015); Das et al. (2013); Ethier-Majcher, Joubert, and Gosselin (2013); 
Kontsevich and Tyler (2004) and facial expression perception in ASD (Adolphs et al., 
2005; Adolphs et al., 2008; Blais, Roy, Fiset, Arguin, & Gosselin, 2012; Song, Kawabe, 
Hakoda, & Du, 2012; Spezio, Adolphs, Hurley, & Piven, 2007a; Spezio et al., 2007b). A 
study using identical stimuli and a similar paradigm to the present study can be found in 
Jack, Garrod, et al. (2012).  
As depicted in Figure 2–6, the present study applied reverse correlation to the raw data. 
The raw data were the output from the categorization labels of emotion (happy, surprise, 
fear, disgust, anger, sadness, other) and intensity (very strong, strong, medium, weak, very 
weak) given to 2400 arbitrary stimuli per participant. A linear model (using linear multiple 
regression and Pearson’s correlation) was fitted to each AU parameter and to the intensity 
ratings for those trials. The end product is a template for each participant, which reflects 
the subjective diagnostic information used in their categorizations, termed hence forth as 
their personal ‘model’ of each emotion. For example, to gain a participant’s model for 
‘happy’, a Pearson’s correlation would be performed between the AUs that were ‘on’ in 
the stimuli viewed by the participant, and the stimuli that were categorised by that 
participant as ‘happy’, over all 2400 trials. Then, a regression would be performed between 
the other AU parameters (peak amplitude, peak latency, onset latency, offset latency, 
acceleration and deceleration) and emotional intensity rating for the trials where the AU 
was ‘on’ and the emotion was categorised as ‘happy’. This would reveal the spatial (action 
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units) and temporal components (starting/ending points and trajectory) of the stimuli, 
which, by their activation, led to each emotional response category.  
 
Figure 2–6. Experimental steps from stimuli generation to reverse correlation analysis 
(Image source: Yu, Garrod and Schyns, 2012, p. 154) 
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2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Response patterns 
In the first instance, the pattern of responses (i.e. button presses) for each group were 
assessed in order to establish an initial picture of group differences in the task. The 
distribution of responses was compared between ASD and TD groups to assess any 
indication of a preference for one particular emotion (see Figure 2–7) or for one particular 
intensity level (Figure 2–8). These figures indicate a preference in the ASD group to select 
‘other’ while the TD group are more evenly distributed across all emotion categories. The 
ASD group also indicated more ‘very strong’ and ‘very weak’ responses, while the TD 
group indicated more ‘medium’ responses. 
 
Figure 2–7 Distribution of responses (emotion button presses) to stimuli (2400 trials per 
participant) 
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Figure 2–8 Distribution of responses (intensity button presses) to stimuli (2400 trials per 
participant)  
In order to further assess statistical differences in the response patterns outlined above, the 
ASD and TD group data were compared using independent samples t-tests. To assess 
differences in emotion response, data were collapsed over intensity, i.e. responses were 
summed for each emotion regardless of responding using the ‘very high’, ‘high’, medium’, 
‘low’ or ‘very low’ response option (as depicted in Figure 2–7). Results revealed the ASD 
group responded ‘other’ significantly more compared to the TD group (t(20) = 3.3, p < 
0.01) and the TD group responded ‘surprise’ significantly more than the ASD group (t(20) 
=3.77, p < 0.01). However, no significant difference was found between groups for the 
remaining emotions: Happy (t (20) = 0.04, p = 0.97), Fear (t (20) = 0.40, p = 0.69), Disgust 
(t (20) = 1.31, p = 0.20), Anger (t (20) = 1.20, p = 0.24), Sadness (t (20) = 1.39, p = 0.18). 
Similarly, a between-groups analysis was conducted for intensity only (i.e. collapsing the 
data across emotions and hence using the frequency of each intensity category only (as 
depicted in Figure 2–8). No significant differences were found between groups in the 
categorization of intensity: V Strong (t (20) = 1.81, p = 0.09), Strong (t (20) = 0.02, p = 
0.99), Medium (t (20) = 1.35, p = 0.19), Weak t (20) = 0.12, p = 0.90) and Very Weak t 
(20) = 0.42, p = 0.67).  
To assess individual response patterns, and hence assess the dataset for ‘atypical’ response 
patterns, the distribution of button presses was examined per individual. As described in 
the methods procedure (section 2.2.4), each participant was required to categorise 2400 
facial stimuli using seven possible emotion labels (‘happy’, ‘surprise’, ‘fear’, ‘disgust’, 
‘anger’, ‘sadness’, ‘other’) and five possible intensity labels (‘very strong’, ‘strong’, 
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‘medium’, ‘weak’, ‘very weak’). Hence, figures depict the number of responses for each 
possible emotion response (from left to right: ‘happy’, ‘surprise’, ‘fear’, ‘disgust’, ‘anger’, 
‘sadness’, ‘other’) and each possible intensity response (from left to right: ‘very strong’, 
‘strong’, ‘medium’, ‘weak’, ‘very weak’). TD participants responded in an overall similar 
pattern, responding in a mostly even distribution of emotion and intensity (see Figure 2–9, 
Figure 2–10 and Figure 2–11). ASD participants, however, responded slightly more 
atypically, with some individuals showing greater bias to selecting ‘other’ (see Figure 2–
12, Figure 2–13 and Figure 2–14). Taken together, these data suggest that the ASD group 
(or at least a proportion of participants in this group) have responded to the stimuli in an 
atypical fashion. In addition to appearing to have the most atypical response patterns, ASD 
participants ‘8’ and ‘9’ also have the highest autism severity levels out of the ASD group 
(as shown in the ADOS scores in section 2.2.2.1).  
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Figure 2–9 TD Group Part 1: Frequency of stimuli responses per TD participant for emotion and intensity (2400 trials per participant). 
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Figure 2–10. TD Group Part 2: Frequency of stimuli responses per TD participant for emotion and intensity (2400 trials per participant). 
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Figure 2–11 TD Group Part 3: Frequency of stimuli responses per TD participant for emotion and intensity (2400 trials per participant). 
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Figure 2–12 ASD Group Part 1: Frequency of stimuli responses per ASD participant for emotion and intensity (2400 trials per participant). 
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Figure 2–13 ASD Group Part 2: Frequency of stimuli responses per ASD participant for emotion and intensity (2400 trials per participant). 
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Figure 2–14 ASD Group Part 3: Frequency of stimuli responses per ASD participant for emotion and intensity (2400 trials per participant). 
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2.3.2 Reverse correlation: modelling individual differences  
In order to obtain a detailed picture (‘model’) of emotion perception for each participant, 
the 2400 categorizations made by each participant were analysed using reverse correlation 
(as described in Section 2.2.5). Each model contains the AUs (Figure 2–15), and temporal 
parameters (Figure 2–16) that were associated with each participant’s responses to a 
significant level (p <= 0.05) and a separate model was produced for each emotion. Below 
is an example of the AUs that emerged in the reverse correlation process for one 
participant. Figure 2–17 depicts, for one participant with ASD (participant 11 (ID 2984)), 
the AUs that were indicated by the reverse correlation analysis (lighter blue indicating 
higher correlation coefficients), the AU that reached a correlation to a significant level (p 
<= 0.05) and also the AUs which are regarded as ‘core’ AUs for each emotion expression, 
as described in Ekman and Friesen (1977).  
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Figure 2–15 Action Unit numbers and their respective names 
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Figure 2–16 Six temporal parameters associated with each action unit 
  
  
52 
 
 
Figure 2–17 From left to right: 1) Single participant data (ASD participant 11 (ID 2984)) of 
AUs that emerge from the data (lighter blue indicates higher correlation coefficient (rho 
values), and hence lower p values) for all emotions (happy, surprise, fear, disgust, anger 
sadness) 2) This is the same as the image 1 but only the rho values that are significant are 
displayed (i.e. p <= 0.05) in red and 3) Action Units indicated as being ‘core’ action units 
from Ekman and Friesen 1978.  
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Dynamic models for each participant can be viewed in video format (see Appendix 2). A 
snapshot at the middle time point (0.75 seconds) of one participant can be seen in Figure 
2–18. This dynamic model allows the viewer a detailed view of the nuances of any one 
individual participant’s data. 
 
 
Figure 2–18 Example: ASD participant 11 (ID 2884)’s model at the midpoint of the dynamic 
videos at 3 intersections of intensity.  
2.3.2.1 Analysis of models: action units 
Group models, i.e. depicting the AUs and temporal dynamics as averaged for each group, 
can be seen in video format (see Appendix 3).  
In order to assess the differences between ASD and TD participants, contingent to the 
specific AUs (i.e. AUs identified as contributing to a significant level), individual models 
(as described in section 2.3.2) were compared between groups. Firstly, the AUs that were 
present in each individual’s model were compared group-wise using Hamming distance 
(Hamming, 1950). Hamming distance is a measure of difference between binary units, 
which is applicable to the AU data presented here because each AU, out of 42, is either 
‘on’ (1) or ‘off’ (0). Hence, a binary vector can be used to represent the AUs that reached 
significance for each model. For example, in the figure above (Figure 2–17) a depiction of 
the AUs that are ‘on’ for participant 11 can be seen. This figure could thus just as easily be 
Intensity 
Happy 
Surprise 
Fear 
Disgust 
Anger 
Sadness 
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depicted as a combination of ‘0’ values for (i.e. the blue boxes) and ‘1’ values (i.e. for the 
red boxes), where the ‘1’ values indicate each AU that was found to be ‘on’ to a significant 
level in the reverse correlation analysis. Hamming distance compares the ‘distance’ 
between two binary vectors by calculating the number of positions at which the vectors are 
different in its ‘1’ or ‘0’ content, divided by the total number of positions (i.e. the length of 
the vector). Hence, a hamming distance of ‘0.2’ between two binary vectors would indicate 
a difference in 20% of the binary pattern. In the current study the AUs for each model were 
depicted in a vector of 42 ‘1’s or ‘0’s. Hamming distance was used to measure the 
difference between pairs of models. Hamming distance for 66 model pairs (i.e. 11 
participants per group x 6 emotion categories), as shown in the dissimilarity matrix in 
Figure 2–19. Colder colours (e.g. dark blue) indicate high similarity between models (low 
hamming distance values) and hotter colours (e.g. dark red) indicate a larger difference 
between models (high hamming distance values). Hence, each small square indicates one 
individual model compared to another individual model and the larger squares indicate the 
overall similarity between the groups per emotion category. The dissimilarity matrix 
indicates that the two groups have similar AU composition in models for happy and 
surprise, relatively similar in models for disgust, and less similarity for the other 3 
emotions (fear, anger and sadness). The figure also suggests that there are 
overlaps/confusions between surprise, fear and sadness.  
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Figure 2–19 Dissimilarity matrix of hamming distance (i.e. percentage of binary values that 
differ) between ASD (n = 11) and TD (n = 11) for all 6 emotions. Cool colours (e.g. dark blue) 
indicate low hamming distance values and hot colours (e.g. dark red) indicate high 
hamming distance values.  
The above dissimilarity matrix suggests that group differences in AUs can be found 
between the ASD and TD groups for some emotions. However two questions remain 
unresolved: 1) Do the differences between ASD and TD groups meet statistical 
significance? 2) Are a number of ‘atypical’ individuals driving the group difference? (as 
suggested in Figure 2–9 and Figure 2–10).  
Between group analyses were conducted on the AUs from each group’s models in order to 
assess whether the ASD and TD groups were statistically different from each other. In 
order to do this, a quantitative measurement of how ‘typical’ the AUs were in each model 
was sought. Therefore, a dataset of 60 models per emotion that depicted ‘typical’ AU 
usage were introduced. This dataset was derived from a previous study by Jack, Caldara, et 
al. (2012b) in which models of emotion perception were derived from 15 participants using 
the same method and reverse correlation analysis procedure as described above. As these 
participants were self-reportedly ‘typical’, (i.e. they reported no clinical diagnoses) and 
previous research has demonstrated their success in an all-round representation of each of 
the basic 6 emotions, this group of models was used as a reference group upon which to 
compare ASD and TD groups. This reference group was made up of 15 Western Caucasian 
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adults (6 men and 9 women) with a mean age of 21.3 years (SD = 1.2 years). For full 
details of the study please see (Jack, Caldara, et al., 2012b)). The ‘atypicality’ of AUs used 
by each group was, therefore, defined by its closeness to the reference group (by means of 
Hamming distance). Likewise, Hamming distance was measured for each TD individual’s 
model to each individual in the reference group. Therefore, distance values represent a 
measure of ‘typicality’ for both the ASD and the TD group, and hence controlling for 
possibilities of atypicality in the TD group.  
 
Figure 2–20 Reference data (n = 15): comparison of models within group 
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Figure 2–21 Hamming distance between AU composition of models for the ASD group 
compared to reference dataset 
 
Figure 2–22 Hamming distance between AU composition of models for the TD group 
compared to reference dataset 
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Figure 2–24 and Figure 2–26 suggest that, when compared to an independent reference 
dataset, the AUs of the ASD models are no more ‘atypical’ than the TD group. This 
finding is further ratified by a t-test, which compared the mean distance of each emotion in 
which no significant differences were found between ASD and TD groups in their mean 
distance values as compared to the reference group: 
Happy: t(20) = 0.02, p = 0.98 
Surprise: t(20) = 0.52, p = 0.61 
Fear: t(20) = - 0.09, p = 0.93 
Disgust: t(20) = 0.06, p = 0.95 
Anger: t(20) = 1.80, p = 0.09 
Sadness: t(20) = 0.46, p = 0.65 
It could be suggested that there may be some individuals who, when isolated, show 
themselves as being ‘atypical’ - a finding which may have previously been overlooked 
when analysing the data at group level. The mean, upper and lower quartiles, and the range 
of hamming distance values, for each individual, are displayed for the ASD group (Figure 
2–23) and for the TD group (Figure 2–24). These figures suggest that both the ASD and 
TD groups contain ‘atypical’ individuals who do not follow suit with the rest of the group 
(e.g. participant number 9 in the ASD group and participant number 9 in the TD group). 
Again, ASD participant number ‘9’ also has the highest autism severity level out of the 
ASD group (as shown in the ADOS scores in section 2.2.2.1). Participant ‘9’ in the TD 
group has the highest level of autism-like traits out of the TD group (as shown in in the AQ 
scores in section 2.2.2.1).  
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Figure 2–23. ASD vs. template hamming distance per individual means and variance 
 
Figure 2–24. TD vs. template hamming distance per individual means and variance 
Further to this, in order to assess within-group differences in ‘atypicality’, mean, upper and 
lower quartiles, and the range of hamming distance values for each emotion are displayed 
in Figure 2–25 and Figure 2–26. These figures indicate that both the ASD and TD group 
are consistently less like the reference data for fear, disgust, anger and sadness as 
suggested in the analyses described above. Hence, this suggests that both groups have a 
more disjointed categorization of the ‘negative’ emotions (fear, disgust, anger and sadness) 
compared to the emotions that are often described as the ‘happy’ emotions of the six 
(happy and surprise).  
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Figure 2–25. ASD vs. template hamming per emotion distance means and variance 
 
Figure 2–26 TD vs. template hamming distance per emotion means and variance 
 
2.3.2.2 Within groups analysis of models: action units 
As of yet, the data have not revealed whether the ASD group’s models contained AU 
patterns that were consistent with each other. This analysis was considered important 
because heterogeneity within the ASD group was highlighted in the way in which some 
participants responded to the stimuli (i.e. atypical categorisations seen in Figure 2–9 and 
Figure 2–10). Hence, in addition to the analyses described thus far, within-group 
differences were also assessed by obtaining Hamming distance values for each model, 
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compared to each other model within one group. To do this, Hamming distance was 
measured for each ASD pair of models in the ASD group (66 comparisons: 11 participants 
x 6 emotions) and the same analysis was carried out for the TD group. 
 
Figure 2–27 Within-group comparison of AU composition of models using Hamming 
distance 
  
 
Figure 2–28 Within-group comparison of AU composition of models using Hamming 
distance 
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The dissimilarity matrices in Figure 2–27 and Figure 2–28 suggest that the ASD group 
were more inconsistent with each other (more blue colour across the figure indicating less 
distance between the models of different emotions and hence more ‘confusion’ between 
emotions). In particular, the ASD group appear to confuse disgust and anger and do not 
appear to have distinct classifications for fear or sadness (indicated by a lack of defined 
blue box that would be expected along the middle diagonal line of the figure). The TD 
group, on the other hand, appear to be more consistent with each other, as indicated by the 
more distinct blue boxes across the diagonal and clear red colouration throughout the rest 
of the figure. However, it is apparent that the TD group are still relatively dissimilar for 
anger, which, in the above figure, is indicated by Hamming distance values in the middle 
of the scale (around 0.3) in contrast to very low hamming distance values for the other 
emotions (around 0.1). In order to ascertain if these data indicated that the TD group were 
significantly more consistent with each other, a two-way ANOVA was applied to the data. 
Results revealed that the variance in distance values could not be accounted for by group 
(F (1,120) = 0.28, p = 0.60) however, the variance could be accounted for by emotion (F 
(5,120) = 16.33, p < 0.01). Variance was not, however driven by an interaction between 
group and emotion (F (6,120) = 1.1, p = 0.36).  
2.3.2.3 Analysis of models: amplitude  
The data were then analysed for differences in ‘amplitude’ of the models (i.e. how strong 
an AU was depicted in the models). A measure of amplitude of the models was established 
by obtaining, for each AU that was ‘on’ (i.e. was present in the model to a significant 
level), the peak amplitude of the AU. Amplitude values were, therefore a value between 0 
and 1, where 0 indicates ‘off’ and 1 indicates maximum amplitude. Figure 2–29 and Figure 
2–30 provide a multiple distribution visualisation (violin plot) of the peak amplitude values 
for each group. For example, Figure 2–29 displays the mean (red cross), the median (green 
box) and the distribution (black opaque section) of values across the whole TD group. 
Figure 2–29 indicates that the mean amplitude values for the TD group are relatively 
similar across all six emotions. The distribution of values is also relatively equal across the 
emotions for the TD group. For the ASD group, Figure 2–30 suggests relatively equal 
mean intensity levels, however surprise displays a long tail relative to the other emotions, 
suggesting that a small subset of models within the ASD group had low intensity values for 
surprise. In general, the violin plots presented in Figure 2–29 and Figure 2–30 indicate that 
the ASD group has a relatively wider distribution of values compared to the TD group.  
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In order to assess the hypothesis that ASD models would have higher intensity values a 2 x 
2 ANOVA was conducted between the groups. Two-way ANOVA revealed that the 
variance in amplitude of the models was not due to group (F(1, 125) = 0.35, p = 0.55), nor 
emotion (F(5, 125) = 0.85, p = 0.51).  
 
Figure 2–29 Multiple distribution plot denoting mean (red cross), median (green box) and 
distribution of intensity values of TD models 
 
Figure 2–30 Multiple distribution plot denoting mean (red cross), median (green box) and 
distribution of intensity values of ASD models 
As it has been suggested that group differences between ASD and TD participants may be 
found between the eye and mouth regions of the models, a further analysis was conducted, 
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isolating AUs associated with the eye and mouth only. The specific AUs that were deemed 
‘eye AUs’ and ‘mouth AUs’ were as follows: 
Eye AUs (Total = 10): 
Inner Brow Raiser 
Inner and Outer Brow Raiser 
Outer Brow Raiser 
Brow Lowerer  
Upper Lid Raiser 
Eye Lid Tightener Left 
Eye Lid Tightener right 
Eye Lid Drop  
Eye Slit  
Eyes Closed 
 
Mouth AUs (Total = 25): 
Cheek Raiser 
Cheek Raiser Left 
Cheek Raiser Right 
Lip Corner Puller and Cheek Raiser 
Upper Lip Raiser Open  
Upper Lip Raiser Open Left 
Upper Lip Raiser Open Right 
Lip Corner Puller 
Lip Corner Puller -Lips Part  
Cheek Puffer 
Dimpler  
Dimpler Left  
Dimpler Right 
Lip Corner Depressor  
Lower Lip Depressor Lips Open  
Chin Raiser  
Lip Stretch  
Lip Stretch Left 
Lip Stretch Right 
Lip Funneler 
Lip Tightener  
Lip Pressor 
Lips Part 
Jaw Drop 
Mouth Stretch 
 
First, multiple distribution plots were created in order to visualize the variance of the 
intensity values across participant group and emotions for the eye AUs. Figure 2–31 
displays the distribution of intensity values within the TD group for each emotion. The 
figure indicates that the TD group was relatively consistent across emotions. Happy had 
the lowest mean intensity value (red cross) however a small cluster of low values within 
this emotion may have influenced this. Similarly, small clusters are found for disgust, 
however the higher intensity cluster is relatively small. Figure 2–32 indicates that, despite 
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relatively similar means, the ASD group were slightly more variable across emotions 
compared to the TD group. For example, for the emotion anger, the ASD group appear to 
have a wide distribution of intensity scores. Note that for disgust, no intensity scores are 
shown because no eye AUs were ‘on’ to a significant level in the eye region in disgust for 
the ASD group.  
 
Figure 2–31 Intensity values of TD models for eye AUs only 
 
Figure 2–32 Intensity values of ASD models for eye AUs only  
A 2-way ANOVA was performed on the peak amplitude of the eye AUs. This ANOVA 
allowed for unbalanced data because some AUs were not ‘on’ for the eye region (for 
example in disgust for the ASD group). As expected from the visualizations show in the 
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violin plots, results revealed no significant difference for the main effect of group F(1, 88) 
= 0.44, p = 0.51, and no significant difference for the main effect of emotion F(5, 88) = 
1.46, p = 0.21.  
The mouth area was assessed using the same analysis steps as the previous analysis on eye 
AUs. Distribution plots (Figure 2–33 and Figure 2–34) display the mean (red cross), 
median (green square) and distribution (black section) of the mouth AUs for each group’s 
models. Overall, the means of each group are relatively similar, slight variations in 
distribution of values can be seen, for example, the ASD group appear to have slightly 
larger distribution of values across all emotions except happy. Also, a somewhat wider 
distribution of intensity values can be seen for surprise in the ASD group as compared to 
the TD group. Again, an unbalanced 2-way ANOVA was applied to these data in order to 
account for unequal vector lengths due to any AUs that were not ‘on’. Results revealed that 
there was no significant difference for the main effect of group F(1, 122) = 0.05, p = 0.83 
and there was no significant difference for the main effect of emotion F(5, 122) = 0.46, p = 
0.80.  
 
 
Figure 2–33 Intensity values of TD models for mouth AUs only 
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Figure 2–34 Intensity values of ASD models for mouth AUs only 
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2.3.2.4 Analysis of models: temporal  
In order to assess differences in the temporal aspect of the models (i.e. the point at which 
the AUs were active across the 1.25 second model), ‘peak latency’ was assessed. Peak 
latency refers to the time point at which the ‘peak’ of the facial movement was displayed. 
This was firstly assessed using visualization of the data via violin plots. Below, the violin 
plots for all TD AUs indicate relatively similar mean values across all emotions. This is 
reflected also in the ASD group, who also remain consistently around the 0.5 mark. The 
distribution of values is not wildly different between groups, although there are nuanced 
differences in specific emotions, for example, for anger the ASD group continues further 
into the very early time frames while the TD group does not. A 2-way ANOVA revealed 
that there was no significant difference for group (F(1,125) = 0.29, p = 0.59) or for 
emotion (F(5,125) = 0.38, p = 0.86).  
 
Figure 2–35 Peak temporal values for TD models 
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Figure 2–36 Peak temporal values for ASD models 
In order to assess whether differences between groups or emotions may have been region 
specific, an independent assessment of the eye region and the mouth region was conducted 
(see Section 2.3.2.3 for break down of eye AUs and mouth AUs). Figure 2–37 and Figure 
2–38 reveal that both TD and ASD groups varied across emotions. For example, both 
groups had a relatively narrow distribution of timing values for surprise (around the 
midpoint of 0.5), while having a relatively wide distribution of timing values for anger. 
Statistical analysis of these data indicated, however that there was no significant difference 
between groups (F(1, 88) = 0.04, p = 0.85) or emotion (F(5, 88) = 0.63, p = 0.68).  
 
Figure 2–37 Peak temporal values for TD models: eye region only 
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Figure 2–38 Peak temporal values for ASD models: eye region only 
Subsequent to this, the timing data were assessed specifically for the mouth region of the 
models. Figure 2–39 and Figure 2–40 indicate that the ASD group had somewhat wider 
distribution of timing values as compared to the TD group, especially for happy, surprise, 
anger and sadness. Results of a 2-way ANOVA revealed that this group difference was, 
however, not statistically significant (F(1, 122) = 1.68, p = 0.19). The main effect of 
emotion was also found to be non significant F(5, 122) = 0.76, p = 0.76.  
 
Figure 2–39 Peak temporal values for TD models: mouth region only 
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Figure 2–40 Peak temporal values for ASD models: mouth region only 
 
2.4 Discussion 
The aim of this study was to provide an in-depth assessment of facial expression 
perception in individuals with ASD, as compared to TD individuals. This study builds 
upon previous research in two key ways: 1. It provides a novel approach to assess FER in 
ASD, offering a comprehensive portrait of facial expression perception per individual and 
2. It explores several hypotheses drawn form the literature based on one rich dataset. The 
methods used in this study allow for a depth of measurement on facial expression 
perception that has not previously been attempted in ASD research. This study extends 
current methodologies, firstly by employing stimuli that are not only dynamic but also 
completely controllable across several parameters (i.e. the AUs are controlled as well as 
amplitude of the stimuli and the timing of the movements) and secondly, by applying a 
reverse correlation technique to this dataset, a representation of emotion perception based 
on responses to these stimuli is established. Four hypotheses were proposed: 1. The pattern 
of AUs in the ASD models will be atypical compared to the TD group. 2. The amplitude of 
the AUs will be higher in the ASD group 3. The timing of the AUs will be atypical in the 
ASD group 4. The ASD group will use information from the mouth area of the face in 
favour of information from the eyes. Each of these hypotheses will be now discussed in 
turn, as well as additional important information that emerged from the dataset.  
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Firstly, results revealed that the ASD group responded to the stimuli using the label ‘other’ 
significantly more times than the TD group. Interventions for emotion recognition in 
children with ASD (as reviewed by Kuou and Egel, 2016) often use a heuristic approach to 
learning emotions (e.g. ‘happy’ is when the corners of the mouth are upturned). Therefore, 
it could be argued that the ASD group are more inclined to select ‘other’ because they 
require the stimulus to be very like the heuristic basic emotions in order to commit to 
selecting an emotion label. Curiously, the TD group responded to the stimuli using the 
label ‘surprise’ significantly more times that the ASD group. This may be due to the 
connotations associated with surprise, i.e. perhaps the TD group are drawn to the ‘surprise’ 
label when shown random facial expressions because surprise can be composed of several 
different combinations of AUs as opposed to, for example, ‘happy’ which would require a 
more specific set of AUs (e.g. an upturned mouth and relaxed eye area).  
The hypothesis that ‘the pattern of AUs in the ASD models will be atypical compared to 
the TD group’ was not supported in the results, which revealed that ASD and TD 
individuals are similar to each other in the AUs that are present in their models. Hence, this 
suggests that categorizing emotions based on facial features alone does not elicit obvious 
group differences between the ASD and TD groups. This is consistent with Harms et al. 
(2010) and Simmons et al. (2009) who suggest that group differences between individuals 
with ASD and TD individuals are harder to detect in static (i.e. AU information only) 
facial expression images as compared to dynamic ones. However, these data suggest that 
despite relative equality between the groups, some individuals were atypical compared to 
others, which appeared to be driven by higher autism severity in the ASD group and higher 
AQ scores in the TD group. This provides evidence to support assertions that FER ability 
is directly linked to severity of autism (Lerner et al., 2013; Uono et al., 2013; B. T. 
Williams & Gray, 2013). However, because these particular individuals scored low on 
Alexithymia, it does not support the hypothesis that FER is a separate construct to ASD 
itself as suggested by Cook et al. (2013). It is also notable that, despite a link between AQ 
level and FER ability in the TD group (and thus supporting assertions that FER can be 
predicted by levels of autism-like traits (Poljac et al., 2013)), no link was found for autism 
quotient score in the ASD group (i.e. those that scored high in autism severity did not score 
themselves high on the AQ). Facial expression recognition and its relationship with 
Alexithymia and AQ are explored further, in a larger population sample, in Chapter 4. 
It was hypothesised that the amplitude of the AUs would be higher in the ASD group, 
however the data presented from this study do not support this. Conversely, these data 
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revealed that the TD group displayed greater amplitude in their models, i.e. stronger 
expressions. This is surprising given that previous research has suggested individuals with 
ASD may require a stronger facial expression in order to recognise it, or at least that they 
are better at recognising emotions that have a higher amplitude (e.g. Law Smith et al. 
(2010)). The results of this study also did not indicate any temporal bias for individuals 
with ASD as was suggested in the original hypotheses. Hence, this finding supports the 
first set of results reported in the current study that individuals with ASD are not 
significantly more ‘atypical’ in FER compared to TD individuals. These findings go 
somewhat against previous research that has suggested that adults with ASD have a slower 
comprehension of facial expressions compared to TD adults (Enticott et al., 2014; Sachse 
et al., 2014). In particular, since these data are reported in the context of information from 
the other aspects of FER (i.e. AUs), the current results also go against previous research 
that has suggested that reaction time is slower, despite intact FER accuracy (Leung et al., 
2013). Because there is only a small amount of research that has looked specifically at the 
temporal domain of FER in ASD, these results warrant further research on the temporal 
characteristics of FER in individuals with ASD.  
In addition to this, no significant differences were found between the ASD and TD group 
in their use of eye and mouth region of the face, which counters the original hypothesis 
that the ASD group will use information from the mouth area of the face in favour of 
information from the eyes. This provides evidence against claims that individuals with 
ASD utilise information from the mouth area over and above the eye area (Spezio et al., 
2007a). However, in the current study information from both the eyes and mouth were 
presented in conjunction with each other (i.e. the whole face was presented) and so future 
research would aim to assess perception from the eye-only stimuli and mouth-only stimuli 
in order to ratify this finding. 
2.4.1 Limitations 
Despite having very rich individual data, the study is limited in its overall sample size (n = 
22). The present study required a large time commitment form the participant (6 hours in 
total spread over several sessions) and therefore the strengths of this study lie in the 
richness of the data collected per individual but a drawback of this is the difficulty in 
obtaining large numbers of participants. In addition to this, the present study may be 
limited due to the fact that a proportion of the participants were recruited in the UK, while 
the rest were recruited in the U.S. The reasons for using this method of recruitment were 
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due to complications regarding the international collaboration involved in this project. 
Specifically, resources for recruitment of typically developed adults were only partially 
available at Caltech, and hence, in order to manage this issue, a proportion of the typically 
developed adults recruited for the present study were recruited in the UK.  
In terms of general limitations, it could also be argued that, as adults, individuals in the 
ASD group may have learnt compensatory strategies to decode facial expression of 
emotion using a ‘rules-based’ approach (Walsh et al., 2014). Hence, these data do not rule 
out the idea that, in an experimental setting, adults with ASD may perform well yet 
impairments are still experienced in ‘real life’ emotion perception.  
The task used in the present study adopted a ‘seven – alternative forced choice task’ 
(7AFC) which allowed participants to selected ‘other’ if the six basic emotions were not 
deemed suitable to label the GFG stimulus presented. This was built into the method of the 
study as a mechanism to avoid participants randomly assigning an emotion label to a 
stimulus that was perceived as arbitrary (or as an emotion not within the 6 basic labels 
given). Thus, by having the option of ‘other’, the amount of noise introduced into the 6 
emotion categorizations was limited. However, there are drawbacks to using this method. 
For example, it transpired that the ASD group selected a greater number of ‘other’ 
responses as compared to the TD group. It is possible that the greater number of ‘other’ 
responses selected by the ASD group may have had an effect on the outcomes of the study. 
However, it is important to note that due to the large number of trials (26,400 trials per 
group) any influence from an increased ‘other’ response from the ASD group is likely to 
be marginal.  
Another possible limitation to this study is the reporting of results from selected 
individuals. In this study, an in depth analysis was conducted, assessing both group 
differences and individual differences. Individual differences were highlighted for two 
reasons: 1. To display the benefits of the novel technique presented in this study i.e. the 
level of individual detail presented has not previously been achieved in the ASD FER field 
and 2. because individual data are rarely reported in this field despite calls for more 
transparency regarding group heterogeneity in ASD (Harms et al., 2010; Uljarevic & 
Hamilton, 2013).  
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2.4.2 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this study provides a comprehensive, individual representation of the key 
components associated with the 6 basic emotion categories (happy, surprise, fear, disgust, 
anger and sadness). These rich data allow for an assessment of the AUs, amplitude and 
timing components that are most important in emotion categorization. Results revealed 
that, despite a comprehensive, fine-grained assessment of FER, adults with ASD are not 
significantly different from TD adults. These themes are further explored in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3 Facial Expression Recognition in 
Children with ASD  
3.1 Introduction 
For typical children, facial expression recognition begins in early infancy and develops 
rapidly throughout the first year of life (Grossmann, 2010). Although some evidence of 
facial expression perception has been reported in neonates (i.e. < 4 weeks old, Farroni et al. 
(2007)), there is a general consensus in the research literature that infants begin to 
recognise facial expressions around 7 months of age (Caron et al., 1982; Nelson, 1987; 
WalkerAndrews, 1997). Compared to typical children, evidence has suggested that 
children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) have difficulty with face perception 
(Campatelli et al., 2013), and in particular, facial expression recognition (FER) (e.g. 
Davies et al., 1994; Gross, 2004; Hobson, 1986a; B. T. Williams & Gray, 2013b; see 
section 1.4 for further discussion of this). How children with ASD perceive facial 
expressions has been intensively researched for over 30 years (Harms et al., 2010). As 
discussed in Chapter 1, this is somewhat unsurprising given that ASD is characterised by 
impairments in social interaction and communication (DSM-5, 2013) and that the face is 
arguably the most important cue to an individual’s thoughts and feelings (and hence crucial 
for effective social interaction and communication). Despite over thirty years of research 
dedicated to facial expression recognition (FER) in children with ASD, conclusions from 
this field of research still paint a confusing picture (Collin, Bindra, Raju, Gillberg, & 
Minnis, 2013; Harms et al., 2010; Simmons et al., 2009). The volume of conflicting results 
is, consequently, also paired with criticism that non-significant findings may be less likely 
to be reported in this field (Nuske, Vivanti, & Dissanayake, 2013). This has resulted in an 
atmosphere of confusion and an appetite for a better explanation of FER in individuals 
with ASD.  
It has been argued that, as individuals with ASD grow older, and hence are exposed to 
support, training and interventions in relation to their diagnosis, compensatory mechanisms 
can be learned in order to improve FER ability (Walsh et al., 2014). Still, there is a large 
volume of conflicting findings in research on FER, specifically in children with ASD, with 
some papers indicating a significant ‘impairment’ in FER in this population while others 
indicate no impairment relative to TD individuals. Evidence of impairment includes: 
(Ashwin, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, O'Riordan, & Bullmore, 2007; Balia et al., 2014; 
Braverman et al., 1989; Capps et al., 1992; Celani et al., 1999; Davies et al., 1994; Domes, 
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Kumbier, Heinrichs, & Herpertz, 2014; Eack et al., 2015; Evers et al., 2015; Feldman et 
al., 1993; Golan, Sinai-Gavrilov, & Baron-Cohen, 2015; Gross, 2004; Grossman, Klin, 
Carter, & Volkmar, 2000; Hobson, 1986a; Lindner & Rosen, 2006; Loukusa, Makinen, 
Kuusikko-Gauffin, Ebeling, & Moilanen, 2014; Ozonoff et al., 1990; Peterson et al., 2015; 
Rutherford, Walsh, & Creighton, 2015; Sachse et al., 2014; Tantam et al., 1989). Evidence 
of no impairment includes: (Bormannkischkel et al., 1995; Castelli, 2005; Evers et al., 
2014; Fein et al., 1992; Gepner et al., 2001; Lacroix, Guidetti, Roe, & Reilly, 2014; 
Loveland et al., 1997; Prior et al., 1990; Robel et al., 2004; Tell & Davidson, 2015).  
One of the limiting factors in FER research, particularly within the ASD field, is the 
limited scope of the methods used (Uljarevic & Hamilton, 2013). Despite a movement 
towards more advanced methods, very few studies within the FER field have moved 
beyond using stimuli of basic static photos, avatars or actors to assess FER ability in ASD 
(Simmons et al., 2009). In addition to this, several studies suggest intensity (i.e the 
‘amplitude’ of the expression) is a key, yet understudied, variable in FER (Law Smith et 
al., 2010; Mazefsky & Oswald, 2007; G. L. Wallace et al., 2011). Despite the likelihood of 
the intensity of facial expressions having a contributory influence on FER ability, very few 
studies to date have aimed to, or have had the methodological capacity to, directly measure 
the contribution of facial expression intensity. In addition to this, timing of emotional 
expression has been indicated as influencing FER in children with ASD. For example, 
Tardif, Laine, Rodriguez, and Gepner (2007) found that FER was significantly enhanced in 
children with ASD when the facial expression was slowed down. The effects of timing on 
FER are, however, not often examined specifically in FER in ASD research.  
The aim of this study was therefore, to utilise a novel technique to assess FER in children 
with ASD. In particular, nuances in FER that may be found between children with ASD 
and typical children that might not otherwise be picked up by different methods. It was 
hypothesised that children with ASD would respond in an inconsistent/atypical manner and 
so their responses would be more ‘atypical’ than the TD children. In addition to this, it was 
hypothesised that children with ASD would, in comparison to TD individuals, require the 
stimuli to be more ‘obvious’ (i.e. greater intensity of facial components) in order to 
categorise the stimulus as the target emotion. It was also hypothesised that for children 
with ASD they would require the stimuli to have greater intensity in order to categorise 
them as the target emotion. Lastly, it was hypothesised that children with ASD would 
display a lag in timing of FER. These hypotheses were drawn despite finding divergent 
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results in adults with ASD in section 2.3, because it was argued that children with ASD 
may show more pronounced FER difficulties compared to adults. 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Participants 
Data were collected from 16 children with ASD and 56 typically developing (TD) children 
aged between six and fourteen years old. An outline of these two sample groups is given in 
Table 3-1. All children were chaperoned throughout the study, meaning that they had an 
adult experimenter or assistant with them at all times to encourage the highest level of 
concentration possible from the child. All caregivers provided informed, written consent 
and all children gave informed, verbal assent before testing began. Ethical approval was 
granted from the University of Glasgow and the University of Victoria before the study 
commenced. 
3.2.1.1 Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder 
Children with ASD were recruited from the University of Victoria, Centre for Autism 
Research Technology and Education (CARTE) and MOSAIC Learning Society (a school 
for children with ASD) in Victoria, British Columbia. Twenty participants were recruited 
to take part in the experiment. Of these, two participants failed to turn up and another two 
participants, despite coming to the session, did not take part in the experiment. Sixteen 
participants completed the experiment. Of these, thirteen were boys and three were girls 
with a mean age of eleven years and two months. This sample had a higher ratio of boys 
than girls (4 boys to 1 girl). The reasons for this were twofold: 1. There were a greater 
number of boys with ASD who were willing to take part in research at CARTE and 
MOSAIC 2. It is largely recognised that, in the general population, there are more boys 
diagnosed with ASD than girls (Brugha et al. (2011); Kim et al. (2011)), with the majority 
of estimates across studies suggesting a 4:1 ratio of boys to girls (Fombonne, 2003, 2009). 
A debate about the exact gender ratio (as discussed in section 1.1) in the ASD population 
is, however, still ongoing (Kirkovski, Enticott, and Fitzgerald (2013); Mattila et al. 
(2011)). The inclusion criteria required children to be aged between six and fourteen years 
old, have normal or corrected-to-normal vision and have a diagnosis of autism or 
Asperger’s syndrome based on standard ICD-10 (World Health Organization, 1993) 
criteria. All children were of western Caucasian ethnicity. Caregivers of ASD participants 
were required to bring evidence of the child’s diagnosis to be viewed by the experimenter 
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before testing commenced, hence, although a re-test for ASD was not performed on-site by 
the experimenter, all of the children met the standard criteria for a clinical diagnosis of 
ASD.  
3.2.1.2 Typically developing children  
Children who were typically developing (TD) were used as a control comparison group. 
Eighty-four children were recruited through the University of Glasgow and the Glasgow 
Science Centre (a popular, hands-on science museum in Glasgow). Caregivers completed 
the Autism Quotient-10 questionnaire (AQ-10; Allison, Auyeung, and Baron-Cohen 
(2012)), which is a shortened version of the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ; S. Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al. (2001) and often used in clinical settings as a referral 
tool for children suspected of having ASD (Allison et al., 2012). We used this to ensure 
that children in the TD group had low levels of autistic traits. IQ was also measured and 
using the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test II (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004). Of the total 
eighty-four children, five children were excluded from the analysis because their AQ score 
was higher than 5. From the remaining seventy-nine children, a sample of children who 
reflected the ASD group on age, gender, verbal IQ (VIQ), performance IQ (PIQ) and 
ethnicity (Western Caucasian) were selected. Of these, forty-five were boys and eleven 
were girls in order to match the gender ratio found in the ASD group as described above. 
Selections were made in order to make the ASD and TD group as similar as possible in 
terms of age, gender and IQ, but all experimental data analysis was conducted after the 
selection of participants had been made. The typically developing group had a mean age of 
ten years and two months. No significant differences were found between the two groups 
on age (t(70) = 1.31, p= 0.19), verbal IQ (t(70) = 0.41, p = 0.68), performance IQ (t(70) = 
0.61, p = 0.54) or full scale IQ (t(70) = 0.46, p = 0.63). All TD children had an AQ-10 
score of below 4 (i.e. below average) and all caregivers reported their children to have 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
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Table 3-1 Demographic information from children with ASD and TD children 
ASD (n = 16) TD (n = 56) 
 Count % Count %  
Gender 13 m 81% 46 m 81%  
 3 f 19% 11 f 19 %  
        
 Mean SD Range Mean SD Range T-test 
Age 
(yrs: 
mnths) 
11:08 01:08 07:07- 14:02 11:00 02:11 
6:02 - 
14:07 
t(70) = 1.32, p = 
0.19 
VIQ 103.1 23.4 60 - 141 105 13.4 
72 - 
136 
t(70) = 0.41, p = 
0.68 
PIQ 103.5 13.9 73 - 124 106 13.5 
84 - 
131 
t(70) = 0.61, p = 
0.54 
FS IQ 104.4 19.1 73 - 135 106 14.1 
83 - 
131 
t(70) = 0.46, p = 
0.62 
 
3.2.2 Experimental set-up 
The aim of the study was to use a novel, sensitive measure to assess the perception of 
facial expressions of emotion in children with ASD and TD children. To do this, a 
procedure similar to that described in Chapter 2 (section 2.2) was implemented, however, 
the procedure was altered to make the experiment more suitable for children by reducing 
the 7AFC task to a 2AFC task. Children were, therefore, asked only about two emotions: 
Happy and Angry. These emotions were chosen in order to tap into both positive and 
negative types of emotional expression. In addition to this, the task was made more ‘child-
friendly’ by lowering the number of trials completed per participant (and therefore 
lowering the overall task length) and introducing cartoons and encouragement messages 
between blocks of trials to facilitate attention to the task.  The experiment was set up in a 
‘fun-day’ style environment consisting of games, activities and educational play, which the 
children took part in in addition to the experiment. In Victoria, this was located in the 
Centre for Autism Research, Technology and Education at the University of Victoria and 
was advertised as ‘Face Lab’. At Face Lab each child was paired with a ‘buddy’ for the 
day. Buddies consisted of CARTE’s director (Professor James Tanaka), CARTE’s Lab 
Coordinator (Bonnie Heptonstall), Kirsty Ainsworth (the author) and twelve third-year 
psychology student volunteers who had knowledge about ASD or had previous experience 
working with children with ASD. Before each Face Lab session, buddies were fully briefed 
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about the experimental task and the format of Face Lab. On the day, they were provided 
with a clipboard which consisted of a detailed outline of the child they would be working 
with, including any particular likes, dislikes or behavioral triggers. The clipboard also 
included a ‘visual schedule’ of the day that showed the child their exact time slot for each 
Face Lab activity: Face Game (the experiment), Recess (play room activities such as 
drawing, jigsaws, origami) and Puzzle Games (the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test- II 
(Kbit-2)). Children could stamp their visual schedule after each session using stickers. In 
order to incentivise attention in the experimental task, children could earn tokens for each 
block of trials of Face Game they completed and were rewarded with prizes at the end of 
the task in exchange for their tokens. The buddy’s role was to help the child with the 
experimental task, to oversee that data were collected in a consistent way, and to take care 
of the child to ensure they enjoyed their experience at Face Lab. Face Lab lasted for two 
hours and many of the children came back a second or third time at later dates. In Victoria, 
all children were rewarded with a $10 book voucher for taking part.  
In Glasgow the experimental set-up was developed to be as closely similar to Face Lab as 
possible. ‘Brain Lab’ was developed as a fun day for children to attend which involved 
games, activities and educational play. Children took part in Brain Lab at the Glasgow 
Science Centre on an ad-hoc basis so a specific visual schedule could not be provided. 
However, the sequence of tasks was very similar to CARTE insofar as children completed 
a combination of Face Game (the experimental task), activities (hands-on educational brain 
workshop) and puzzles (the Kbit-2). In Glasgow, sixteen volunteers were recruited to help 
out as ‘buddies’, most of whom were psychology undergraduates and postgraduates from 
the University of Glasgow, with an interest in working with children. In order to encourage 
attention to the experimental task, children earned tokens for each block of trials of Face 
Game they completed and were rewarded with prizes at the end of the task in exchange for 
their tokens. The experiment was also mobile in Glasgow, meaning that for children who 
were interested in taking part but could not make it to the Glasgow Science Centre, the 
experimenter could bring the task to the children in their own homes. When data were 
collected in the home of the child, instead of earning tokens for prizes, £10 cash was 
awarded to the child at the end of the experiment.  
Due to constraints met with accessing participant samples, the experimenter had a 
relatively short time with typically developed children as compared to the time available 
with children with ASD. Due to these constraints, the ASD group completed a total of 
19,000 trials and the ASD group completed a total of 21,200 trials (see Table 3-2), 
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however, there were a larger number of participants in the TD group. In order to address 
this, data were aggregated for each group and data were assessed only using aggregated 
group-wise analyses, as further described in section 3.2.5. The limitations imposed on the 
results due to these circumstances are discussed in section 3.4.1.  
Table 3-2 Trial Numbers of Aggregate Group Data 
 
ASD TD Total 
Happy 7,800 9,400 17,200 
Angry 11,200 12,200 23,400 
Total 19,000 21,600 40,600 
 
3.2.3 Stimuli  
The stimuli were produced using the Generative Face Grammar (GFG) developed by Yu 
and colleagues (Yu et al. (2012). The GFG technique was used to create 2400 dynamic 
facial expression stimuli, which displayed a facial expression that moved in ‘random’ ways 
(i.e. like a ‘digital puppet’ that was being moved in different places on the face, at different 
times and with varying levels of intensity). The dynamic stimuli were constructed from a 
randomised selection of 42 possible facial muscle groups (called “action units” AUs; 
Ekman & Friesen, 1978) and 6 temporal parameters (onset latency, acceleration, peak 
latency, peak amplitude, deceleration, offset latency). For each stimulus generation the 
GFG selected a number of AUs from a binomial distribution (median = 3), for example in 
Figure 3–1 the GFG has selected AU 17 (Chin Raiser), AU 10 L (Upper Lip Raiser Left) 
and AU 9 (Nose Wrinkler). Then, for each AU of the stimulus, the GFG randomly assigns 
a value for the six temporal parameters: These values were taken from a uniform 
distribution (coloured lines on the figure). On each stimulus generation the GFG 
randomises its selection of AUs and temporal parameters but, importantly, the algorithm 
constrains the pattern of selected AUs and parameters so that the combination is one that is 
physically possible by the human face. For example it would be near impossible to express 
a downturned mouth (AU 15 Lip Corner Decompressor) with a lifting of the cheeks (AU 6 
Cheek Raiser). Similarly, there is a point at which if the intensity value of an AU is too 
high it becomes non-human like (Katsyri, Forger, Makarainen, & Takala, 2015; Yu et al., 
2012). The GFG, therefore, constrained the selection of AUs and temporal parameters to 
create a random, but physiologically plausible, facial expression stimulus that had no real 
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meaning/affect associated with it (i.e. each stimulus was a ‘random’ facial expression). 
This study used 2400 individual, dynamic stimuli generated by the GFG. Because each 
stimulus displayed random combinations of AUs and temporal dynamics, a stimulus will 
be referred to henceforth as a ‘random facial stimulus’ (note here the adjective ‘random’ is 
descriptive of the random nature in which the features and timing of the facial expression 
move). The 2400 stimuli used in this experiment were identical to those used in Chapter 2. 
The simplification of the study required that only two emotions could be assessed (because 
to the large number of trials needed). The study sought to assess both positive and negative 
emotions, therefore happy was chosen to assess positive emotion FER and anger was 
chosen to assess negative emotion FER. 
 
Figure 3–1 Stimulus Generation using the Generative Face Grammar (Yu et al. 2012). For 
details see text (section 3.2.3). 
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3.2.4 Procedure 
After taking the IQ test (K-Bit 2) the children were introduced to the experiment. The task 
of each participant was to categorise each facial expression stimulus using computer keys 
labeled ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in response to the question displayed below the stimulus (in the happy 
condition this was ‘is this person happy?’, and in the angry condition this was ‘is this 
person angry?’). The order of stimuli and order of condition was randomised across 
participants. Before the task commenced, the experimenter or assistant working with the 
child explained that it was important to look at the way the face moves and not what the 
person looks like. All efforts were made to ensure that the child focused on the dynamic 
expression that was produced by the stimulus and not the resting expression of the face, or 
the identity of the person. Stimuli were interleaved with cartoon images displaying 
motivational messages (e.g. ‘good job!’; ‘keep it up!’) in order to encourage attention to 
the task. Stimuli were displayed on a computer monitor 60 cm from the child’s face, as 
measured by a distance meter (a 60cm measure of string), which was attached to the base 
of the computer monitor. Children touched the end of the string to their nose before testing 
commenced and were asked to remain in the same position throughout the experiment. 
Each facial expression stimulus lasted 1.25 seconds, starting and ending in a neutral 
expression. The stimulus remained on the screen until the child responded.  
 
Time 
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Figure 3–2 Example of two trials within the experimental task. Random facial expressions 
lasted 1.25 seconds (displayed here as a snapshot at 0.75 seconds). The facial expression 
trials were interleaved with cartoon and motivational messages.  
3.2.5 Analysis  
The original set of 2400 stimuli (as described in Section 3.2.3) were, when in numerical 
format, a matrix of 3 dimensions: size A x T x S where A indicates the AUs that are active 
(a binary indicator for each AU: 1 to 42), T indicates time (1.25 seconds is split into 30 
even frames) and S is 2400 stimuli. The values in the matrix are amplitude values i.e. 
values from 0 to 1 representing the intensity of the stimulus. During the experiment, 
stimuli are categorised into datasets of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ for happy condition (‘Is this person 
happy?’) and also for the angry condition (‘Is this person angry?’). Therefore, there were 
four matrices of raw data, each containing the set of stimuli for which participants selected 
‘yes’. One dataset for the ASD group happy condition (‘Is this person happy?’), one for the 
ASD group angry condition (‘Is this person angry?’), one for the TD group happy 
condition (‘Is this person happy?’), and one for the TD group angry condition (‘Is this 
person angry?’). The input to the analysis was therefore four separate datasets of the size 
the A x T x N where A x T is a stimulus in numerical format (as above) and N is the 
number of stimuli. The number of stimuli was different for each dataset because a different 
number of stimuli were found to fit a ‘yes’ response for each group/condition (further 
details given in section 3.2.3. The aim of the analysis was to reveal the patterns in AU 
activations and intensity values that were consistently present in the stimulus when 
participants responded ‘yes’. In other words, what aspects of the stimuli were important in 
order for a ‘yes’ response to occur? Because of the nature of the stimuli, non-negative 
matrix factorization (NMF) was identified as an ideal analysis tool to answer this question, 
as detailed below. 
Prior to applying NMF, the raw data (‘yes’, ‘no’ responses) and their associated stimuli 
(AU number and intensity values across time) were refined into a smaller number of data 
points, consisting only of the commonly agreed categorizations. This step was necessary in 
order to identify the stimulus-response pairs that were not only representative of an 
individual but also representative of the group as a whole. A group-wise mean average 
response was calculated for each stimulus where ‘yes’ response = 1 and ‘no’ response = 2 
(i.e. for each stimulus the sum of the responses divided by the number of participants who 
viewed that stimulus). A threshold was selected so that the stimuli that had an average 
response reaching <1.2 (i.e. on average close to a 1 (‘yes’) response) were inputted into a 
dataset of ‘selected’ stimuli. Stimuli that had an average response >1.8 (i.e. on average 
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close to a 2 (‘no’) response) were inputted into a dataset of ‘rejected’ stimuli. Only the 
‘selected’ stimuli datasets were used in the data analysis. 
3.2.5.1 Non-negative Matrix Factorization (NMF) 
Non-negative matrix factorization (NMF) is a dimensionality reduction technique, argued 
to be particularly useful for analysing datasets of faces, in comparison to older techniques 
of dimensionality reduction such as Principle Components Analysis (PCA) and Vector 
Quantization (Lee & Seung, 1999). NMF uses a parts-based algorithm (i.e. determining the 
data structure via individual components) as opposed to a holistic pattern (determining the 
data structure using a group of many different parts combined together). This enables the 
user to gain information about the components of the face, which is ideal for this particular 
dataset. When applied to a dataset of face stimuli, NMF is essentially attempting to answer 
the question ‘what are the key ingredients of the stimuli that received a ‘yes’ response?’. In 
order to reveal the ‘key ingredients’ of the dataset, NMF reduces the dimensions of the 
dataset to a linear combination of bases and weights. In other words, NMF approximates 
dataset V into two smaller datasets W and H, where V ≈ W * H. W is a m x r matrix of 
‘bases’ where m is equal to the rows in V. H is a n x r matrix of ‘weights’ where n is equal 
to the columns in V.  
Equation 1 - Non-Negative Matrix Factorization 
 
The value r is set by the user and provides boundaries for NMF. Therefore, NMF uses W 
and H to provide a simpler, dimensionally-reduced version of the original matrix V. W*H 
can also be thought of as a ‘compressed’ version of V (Lee & Seung, 1999) i.e. by 
weighting the bases and adding them together NMF provides an approximation of V. In 
order to calculate the closest approximation of V, NMF applies gradient descent (Snyman, 
2005): minimizing the squared distance of V – W * H until a tolerance limit is met.  
In this study the decomposition output from NMF details the AUs and intensity values that 
complement each other. For example, if a decomposition revealed AU 6 (Cheek Raiser) 
and AU 12 (Lip Corner Puller) for the TD happy condition it indicates that when a 
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stimulus displayed ‘Cheek Raiser’ and ‘Lip Corner Puller’ together, this combination of 
AUs was important to selecting ‘yes’ to ‘Is this person happy?’. The value ‘r’ (set by the 
user) specifies the number of decompositions NMF will attempt to approximate the dataset 
with (this is similar to cluster analysis when the user specifies the number of clusters the 
dataset is desired to be broken into). Here, r was specified as 3 in order to reveal a snapshot 
of the underlying structure of the dataset whilst gaining information on the pertinent 
combinations of AUs and timing parameters. In other words, each of the 3 decompositions 
contains a representation of the ‘key ingredients’ present in the stimuli which elicited a 
‘yes’ response. NMF output for this dataset is an ‘A x T x 3’ matrix containing intensity 
values of each AU (A) across 30 timeframes (T) for each decomposition (of which there 
are 3). NMF was, therefore, deemed a particularly well suited analysis tool for this dataset 
and has recently been demonstrated to perform well on data similar to these (e.g.(Delis et 
al., 2016)).  
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Response characteristics 
3.3.1.1 Reaction time  
Since task performance on facial expression recognition tasks can be influenced by 
reaction time (Harms et al., 2010), an initial analysis comparing reaction time between 
ASD and TD groups was conducted. It was expected that children with ASD might take 
more time over their judgements of the stimuli due to previous research findings that 
children with ASD are slower than TD children on FER tasks (Leung et al., 2013). 
Although this task was not primarily a reaction time (RT) task (i.e. children were asked to 
‘answer quickly’ but were not told their RTs were being recorded), RT was recorded for 
each trial, starting as soon as the stimulus finished and ending as soon as the participant 
pressed a valid response key (‘yes’ or ‘no’). In order to control for outliers, RTs that were 
greater than 3000ms were eliminated. 3000ms was deemed an appropriate cut-off point as 
it was apparent that reactions after 3000ms were due to the participant being distracted, 
and not reflective of a true response (based on reports from the helpers who were paired 
with each child during experimentation). This cut-off was implemented following 
established guidelines from Whelan (2008), who claims that when RT are positively 
skewed (as they are in this case) trimming RTs from a point relative to the standard 
deviation is not appropriate due to the biased distribution (i.e. the mean of all datasets does 
not reflect the positive skew). The median was also not an appropriate measure of central 
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tendency for this dataset because there were a different number of trials in each group 
(Whelan, 2008). Therefore, the absolute cut-off point for RTs being >100ms and < 3000ms 
was deemed appropriate for this sample. Figure 3–3 displays the distribution of reaction 
times (in milliseconds) after the aforementioned trimming procedure was conducted. The 
figure suggests that the distribution of trimmed RTs is very similar across all groups and 
conditions, despite there being varying numbers of trials in each.  
 
Figure 3–3 Reaction time trimmed (<3000ms) for all trials 
3.3.1.2 Response distribution: groups  
In order to obtain a better understanding of the way in which each group responded for 
each condition, descriptive information was obtained from the experimental responses. It 
was hypothesised that children with ASD will, in comparison to the TD group, require the 
stimuli to be more ‘obvious’ (i.e. greater intensity of facial components) in order to 
categorise them as the target emotion. An indicator of requiring more intense stimuli was 
the proportion of stimuli selected (i.e. responding ‘yes’) compared to stimuli rejected (i.e. 
responding ‘no’). Being sensitive only to very intense stimuli would likely result in the 
participant selecting rather few (i.e. only intense) stimuli as ‘yes’ and therefore rejecting a 
larger number of stimuli (i.e. answering ‘no’). To assess this, the percentage number of yes 
and no responses was computed for each group. As expected, the ASD group did answer 
‘no’ more than they answered ‘yes’, however this was to a greater extent in the happy 
condition (33% yes, 67% no) than the angry condition (49% yes, 51% no). The TD group 
answered ‘no’ more often than ‘yes’ for both conditions (see Table 3-3). 
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Table 3-3 Percentage of responses for each condition 
 ASD  TD 
 Yes No  Yes No 
Happy 33% 67%  36% 64% 
Angry 49% 51%  39% 61% 
 
In order to deconstruct, and further assess, the response data displayed in Table 3-3, the 
distribution of average scores was computed and visualised in Figure 3–4, Figure 3–5, 
Figure 3–6 and Figure 3–7. Average scores were computed by taking the mean of the total 
responses to each stimulus: the sum of all participants’ responses (sum of ‘1’ = yes or ‘2’ = 
no), divided by the number of participants that viewed that stimulus. Hence, a mean 
response score (a value between 1 and 2) was computed for each video stimulus. The 
frequency of all mean response scores were plotted to assess the distribution of responses. 
Plots that skew to the right indicate a group preference towards responding ‘no’ (i.e. close 
to ‘2’ response) and plots that skew to the left indicate a group preference towards 
responding to ‘yes’ (i.e. closer to a ‘1’ response). Figure 3–4 and Figure 3–5 suggest that 
average responses of the ASD group tended towards ‘no’ for the happy condition but 
reflected a normal distribution (not biased to ‘yes’ or ‘no’ responses) for the angry 
condition. Figure 3–6 and Figure 3–7 indicate that the TD group tended towards ‘no’ for 
the happy condition and for the angry condition. This supports the group/condition 
response pattern indicated in Table 3-3.  
 
Figure 3–4 Response distribution of children with ASD in the happy condition.  
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Figure 3–5 Response distribution of children with ASD in the angry condition.  
 
Figure 3–6 Response distribution of TD group in the happy condition.  
 
Figure 3–7 Response distribution of TD group in the angry condition.  
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3.3.1.3 Response distribution: individuals  
In order to assess whether specific individuals may have influenced results reported in 
section 3.3.1.2, the percentage of yes/no responses for each condition were assessed per 
individual. Figure 3–8, Figure 3–9, Figure 3–10 and Figure 3–11 indicate that individuals 
in both the ASD and TD group have similar patterns of responses for each condition. 
Therefore, there is no evidence to suggest that there is a specific ‘responding pattern’ 
characteristic only to the ASD group. Note, figures indicate n = 11 in the happy condition 
and n = 12 in the angry condition. This is due to slight variation in the number of trials 
completed by each participant; hence some participants completed only one of the 
conditions. We do find, however, that for both ASD and TD groups there are a proportion 
of people who are very ‘choosy’ (i.e. they say ‘yes’ very selectively) and a proportion of 
people who say ‘yes’ and ‘no’ to almost equivalent levels. It should also be noted that for 
both groups, there were a proportion of individuals willing to select many ‘yes’ responses 
in the angry condition despite this not being found for the happy condition. This suggests 
that a selection of ‘yes’ over ‘no’ response in the happy condition is harder to do, and may 
require more specific features from the random facial expressions, while angry can be 
attributed to a larger number of random facial expressions.  
 
Figure 3–8 Percentage of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses from ASD participants in the happy 
condition i.e. ‘Is this person happy?’  
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Figure 3–9 Percentage of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses from ASD participants in the angry 
condition i.e. ‘Is this person angry?’ 
 
Figure 3–10 Percentage of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses from TD participants in the happy 
condition i.e. ‘Is this person happy?’ 
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Figure 3–11 Percentage of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses from TD participants in the angry 
condition i.e. ‘Is this person angry?’ 
3.3.2 ASD and TD decompositions derived from NMF 
As described in section 3.2.5, the raw data were analysed using a non-negative matrix 
factorization (NMF) technique. The result of this was a large matrix of AU, timing and 
intensity information for each group (ASD and TD), and for each emotion (happy and 
angry) decomposition. Hence, NMF output for this dataset was a ‘A x T x 3’ matrix 
containing intensity values of each AU (A), across 30 timeframes (T), for each 
decomposition (of which there are 3). Decompositions were rendered into a format that can 
be viewed in the context of the face (i.e. face avatars) and can be viewed in video format 
(see Appendix 4). 
3.3.2.1 Atypicality of AUs in the decompositions  
It was hypothesised that children with ASD would respond in an inconsistent or atypical 
manner to the GFG random stimuli and so the underlying AUs that make up their ‘yes’ 
responses would be atypical in comparison to the TD children. In order to comcompare 
the AUs of the decompositions, hamming distance was applied to measure the distance 
between each binary vector. Figure 3-12 displays distance values in the form of a heat 
map where cool colours (i.e. dark blue) indicate distance values close to zero and hot 
colours (i.e. dark red) indicate higher distance values. Highest distance values were 
found between ASD angry and TD happy decompositions. Similarly, relatively high 
distance values were found between ASD happy and TD happy decompositions. The 
most similar decompositions in terms of AUs were TD angry and ASD angry. Hence, 
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these data suggest happy decompositions are least like each other while angry 
decompositions are most like each other. However, note that the maximum distance 
value between the two groups is 0.4 despite the maximum possible distance being 1.0, 
and so, it could be argued that although some differences can be found between the 
groups, these are relatively small. 
 
Figure 3–12 Hamming distance between ASD and TD decompositions. 
 
3.3.2.2 Amplitude of decompositions 
Decompositions were also assessed for variance in amplitude values (i.e. the ‘intensity’ of 
the AUs). Intensity values of AUs were between 0 and 1, where 0 is no intensity (i.e. the 
AU is not active) and 1 is maximum intensity, which, controlled by the GFG (see Section 
3.2.3), remained within the bounds of what is physiologically possible (meaning a 
maximum intensity of ‘1’ is still human-like). Figure 3–13 and Figure 3–14 indicate at 
least 1 AU reaches maximum intensity (red) in each decomposition across all 
conditions/groups. The figures also illustrate that there are fewer medium or high intensity 
(yellow or orange) AUs in the angry condition, compared to the happy condition (for both 
groups). The key in Table 3-4 can be used to find the associated AU number and AU name 
for the AU cell (i.e. numbers given along the x-axis in Figure 3-10 and Figure 3–14). AUs 
that reached intensities in the upper quartile (> 0.75) in the happy condition were, for ASD, 
Dimpler, Lip Tightener, Nose Wrinkler, Lip Corner Puller and Lip Corner Puller Right and 
for the TD group, Inner Brow Raiser, Lip Corner Puller Left, Dimpler Right, Lip Stretch 
Left and Nostril Compressor. Ekman and Friesen (1978) suggest in their taxonomy of 
facial expression that, in a happy expression, the AUs Cheek Raiser and Lip Corner Puller 
  
95 
must be present. Therefore, two AUs that are particularly dissimilar to Ekman and 
Friesen’s happy expression were found in the ASD group (Lip Tightener, Nose Wrinkler), 
while one that was particularly dissimilar to happy was found in the TD group (nostril 
compressor). These data suggest that, although the ASD group’s more intensive AUs are 
not completely dissimilar from what would be expected to be seen in a happy expression  
(according to Ekman and Friesen (1978)), they are not as representative of this ‘expected’ 
happy when compared to the most intensive AUs found in the TD group. Hence it could be 
suggested from these data that there is more confusion in the ASD group compared to the 
TD group, but there is little evidence that the ASD group are completely impaired in their 
perception of the emotion happy.  
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Table 3-4 Action Unit Number and Associated AU Name 
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Figure 3–13 Amplitude values (0:1) of ASD and TD Decompositions for the happy condition.  
Action units that reached threshold intensity in the upper quartile (> 0.75) in the angry 
condition were, for the ASD group: Lip Funneler, Mouth Stretch, Nose Wrinkler and Jaw 
Drop, and for the TD group: Nose Wrinkler, Nostril Compressor and Nasolabial Deepener 
Left. Therefore, the AUs that emerged as having the highest intensity from both the ASD 
and TD group were dissimilar to the AUs expected for an angry expression (according to 
Ekman and Freisen, 1978 anger should contain ‘Brow Lowerer’, ‘Upper Lid Raiser’, ‘Eye 
Lid Raiser’ ‘Lip Tightener’). Therefore, the data suggest that the AUs that emerge from 
both the ASD and TD group are not representative of the typical components of anger.  
Figure 3–14 Amplitude values (0:1) of ASD and TD Decompositions for the angry condition.  
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Figure 3–15 Mean amplitude (intensity) values for all decompositions for each 
group/condition 
Decomposition number was collapsed to provide one set of intensity values for each 
condition/group. Figure 3–15 suggests that the overall mean of these factors have slightly 
higher intensity in the happy condition, particularly for the TD group. A 2 x 2 ANOVA 
was applied to the collapsed intensity values (i.e. one vector of 42 values per 
emotion/group pair). There was, therefore, two factors being assessed: group (ASD or TD) 
and emotion (Happy or Angry), with 42 values of intensity for each group/emotion pairing. 
The results did not indicate the difference to be large enough to be significantly different 
from chance: no significant main effect of group (F (1, 164) = 3.3, p = 0.07, np2 = 0.02);  
no significant main effect of emotion (F(1, 164) = 0.15, p = 0.70, np2 < 0.02) and no 
significant interaction between group and emotion (F(1, 164) = 2.61, p = 0.11). , np2 = 
0.02) 
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It was recognised that even at relatively low intensities, the cumulative effect of many AUs 
being ‘on’ (i.e. active) in the decomposition could be considered perceptually more intense 
than only one or two AUs being ‘on’ at very high intensities. In order to assess intensity 
value while accounting for the greater weight of a large numbers of AUs, an additional 
analysis was conducted. The sum of the intensity values for all ‘on’ AUs was calculated, 
i.e. creating a single representative value of intensity for each decomposition. Therefore, 
this measure captures AU activation numbers and intensity values along a single 
continuum, where the lowest values reflect very few ‘on’ AUs at very low intensity and the 
highest values reflect a large number of ‘on’ AUs at high intensity. Note, values included 
in the analysis were >0.2 because intensity lower than 0.2 were below detection threshold 
(Delis, Berret, Pozzo, & Panzeri, 2013).
 
Figure 3–16 Sum of the ‘on’ amplitude (intensity) values (i.e. values > 0.2) for all 
decompositions 
Summed intensity values in Figure 3–16 indicate similar patterns to the mean intensity 
values in Figure 3–15, with higher intensity values in the happy condition, particularly for 
the TD group. The data reveal that, visually, the intensity values seem to be slightly higher 
in the happy condition compared to the angry condition. This is particularly pronounced 
for the TD group. It can be concluded therefore, that there is no evidence to suggest the 
ASD group requires a more intense stimulus as indicated in the initial hypothesis, which is 
consistent with findings from adults with ASD in section 2.3. 
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3.3.2.3 Timing of decompositions 
Analyses of timing components were also applied to these data. The timing (x-axis) and 
amplitude (as indicated by the right hand colour bar) of each AU are displayed for the ASD 
happy condition in Figure 3–17, Figure 3–18, and Figure 3–19 and for the TD happy 
condition in Figure 3–20, Figure 3–21, and Figure 3–22. These figures indicate that the 
ASD group use AUs from the mouth region at relatively central time points (around the 
mid point of 0.75 seconds) and the TD group use mouth and eye AUs, again around the 
midpoint of the expression latency.  
 
Figure 3–17 ASD happy Decomposition 1: Activation of AUs across time and amplitude 
(intensity). Highest amplitude AUs are AU number 22 (AU 13: ‘Cheek Puffer’) and AU 
number 33 (AU23: ‘Lip Tightener’). 
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Figure 3–18 ASD happy Decomposition 2: Activation of AUs across time and amplitude 
(intensity). Highest amplitude AU is AU number 20 (AU12L: ‘Lip Corner Puller Left’) 
 
Figure 3–19 ASD happy Decomposition 3: Activation of AUs across time and amplitude 
(intensity) Highest amplitude AU is AU number 18 (AU 12 Lip Corner Puller) 
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Figure 3–20 TD happy Decomposition 1: Activation of AUs across time and amplitude 
(intensity). Highest amplitude AUs are AU number 20 (AU12L: ‘Lip Corner Puller Left’) and 
AU number 39 (AU 39 ‘Nostril Dialator’).  
 
 
Figure 3–21 TD happy Decomposition 2: Activation of AUs across time and amplitude 
(intensity). Highest amplitude AUs are AU number 1 (AU1: ‘Inner Brow Raiser) and AU 
number 30 (AU20L ‘Lip Stretch Left’). 
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Figure 3–22 TD happy Decomposition 3: Activation of AUs across time and amplitude 
(intensity). Highest amplitude AU is AU number 25 (AU 14R ‘Dimpler Right’).  
Similarly, the amplitude of the AU across time for the ASD angry condition can be found 
in Figure 3–23, Figure 3–24, and Figure 3–25 and for the TD angry condition in Figure 3–
26, Figure 3–27 and Figure 3–28. The figures indicate slightly left of centre peak AUs in 
the ASD group (except for AU 36 in the third decomposition, which is slightly after the 
midpoint). The TD group show slightly left of centre peak amplitudes (except for AU 39 in 
the second decomposition which is directly on the midpoint). Hence, thus far, timing data 
of the decompositions indicate 1. no obvious timing differences between ASD and TD 
groups and 2. no evidence to suggest a ‘late’ timing bias as seen in the previous chapter.  
 
Figure 3–23 ASD angry Decomposition 1: Activation of AUs across time and amplitude 
(intensity). Highest amplitude AU is AU number 32 (AU 22 ‘Lip Funneler’). 
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Figure 3–24 ASD angry Decomposition 2: Activation of AUs across time and amplitude 
(intensity). Highest amplitude AU is AU number 37 (AU 27 ‘Mouth Stretch’). 
 
Figure 3–25 ASD angry Decomposition 3: Activation of AUs across time and amplitude 
(intensity). Highest amplitude AUs are AU number 12 (AU 9 Nose Wrinkler) and AU number 
36 (AU 26 ‘Jaw Drop’). 
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Figure 3–26 TD angry Decomposition 1: Activation of AUs across time and amplitude 
(intensity). Highest amplitude AU is AU number 12 (AU 9 ‘Nose Wrinkler’). 
 
 
Figure 3–27 TD angry Decomposition 2: Activation of AUs across time and amplitude 
(intensity). Highest amplitude AU is AU number 39 (AU 39 ‘Nostril Compressor’). 
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Figure 3–28 TD angry Decomposition 3: Activation of AUs across time and amplitude 
(intensity). Highest amplitude AU is AU number 16 (AU 11L ‘Nasolabial Deepener Left’). 
The overall mean timing of each group, visualised in Figure 3–29, indicated that timing 
appeared to be similar between groups. However, a statistical analysis was conducted to 
establish whether the null hypothesis (i.e. the variance in timing of the decomposition was 
due to chance) could be rejected. A 2-way ANOVA assessed the contribution of group 
(ASD or TD) and of emotion (Happy or Angry) to the variance in timing (i.e. 42 points 
across 3 decompositions (126 values) for each group/emotion pair). Note, ‘peak time point’ 
is displayed along the x axis in where the red colour bar is found (see above figures).. As 
expected from the figure, no significant difference was indicated for group: F(1, 500) = 
0.07, p = 0.79, np2 < 0.00; emotion: F (1, 500) = 0.01, np2 < 0.00, p = 0.92 or interaction: 
F(1, 500) = 0.61, p 0.43, np2 < 0.00.  
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Figure 3–29 Timepoint (seconds) of AUs when taken together (mean average) 
 
3.4 Discussion 
This study aimed to expand findings reported in Chapter 2 by exploring facial expression 
recognition in children with ASD. This study adopted a method similar to that reported in 
Chapter 2, which was adapted to be more suitable for use with children. Despite finding 
adults with ASD to be relatively equal to TD adults in FER (reported in Chapter 2), this 
study hypothesised that children with ASD may show more pronounced FER difficulties 
compared to adults. Thus, the first hypothesis of the current study was that children with 
ASD would respond in an atypical manner as compared to TD children. It was also 
hypothesised that children with ASD would require the stimuli to have greater intensity in 
order to categorise them as the target emotion. Lastly, it was hypothesised that children 
with ASD would display a lag in timing of FER. 
The characteristics of the children’s responses (i.e. the proportion of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ 
responses, and reaction time) were evaluated in order to ascertain whether children with 
ASD had an atypical response pattern compared to TD children. In the present study, 
children with ASD had a slight response bias to ‘yes’ for the angry condition (i.e. most 
children with ASD pressed a higher proportion of ‘yes’ responses than ‘no’ responses). 
This suggests that children with ASD were less ‘conservative’ in their categorizations of 
the stimuli and so rejected less of the random facial expressions. This was, however, driven 
by a less conservative response in the angry condition only (i.e. being asked ‘is this person 
angry?’) as opposed to the happy condition (‘is his person happy?’). It is unclear from the 
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data why children with ASD responded with a greater proportion of ‘yes’ responses in the 
angry condition, while having a similar response pattern to the TD group in the happy 
condition. However, it could be argued that the children with ASD found it more difficult 
to recognise an angry expression from the random stimuli as opposed to a happy 
expression because of the greater complexity of affect associated with angry. Several 
studies have suggested that anger, as well as fear and other ‘negative emotions’, are 
particularly difficult for children with ASD (Ashwin et al., 2007; Humphreys et al., 2007; 
Lindner & Rosen, 2006). Due to the findings in Chapter 2 that adults with ASD selected a 
higher proportion of ‘other’ responses compared to the 6 basic emotion labels, it was 
expected that the children with ASD would select a higher proportion of ‘no’ responses. It 
could be argued that adaptations made to the experimental design in order to suit children 
(and hence the removal of ‘other’ as a response option) may have altered the way in which 
the children responded to the task (task limitations are discussed further in section 3.4.1). 
An evaluation of response characteristics found there to be no major differences in reaction 
time between children with ASD and TD children. This counters previous research 
suggesting that children with ASD may be slower in RT compared to TD children, despite 
having equivalent accuracy scores in FER tasks (Leung et al., 2013). Therefore, despite 
slightly different response patterns in the ASD group compared to TD group, the present 
study provides no evidence for a specific response speed characteristic to children with 
ASD. However, because this task was not a ‘speeded task’ (i.e. not RT was not a pre-
defined dependent variable) further evidence, specifically aiming to measure RT in this 
task, may be required.  
This study employed a novel experimental method (Generative Face Grammar), paired 
with non-negative matrix factorization to obtain subtle information about the principal 
components used to categorise happy and angry facial expressions. Despite recent 
advances in FER research, a study of this kind has never been applied to examine FER in 
individuals with ASD. This method revealed information about the subtleties of FER that 
cannot be obtained from static image stimuli or actor video stimuli. From the data, NMF 
revealed the principle AUs, amplitude (intensity) and timing associated with each group’s 
responses and these were then analysed for differences between conditions and between 
ASD and TD groups. It was hypothesised that children with ASD would respond in an 
atypical manner to the stimuli and so the underlying components (i.e. the decompositions) 
which made up their ‘yes’ responses would be more atypical than those of the TD children. 
AU differences were relatively small (hamming distance < 0.4) between ASD and TD 
group. Overall, the AU comparison data suggested that happy decompositions were least 
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like each other while angry decompositions are most like each other however, these 
differences were relatively marginal. This result provides a somewhat different approach 
than the majority of FER ASD studies, that largely claim that FER is either ‘impaired’ or 
‘typical’ in individuals with ASD (Harms et al., 2010; Simmons et al., 2009). Results also 
indicated that children with ASD did not need a more ‘intense’ version of a facial 
expression in order to categorise it as the target emotion, despite previous research 
suggesting stimulus intensity was a key factor in FER ability (Tell et al., 2014). This 
supports findings in Chapter 2 that intensity of the facial expression does not appear to be 
directly linked to FER ability in adults with ASD. Timing was also found to be a non-
contributing factor to FER ability in this sample of children with ASD. These results do not 
support the original hypothesis that children with ASD would display a lag in timing of 
FER and do not support claims that timing components of FER may be particularly 
atypical in individuals with ASD (Lerner et al., 2013; Sato et al., 2013; Tardif et al., 2007). 
Taken together, these data indicate no strong FER differences between children with ASD 
and TD children, which is in disagreement with large proportion of the literature (Harms et 
al., 2010), but is in agreement with the data on adults with ASD preceding the present 
study (Chapter 2). 
3.4.1 Limitations  
Although all efforts were made to ‘simplify’ the task in Chapter 2 to be more appropriate 
for children, the task was slightly more difficult than anticipated for some participants. A 
competitive aspect was incorporated into the task in an effort to avoid these issues, 
however, future research could aim to improve attentiveness of child participation by 
incorporating a game-like design into the task procedure from inception of the task design.  
The ‘child-friendly’ alterations made to this experimental design may themselves impact 
the way in which comparisons can be made between the adult and child groups. For 
example, because this experimental design ‘primes’ the participant with the target emotion 
(for example, ‘Is this person angry?’) this may elicit a quicker response to the stimuli as 
opposed to the design used with adults (Chapter 2, section 2.2.4) which required the 
participant to choose from a choice of 7 emotion labels.  
Unfortunately, time constraints were also a limiting factor in the present study because a 
longer time allocation was available with children with ASD as was available with TD 
children. To address this, data had to be aggregated and hence no within-group analyses 
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could be conducted. Results may, therefore, reflect a bias towards the ASD children 
because each individual in the ASD group completed a larger number of trials. Efforts 
were made to address this by aggregating the data and performing analyses that were 
suitable to this, however a more ideal situation would be equality between groups for 
sample size and trail number. Future versions of this study would aim to implement this 
step. The methodology of the present study could potentially be further improved by 
providing a practice session for participants. In addition to this, a more detailed analysis of 
the data may have been possible with the addition of AQ data (or a level of ASD severity) 
for the children with ASD and also possibly the inclusion of an alexithymia measure as 
was included in the previous chapter.  
3.4.2 Conclusion 
This study aimed to provide an evidence base, unlike any methods previously used, in an 
attempt to better understand the complexity of FER in children with ASD. Despite 
employing a novel, sensitive technique to measure FER, results provided no evidence of a 
clear-cut FER atypicality in children with ASD. This conclusion builds upon evidence 
presented in Chapter 2, providing further indication that there are no discernible 
differences between individuals with ASD and TD individuals in FER ability. Therefore, 
this study demonstrates that even a sensitive measure of FER does not elucidate 
atypicalities of FER in the ASD population. This reflects the current tone of research in 
FER literature that more must be done to reconceptualise the notion that all individuals 
with ASD are impaired in facial expression recognition (Collin et al., 2013; Harms et al., 
2010; Simmons et al., 2009; Uljarevic & Hamilton, 2013).  
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Chapter 4 FER in Relation to Alexithymia and 
Autism-like Traits 
4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 1, there is mixed evidence that individuals with ASD are impaired 
in perceiving facial expressions of emotion (Harms et al., 2010), despite emotion 
perception being a key component of a diagnosis of ASD (e.g. Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule (Lord et al., 2000)). In fact, there is much evidence to suggest that 
we cannot clearly define a difference in facial expression perception in individuals with 
ASD compared to typically developing individuals (e.g. (Uljarevic & Hamilton, 2013)). 
The previous chapters presented in this thesis have provided evidence that adults and 
children with ASD were relatively similar to TD individuals in their FER abilities. This 
chapter therefore sought to expand the lens in order to take into account other, possibly 
unnoticed, variables that may influence FER in ASD. In particular, this chapter sought to 
assess the contribution of alexithymia because of the traction this argument has been 
gaining in the literature (discussed in further detail below). In addition, empathy, 
psychological wellbeing and demographic factors were assessed which are now also 
discussed in further detail.  
Previous research has challenged the notion that emotion recognition impairment is 
integral to having an ASD diagnosis. Bird and Cook (2013) suggest the ASD population 
can be divided into two ‘sub-groups’: one with an emotion recognition impairment and an 
ASD diagnosis, and the other with no emotion recognition impairment but an ASD 
diagnosis. They suggest that, since a Facial Expression Recognition (FER) deficit can be 
found in the typical population, identified as ‘alexithymia’, the sub-group of individuals 
who have an FER deficit and an ASD diagnosis should instead consider the FER deficit as 
a co-occurring alexithymia condition. This theory provides a different perspective on why 
the FER ASD literature reports conflicting results.  
In recent years, alexithymia (defined as a ‘relative constriction in emotional functioning, 
poverty of fantasy life, and inability to find appropriate words to describe emotions’ 
(Sifneos, 1973)) has been brought into the scientific discussion about FER abilities in 
ASD. Specifically, alexithymia has been presented as a possible explanation as to why 
some individuals with ASD have difficulty with FER (Bird & Cook, 2013). This is because 
alexithymia can be found in the typical population (Salminen et al., 1999) and is 
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significantly higher in individuals who have difficulty attributing mental states to others 
(Moriguchi et al. (2006)). It has been suggested that 50% of people with an ASD diagnosis 
have alexithymia (Berthoz & Hill, 2005). Hence, alexithymia has been explored as a 
comorbid construct to ASD and a possible reason as to why FER difficulties may be 
present in some individuals with ASD and not others (Bird & Cook, 2013). A wider 
discussion of the concept of alexithymia can be found in Section 1.3.3.3. The current study 
therefore sought to examine this contribution of alexithymia in further detail.  
In addition to Cook et al. (2013), Poljac et al. (2013) also used AQ as a measure of autism-
like traits, comparing emotion recognition skills between high and low AQ scorers. Poljac 
et al. (2013) reported a significant difference in both emotion accuracy (per cent correct) 
and emotion sensitivity (amount of emotion needed in order to provide a correct response) 
for anger, disgust and sadness. However, the differences, although found to be significant, 
were relatively small. For example, per cent correct results revealed, for anger, 70% 
accuracy for high AQ and 75% accuracy for low AQ scorers. In addition to this, they found 
both high and low AQ scorers to have a very low accuracy for fear (high AQ 40%; low AQ 
45%). Also, for surprise, their results indicated that low AQ scorers were less accurate than 
high AQ scorers, which does not reflect their conclusion that “the ability to recognise 
emotions is highly related to the extent of autism-like traits” (Poljac et al. (2013), page 
10.). There is little further evidence in the current literature upon which to compare the 
findings of Poljac et al. (2013), hence, the current study sought to explore the relationship 
between AQ score and emotion recognition further.  
In addition to assessing the potential contribution of alexithymia to FER, this study also 
sought to assess the claim that the contribution of demographic factors is important, but 
often overlooked (Harms et al., 2010; Uljarevic & Hamilton, 2013). Uljaveric & Hamilton 
acknowledge the complex heterogeneity of the ASD phenotype in their meta-analysis of 
the FER in ASD literature, pointing to demographic factors as being a variable that is 
likely linked to individual differences in ASD symptoms (for example, age and IQ). 
Regardless of this, Uljaveric and Hamilton state that it is unfortunate that very few papers 
included in their meta-analysis report enough information about demographic variables in 
order to effectively measure their contribution FER ability. Uljaveric and Hamilton cite 
this as an interesting area of future work, advocating for more transparency of 
demographic factors and for their inclusion at analysis stage. Harms et al (2010) described 
demographic factors as accounting for a proportion of the discrepant findings in the 
literature in their review of FER ASD literature published before 2010. Harms et al 
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postulated that this has two guises: 1. ASD is heterogeneous and there is little solid 
evidence for specific demographic factors that may account for the large individual 
differences observed in the ASD phenotype 2. Despite this, demographic factors are not 
reported in great detail or included at analysis stage (as was also observed by Uljaveric and 
Hamilton (2013)). The present study sought to cast a wide net, measuring several different 
demographic factors and, in addition, all of the factors measured were included in the 
analysis stage. This was intended to highlight any potential contributory variables to FER 
that may have not otherwise been picked up. The demographic factors included in this 
study were location (i.e. whether the participants took part in Glasgow or in San Diego), 
age, gender, handedness, race, psychological history and education.  
Empathy was also included in this study as a variable that may influence FER. The ability 
to ‘put oneself in another person’s shoes’, empathy has long been studied in relation to 
emotion perception and has been of particular interest to researchers in the field of ASD. 
The link between empathy and emotion perception has, in particular, attracted much 
research in the field of atypical psychology. For example, poor FER ability has been found 
to be associated with low levels of empathy in individuals with schizophrenia (Mandal, 
Pandey, & Prasad, 1998). A core characteristic of an ASD diagnosis is a difficulty 
understanding the mental states of others, or ‘metalizing’ (S. Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). A 
diminished ability to accurately determine the mental state of others has been recognised in 
empirical studies with individuals with ASD: for example understanding another’s beliefs 
(S. Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Leslie & Frith, 1988; Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989), 
pretence (Leslie, 1987) and intentions (Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 1998). These 
seminal pieces of work culminated in one of the first cognitive theories of autism: Theory 
of Mind (C. Frith & Frith, 2005), as is discussed in Section 1.5. The ability to ‘mentalize’ 
is intrinsically linked to the ability to empathise with another person (Lawson, Baron-
Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2004). Because of this, researchers have attributed poor metalizing 
abilities in individuals with ASD to having less empathy for others. A conceptualization of 
this has been developed in the Extreme Male Brain (EMB) theory of autism (S. Baron-
Cohen, 2002) which posits that a low-empathizing, high-systemizing brain (which is 
described as being ‘stereotypical’ of males) is presented in the ASD phenotype in an 
exaggerated form (also discussed further in Section 1.5). Empirical research has somewhat 
supported this claim, for example Sucksmith, Allison, Baron-Cohen, Chakrabarti, and 
Hoekstra (2013) found that both males and females with ASC had significantly lower 
empathy abilities when measured using the ‘Empathy Quotient’ self-report questionnaire 
(Simon Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). Aaron, Benson, and Park (2015) assessed 
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empathy in typical college students who varied in their level of autism-like traits. Aaron et 
al concluded that an increase in AQ levels was significantly correlated with a decrease in 
empathic ability. Mazza et al. (2014) found that adolescents with ASD were comparable to 
TD adolescents in an empathizing task involving positive emotional valence (e.g. happy 
emotion) but were significantly worse than TD adolescents when the emotional valence 
was negative. The story of empathy in ASD is further complicated by research such as that 
of Schulte-Ruther et al. (2014) who demonstrated that the neural substrates of empathy 
may be influenced by age, insofar as adolescents with ASD performed poorly on an 
empathy behavioural task while adults with ASD performed relatively similarly to TD 
adults. In addition, they reported that in an fMRI scanner, adolescents with ASD showed 
less neural activation in the lateral pre-frontal cortex during the behavioural empathy task 
compared to TD adolescents, while adults with ASD were relatively similar to TD adults. 
There has been criticism from the autism community regarding the attribution of ASD with 
being ‘impaired’ in understanding empathy. Researchers have argued that individuals with 
ASD do not lack empathy but sensitivity to empathy is slightly less pronounced. For 
example children with autism were found to do well on an empathy task despite 
performing less well than typical children (Charman et al., 1997). Brewer and Murphy 
advocate that holding the view that individuals with ASD lack empathy can “distort the 
perception” of individuals with ASD and “possibly delay effective treatments” (Brewer & 
Murphy, 2016).  
This study aimed to assess Facial Expression Recognition (FER) ability and its relationship 
to AQ scores (autism-like traits) and TAS scores (alexithymia). In addition to this, several 
other measures were taken such as Empathy, Psychological Diagnosis and Depression 
indicators, in an attempt to provide possible alternative predictors of poor FER. It was 
hypothesised that both autism-like traits and alexithymia would predict emotion 
discrimination ability. Moreover, alexithymia would account for a higher proportion of the 
variance than autism-like traits. 
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Participants 
A total of 144 adults took part in this study, recruited from two locations: University of 
Glasgow (n = 54) and University California San Diego (UCSD; n = 90). Online and poster 
advertisements were used to recruit participants and all participants provided written, 
  
115 
informed consent prior to starting the study. Participation was voluntary and compensated 
by Psychology course credit or a small monetary payment (£9 at University of Glasgow or 
$20 at UCSD). The study was carried out in accordance with ethical standards of the 
College of Science and Engineering ethics committee at Glasgow University and 
Institutional Review Board committee at UCSD. Approval was obtained from these 
respective committees before testing commenced. At the data analysis stage it was 
apparent that three participants displayed extreme outlier values (see Section 4.2.6) and so 
these participants were removed. Final data analysis was therefore conducted on 141 
participants (Glasgow n = 54; UCSD n = 87).  
4.2.2 Psychometric measures 
4.2.2.1 Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) 
The Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ; S. Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al. (2001)) 
is a 50-item, self-report questionnaire that probes information about the level of autism-
like traits an individual has. The questions target five subscales, which are thought to be 
characteristic of an ASD diagnosis: 1) social skills 2) attention switching 3) attention to 
detail 4) communication and 5) imagination. Responses are given in terms of a four-point 
Likert scale (‘definitely agree’, ‘slightly agree’, ‘slightly disagree’ or ‘definitely disagree’) 
to statements which target the above 5 ASD characteristics. For example, statements 
include: “I enjoy social chit-chat.” (social skills; reverse score), “I usually notice car 
number plates or similar strings of information” (attention to detail; regular score), “When 
I’m reading a story, I can easily imagine what the characters might look like.” 
(imagination, reverse score). A response of ‘definitely agree’ or ‘slightly agree’ was scored 
as a ‘1’ and ‘slightly disagree’ or ‘definitely disagree’ as a ‘0’, and the opposite for reverse 
scored items. A total score on the AQ consists of a sum of all 50 items (i.e. with some 
questions reversed scored), hence, higher scores indicate higher levels of autism-like traits. 
This follows typical scoring technique for this questionnaire (S. Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001).  
4.2.2.2 The twenty-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) 
The 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; (Bagby, Parker, et al., 1994; Bagby, 
Taylor, et al., 1994)) is a self-report questionnaire that investigates an individual’s ability 
to understand their own, and other people’s emotions. Having alexithymia is sometimes 
referred to colloquially as having ‘emotion–blindness’. The TAS-20 has 3 subscales: 
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‘describing feelings and emotions’, ‘identifying feelings and emotions’ and ‘externally-
oriented thinking’. Items are statements regarding the above 3 subscales, for example “I 
am able to describe my feelings easily” (describing feelings and emotions, reverse score), 
“When I am upset, I don’t know if I am sad, frightened, or angry” (identifying feelings and 
emotions, regular score), “Looking for hidden meanings in movies or plays distracts from 
their enjoyment.” (externally-oriented thinking, regular score). Participants responded to 
the statements using a 5-point Likert scale: 1 = ‘Strongly Disagree’, 2 = ‘Disagree’, 3 = 
‘Neither Disagree or Agree,’ 4 = ‘Agree’ and 5 = ‘Strongly Agree’. For each participant all 
20 items are summed (note, 5 items are reverse scored in which their responses are scored 
as follows: ‘Strongly Disagree’ = 5, ‘Disagree’ = 4, ‘Agree’ = 2 and ‘Strongly Agree’ = 1). 
The sum of the items indicates the participant’s total TAS score, and therefore, higher TAS 
scores indicate higher levels of alexithymia.! 
4.2.2.3 Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) 
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980) is a 28-item, self-report questionnaire 
that asks information about empathy, defined by Davis as “the reactions of one individual 
to the observed experiences of another” (Davis (1983), p 113). Participants indicate their 
response on the IRI by choosing one of five Likert scale choices from A (‘Does not 
describe me well’) to E (‘Describes me very well’). The IRI can be broken down into four 
sub-components: 1) perspective-taking, 2) fantasy, 3) empathetic concern and 4) personal 
distress. For example, “I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" 
point of view.” (perspective-taking, reverse scored), “I often have tender, concerned 
feelings for people less fortunate than me” (empathetic concern, regular score), “Being in a 
tense emotional situation scares me.” (personal distress, regular score). Following the 
preferred scoring technique (Davis, 1980), each statement was scored as follows: questions 
scored in the regular way are scored: A = 0, B = 1, C = 2, D = 3, E = 4 and for reverse-
scored items the reverse score is given (i.e. A = 4, B = 3, C = 2, D = 1, E = 0). A total score 
on the IRI consists of a sum of all 28 items with higher values indicating higher levels of 
empathy. 
4.2.2.4 Personal information questionnaire 
In addition to the above psychometric measures, participants filled out questionnaires 
about 1) demographics and 2) medical history. Demographics included age, handedness, 
gender, ethnicity, race and level of education. Medical history questions asked whether the 
participant had had a history of a) mental health issues, b) a period of over two weeks of 
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unhappiness, c) a period of over two weeks of irritability, and d) autism in a sibling or 
family member.  
4.2.3 Design 
The present study used psychometric functions to plot data and draw useful information 
regarding participants’ response to the stimuli. Previous chapters in this thesis utilized a 
Generative Face Grammar system paired with reverse correlation and non-negative matrix 
factorization techniques, however an alternative paradigm was deemed appropriate for the 
present study for the following reasons: 1. as AQ was being used as a measure of ASD, a 
large sample of participants was required (unsuitable because of the long length of time 
required to test participants using the GFG) and 2. Because the present study was in 
collaboration with a research group in California, the option to use the GFG was not 
available for use in the Californian lab. Instead, the current study drew from the 
psychophysics literature and from this built a paradigm to assess emotion perception in a 
quantitative manner. Previous research in this domain has utilized psychophysics methods 
to assess visual perception using difference thresholds and points of subjective equality 
(PSE) (Harris, Atkinson, Lee, Nithi, & Fowler, 2003; Pokorny, 1998; Tokita & Ishiguchi, 
2010). In the field of emotion perception in ASD, Cook et al. (2013) utilized such 
techniques to assess discrimination between facial expressions. Cook et al. (2013) claimed 
that alexithymia, not autism, predicts poor recognition of emotional facial expressions. 
They assessed 64 adults with ASD and 42 TD adults on their ability to distinguish between 
two emotions (e.g. disgust/anger and surprise/fear) and two identities (Harold/Felix and 
Tracie/Maria). Stimuli were static images of one of 13 points along a continuum of the 
morph. Hence, the participant was presented with an image which was a hybrid of two 
emotions (e.g. disgust and anger) and two identities (e.g. Harold and Felix). In this 
example, participants were asked to indicate whether the emotion was ‘disgust or anger’ 
and ‘Harold or Felix. A measurement of how closely the participant was able to 
discriminate was taken by plotting each participant’s responses to the stimuli then fitting a 
psychometric function to these data. Therefore higher slope values indicate better 
discrimination ability and is a standard measure used to report psychometric functions 
(Rose, 1988). Point of Subjective Equivalence (PSE) was also drawn form each 
psychometric function, which indicates the point at which the participant was equally 
likely to respond one way (e.g. disgust) and the other (e.g. anger). Again, the use of PSE is 
an established measure of perceptual bias using psychometric functions (Meese, 1995).  
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4.2.4 Stimuli  
Stimuli were generated from six base images of a female actor conveying happy, sad, 
disgust, anger, surprise and fear facial expressions obtained from the Karolinska Directed 
Emotional Faces database (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998). These images made up the 
‘endpoints’ for image morphs in 3 different emotional-pairs conditions: happy/sad, 
disgust/anger, fear/surprise (see Figure 4–2, Figure 4–3 and Figure 4–4).  
 
Figure 4–1 Endpoint images used in stimuli generation for the happy/sad condition 
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Figure 4–2 Endpoint images used in stimuli generation for the disgust/anger condition 
 
Figure 4–3 Endpoint images used in stimulus generation for the surprise/fear condition 
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Using Fantamorph morphing software (Abrosoft, 2015) for each emotion-pair condition, 
17 morphs were created between the endpoints, referring to the endpoints as 0% and 100%.  
For example, in the disgust/angry condition, 0% refers to ‘0% disgust’ (which is the angry 
endpoint face) and 100% refers to ‘100% disgust’ (which is the disgust endpoint face). A 
total of 17 morph steps were created: 0%, 10%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 35%, 40%, 45%, 50%, 
55%, 60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, 90%, 100%. The morph steps are uneven because finer 
detail was required at the middle of the morph continuum.  
 
Figure 4–4 Stimulus Generation Example for disgust/angry Condition 
Before morphing the endpoints, images were fitted with an oval-shaped ‘mask’, which 
removed any external features of the images (e.g. ears, hair, background). Subsequent to 
this, the images were ‘normalised’ i.e. manipulated so that all stimuli had the same 
luminance and contrast. Note, however, only the area within the mask was normalised. The 
normalization process is typical of this kind of study (Pallett, Cohen, & Dobkins, 2014) 
and ensured that any performance differences observed between conditions could not be 
accounted for by differences in low-level visual spatial characteristics. The normalization 
process took the following steps:  
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1. All stimuli were converted to grey-scale using Adobe Photoshop (Adobe, 2015) 
2. Images were converted back to their original luminance values. This was achieved 
by performing an ‘inverse gamma’ function on each of the endpoint images. An 
inverse gamma function is applied because, when compressed images (e.g. jpeg) 
are presented on a computer monitor, there is a non-linear relationship between gun 
values (i.e. proportion of of white, red, blue and green) and luminance values (i.e. 
perceived brightness of the image). In order to have full control over the luminance 
values of all images, the inverse gamma function converts this non-linear 
relationship between gun values and luminance into a linear one. The luminance 
values were then averaged across all 6 ‘endpoint’ images. This was achieved by 
firstly determining an overall mean luminance value. Then, for each ‘endpoint’ 
image, each pixel was multiplied by a value that made the mean luminance equal to 
the desired value. The mean luminance of all images was 15.17 cd/m2.  
3. The root-mean-squared (rms) contrast of the stimuli was then manipulated for each 
baseline image. This was achieved by determining the rms contrast of the 
luminance-adjusted image, and then dividing each image-pixel value by a ratio 
(rms contrast of the luminance-adjusted image/desired rms contrast) in order to 
make the total rms contrast of the image the desired value. 
Stimuli were presented on a gamma corrected monitor using Palemedes toolbox for Matlab 
(Palamedes Version 1.8.2, Prins 2009) at a angular size of 3.64 deg (width) 7.06 deg 
(height). Stimulus angular size was exactly the same in Glasgow and UCSD, as were all of 
the stimulus qualities described above.  
4.2.5 Procedure 
Before testing began, participants were seated in the lab where they were briefed about the 
experiment. All participants provided written, informed consent before testing began. 
Exact instructions for the experimental task were then given to the participant (both orally 
and in an information sheet), followed by a short period in which the participant was able 
to familiarise themselves with the response keys (on a computer keyboard in front of them) 
and the viewing distance of the task. Stimulus angular size was kept the same for Glasgow 
and for UCSD (stimuli width = 3.64 deg and stimuli length = 7.06 deg). Hence, viewing 
distance at Glasgow was set at 120cm and at UCSD it was set at 79cm, because at 
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Glasgow, stimuli were presented on a 32-inch (1920 x 1080 pixels) computer monitor with 
maximum luminance 112 cd/m2. At UCSD, stimuli were presented on an 18-inch (1280 x 
800 pixels) computer monitor and max luminance was restricted to 112 cd/m2 in order to 
match the maximum luminance in Glasgow.  
In addition to oral instructions from the experimenter, participants were prompted with the 
following on-screen instructions before the experiment began:  
Welcome to the Emotion Judgment Experiment! In this experiment, you will 
see faces and decide if they look more like one emotion or another. We will let 
you know before a block begins which emotions you will be judging. When 
you are ready to begin, press the SPACE bar.  
After the participant pressed the spacebar a fixation-cross appeared at the centre of the 
screen. Participants were asked to look directly at the fixation-cross then, again, press the 
spacebar to initiate the first trial. At this point, a stimulus (see section 4.2.4) was presented 
in the centre of the screen for 400ms along with two response options on the left- and 
right-hand side of the stimulus. Response options were a ‘2-alternative forced choice’ 
(2AFC) of 2 emotion labels. Emotions labels were ‘happy’ or ‘sad’ for the happy/sad 
condition ‘disgust’ or ‘anger’ for the disgust/anger condition and ‘surprise’ or ‘fear’ for the 
surprise/fear condition. Participants pressed the left or right key to indicate the emotion 
label (bright stickers were attached to the left key (‘z’) and the right key (‘/’)) and all other 
keys were disabled. Although the stimulus was presented for only 400ms, response options 
remained on the screen until the participant responded. No feedback was given and 
participants were not able to respond faster than 100ms – a message saying ‘You 
responded too fast’ appeared on the screen if this happened. If the participant did not 
respond before 3000ms a message appeared saying ‘please make your response’.  
The experiment consisted of three conditions: happy/sad, surprise/fear, disgust/anger. In 
total the experiment lasted around 90 minutes. Each condition was repeated with the 
emotion labels either side of the stimulus switched to the opposite side e.g. if the left 
emotion label read ‘happy’ and the right emotion label read ‘sad’ for the first block of the 
happy/sad condition, the second block would have left emotion label as ‘sad’ right emotion 
label as ‘happy’. This measure was implemented in order to control for response bias (i.e. a 
participant favouring pressing one key over another). The experiment, therefore, comprised 
a total of 6 experimental blocks. Each block consisted of 170 trials (17 morph stimuli x 10 
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repetitions): 1020 trials in total. Before each block began, participants were prompted with 
on-screen instructions. For example the happy/sad condition would read: 
In this round, you will be judging whether faces look more like happy or sad. 
You will begin with some practice trials to familiarise yourself with the 
emotions for this round.  
Note, participants were prompted that the emotion labels would switch sides. For example, 
the second block of the happy/sad condition would read: 
In this round, you will be judging whether faces look more like sad or happy. 
You will begin with some practice trials to familiarise yourself with the 
emotions for this round. PLEASE NOTE THAT THE KEYS ARE 
SWITCHED. 
A practice session was given before each block in order to a. allow the participant to 
familiarise themselves with the stimuli and the keys and b. to ensure the participant was 
able to correctly label the six basic emotions (happy, sad, disgust, anger, sadness and fear). 
Participants were shown the ‘endpoint’ images (i.e. 100% and 0% emotion stimuli) and 
were required to correctly label these. For example, in the happy/sad condition participants 
were shown the 100% happy stimulus (100% happy face) and the 0% happy stimulus 
(100% sad face) and asked to label the stimuli as ‘happy’ or ‘sad’. Participants were shown 
each stimulus 10 times and were required to obtain 100% correct in the practice round to 
move on to the real experiment.  
After each block, participants were asked to take a break. During the breaks participants 
completed the psychometric and personal information questionnaires. Hence, the whole 
experiment was conducted in the following sequence (this was consistent for both Glasgow 
and UCSD):  
1. Introduction/ Consent form  
2. Questionnaire 1: Demographic/Medical Questionnaire  
3. Block 1 (randomised condition) 
4. Questionnaire 2: IRI 
5. Block 2 (randomised condition) 
  
124 
6. Own break (no questionnaire)  
7. Block 3 (randomised condition) 
8. Questionnaire 3: AQ 
9. Block 4 (randomised condition) 
10. Own break (no questionnaire) 
11. Block 5(randomised condition) 
12. Questionnaire 4: TAS 
13. Block 6 (randomised condition) 
Participants were debriefed at the end of the experiment and compensated for their 
participation with a course credit or a small monetary payment (£9 at University of 
Glasgow or $20 at UCSD). Each participant was offered the chance to ask questions or 
make comment at the end of the experiment as well as taking home an information sheet 
containing the experimenter’s contact details in case needed at a later date. In total, the 
experiment lasted around 90 minutes for each participant.  
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4.2.6 Analysis 
For each participant, data were obtained detailing the number of times they selected each 
emotion option in response to each of the 17 morph levels. In order to better characterise 
each participant’s responses, a cumulative normal function was fitted to these data using 
Palemedes toolbox for Matlab (Palamedes Version 1.8.2, Prins 2009; see example in 
Figure 4–5). 
 
Figure 4–5 Example of one participant’s data for the disgust/anger condition (blue dots) and 
the Cumulative Normal Function fitted to the data (red line)  
From the curve-fitting procedure two dependent variables were derived: 1) the slope of the 
cumulative normal curve (i.e. slope values closer 0 indicated poorer emotion 
discrimination ability) 2) the point of subjective equivalence (PSE) which is the point on 
the x-axis (morph level) that reflects 50 on the y axis (the point at which the participant 
was indicating equally 50% one emotion and 50% the other). PSE values that deviate from 
50 indicate a perceptual bias, smaller values indicating a bias to happy, disgust or surprise 
and higher values indicating a perceptual bias towards sad, anger or fear. After the 
cumulative normal function was fit, outlier participants were detected and removed from 
the dataset. In order to be kept in the dataset, the function fit to each participant was 
required to achieve 15% or below on the y-axis at one end of the morph continuum and 
85% or above on the y-axis at the other end of the morph continuum. It was recognised that 
if a participant curve did not meet 15% (i.e. the y intercept was > 15) and if it did not meet 
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85% (asymptote of the curve < 85) then it was likely that the participant was responding at 
random or was not paying attention to the task. Therefore, if these criteria were not met (in 
any of the 3 conditions) the participant was removed from the dataset. These rejection 
criteria applied to 3 individuals, hence the final number of participants included in the 
analysis was 141. 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Descriptive information 
Demographic information for all participants can be found in Table 4-1 and is displayed 
per location group (i.e. Glasgow and UCSD). Age was compared using an independent 
samples t-test (because these data were in scale format) and all other variables were 
compared using a Chi-Square test (i.e. because these data were in nominal format). After 
controlling for multiple comparisons using a Holm-Bonferroni correction (Holm, 1979), 
only race was found to be significantly different between Glasgow and UCSD: X2 = (1, N 
= 144) = 29.33, p < 0.01. This indicated that UCSD had a significantly greater number of 
non-Western Caucasian participants (i.e. American Indian/Alaska native, Asian, Native 
Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, Black or African American, White, Latin American or 
Unknown/Other) than Glasgow. Race was, therefore, included as a possible contributing 
factor to the below analyses, in order to assess if race had a significant contribution to the 
variance in the data.  
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Table 4-1 Demographic Information 
 Glasgow (n = 54)  UCSD (n = 87)  
Age Mean 23.04 (SD 4.63)  Mean 21.25 (SD 2.82) 
Gender 31% M  69% F 
 
29% M  71% F 
Handedness 87% R 13% L  93% R 7% L 
Race  70% White 30% Other*  31% White 69% Other* 
Education 
0% < High 
School 
100% > High 
School  
13% < High 
School 
87% > High 
School 
Psych Diagnosis 11% Yes 89% No  14% Yes 86% No 
Period of 
Unhappiness > 2 
weeks 53% Yes 48% No  40% Yes 60% No 
Period Irritability  
> 2 weeks 28% Yes 72% No  18% Yes 82% No 
Relative with ASD 4% Yes 96% No  5% Yes 95% No 
* Meets significance at p < 0.05  
 
Descriptive statistics for psychometric measures were also compared between Glasgow 
and UCSD (see Table 4-2). Results revealed no significant difference between the groups on 
any of these measures. Dependent variables (i.e. Slope and PSE values) were also 
compared between Glasgow and UCSD ( 
Table 4-3). Results revealed no significant difference between Glasgow and UCSD. 
Consequently, Glasgow and UCSD were included as one participant group in the analyses 
described henceforth. Location was, nevertheless, included as a possible contributing 
factor in the below analyses in order to remain watchful of any group differences in 
subsequent analyses. 
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Table 4-2 Descriptive information about the psychometric measures 
  Glasgow    UCSD  
 Mean SD Range  Mean SD Range 
AQ_Total 18.28 9.13 2 - 41 
 
16.50 6.84 4 - 35 
TAS_Total 48.76 11.86 25 - 78 
 
46.00 9.11 24 - 68 
IRI_Total 68.04 11.07 37 - 90 
 
69.25 9.56 50 - 92 
       
  
Table 4-3 Average scores for dependent variables for all participants, separated by location 
 Glasgow  UCSD 
 
Mean SD 
 
Mean SD 
Slope hap/sad 0.09 0.03 
 
0.08 0.03 
Slope dis/ang 0.08 0.03 
 
0.06 0.02 
Slope sur/fear 0.06 0.02 
 
0.06 0.02 
      
PSE hap/sad 53.01 8.82  55.97 8.24 
PSE dis/ang 54.16 6.41  54.43 6.71 
PSE sur/fear 47.70 7.12  49.18 6.64 
 
4.3.2 Pearson’s correlation  
In the first instance the hypotheses that people with higher AQ scores would be poorer at 
emotion discrimination was assessed using a Pearson’s correlation. This was performed 
between AQ and slope for all three conditions. Results revealed no significant correlation 
between AQ and slope for happy/sad (r = - 0.05, n = 141, p = 0.53; see Figure 4–6), 
disgust/anger (r = 0.1,n = 141, p = 0.26; see Figure 4–7) or surprise/fear ( r = -0.04, n = 
141, p = 0.67; see Figure 4–8). 
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Figure 4–6 Pearson's correlation between slope values and AQ score (happy/sad condition) 
 
 
Figure 4–7 Pearson's correlation between slope values and AQ score (disgust/anger 
condition) 
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Figure 4–8 Pearson's correlation between slope values and AQ score (surprise/fear 
condition) 
Since it was also hypothesised that, if AQ did not correlate with slope, alexithymia (TAS 
scores) would, independent samples t-tests were carried out between TAS score and slope 
values for each condition. No significant correlation was found between TAS and slope for 
happy/sad (r = -0.03, n = 141, p =0.70; see Figure 4–9), disgust/anger (r =0.00, n = 141, p 
=0.96; see Figure 3-5) and surprise/fear (r =0.06, n = 141, p =0.49; see Figure 4–11) 
conditions. Therefore, these initial analyses indicate that the null hypotheses are accepted 
because no correlation had been found between slope and AQ or TAS.  
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Figure 4–9 Pearson's correlation between slope values and TAS score (happy/sad 
condition) 
 
Figure 4–10 Pearson's correlation between slope values and TAS score (disgust/anger 
condition) 
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Figure 4–11 Pearson's correlation between slope values and TAS score (surprise/fear 
condition) 
In order to further assess the relationship between AQ and TAS score, Pearson’s 
correlation was performed between these variables. As shown in Figure 4–12, a significant 
positive correlation was found between AQ and TAS (r =0.541, n = 141, p < 0.01), 
indicating that individuals with higher autism-like traits were more likely to have higher 
levels of alexithymia.  
 
Figure 4–12 Pearson's correlation between autism-like traits (AQ score) and alexithymia 
(TAS score) 
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4.3.3 Multiple regression analysis 
The above Pearson’s correlation analysis indicated that neither AQ nor TAS scores 
predicted slope values. Therefore, Multiple Regression Analyses (MRAs) were performed 
in order to 1. further assess any nuanced contribution of AQ and TAS to the variance of 
slope and 2. assess the contribution of other variables that may better predict the variance 
in slope values. MRA was chosen as an ideal statistical measure due to the large number of 
possible contributing IVs. Because MRA requires, by its very nature, multiple IVs to be 
implemented into the model, it is susceptible to the unfavourable effects of multi-
collinearity (i.e. two IVs being correlated with each other resulting in an artificially 
inflated prediction of the DV; Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black (1995)). The severity of 
multi-collinearity was then assessed by finding the variance inflation factor (VIF) via the 
equation: 1/(1-R2). A VIF of 1 indicates no correlation and the most common cut off value 
for VIF is 10 (e.g., (Hair et al., 1995; Marquard.Dw, 1970; Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 
1989)) However, more recent literature suggests a more conservative maximum VIF of 4 
(e.g. Pan and Jackson (2008)). A cut off of point of <1 and >4 VIF was therefore 
implemented to this dataset. An MRA was conducted in order to assess the contribution of 
13 possible IVs (including AQ and TAS) on the slope. Hence, the variables implemented 
in the multiple regression were as follows:  
DV: Slope (derived from cumulative normal fit for each participant) 
 
IVs:  
• Location 
• Age 
• Gender 
• Handedness 
• Race  
• Education  
• Psych Diagnosis 
• Period of Unhappiness > 2 weeks 
• Period Irritability > 2 weeks 
• Relative with ASD 
• IRI Total 
• TAS Total 
• AQ Total 
 
 
4.3.3.1 Slope happy/sad condition 
As a whole, the model did not account for a significant proportion of the variance in slope 
(R = 0.40, R2 = 0.16, R2 Adjusted = 0.05; F(13,117) = 1.50, p = 0.13). However, each IV was 
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assessed for its individual contribution to the model, calculated by dividing the 
unstandardised B value by its standard error. The B, beta and t values of all IVs were 
examined: significant t values indicated that the IV was making a significant contribution 
to the prediction of the DV. Age was found to be a significant contributor to the MRA 
model for happy/sad slope. Where B = 0.002, beta = 0.22, t = 2.17 p = 0.03, i.e. increase in 
age indicated higher slope and therefore better emotion discrimination ability. For age, VIF 
was 1.246, meaning that age was not collinear to a significant level with any other IV when 
predicting slope. In addition to this, having a ‘period of irritability > 2 weeks’ was also 
found to be a significant individual contributor to the model (i.e. B = - 0.02, beta = -0.21, t 
= - 2.06, p = 0.04, VIF = 1.33). This provides an indication that emotion discrimination 
ability decreased as (the point biserial) group membership moved from ‘no’ to ‘yes’. In 
other words, those who indicated they had a period of irritability for greater than 2 weeks 
were worse at emotion discrimination for happy/sad faces. Again, this IV was not found to 
be collinear to a significant level with any other IV when predicting slope, therefore risk of 
multi-collinearity was very low. These results suggest that, although this MRA model as a 
whole is non-significant, individual contributors may be age and having had a period of 
irritability. This analysis further verifies that neither AQ nor TAS predict emotion 
discrimination ability for happy/sad condition, and that age and a period of irritability may 
be better predictors of emotion discrimination.  
In order to ratify the relative contribution of AQ and TAS. A second MRA was performed. 
Here, the IVs that were revealed to be most indicative of slope values were incorporated 
into the model, i.e. the variables incorporated into the MRA were as follows: 
DV: Slope 
IVs:  
• age 
• ‘period of irritability > 2 weeks’  
Results revealed that this model significantly accounted for the variance in slope (R = 0.22, 
R2 = 0.05, R2 Adjusted = 0.03; F(2,137) = 3.35, p = 0.03). When AQ was added, it did not 
improve the model, but in fact reduced the significance of the model (R = 0.22, R2 = 0.05, 
R2 Adjusted = 0.03; F(3,137) = 2.22, p = 0.09). AQ was removed from the model and this 
time TAS was added. Adding TAS to the model did not improve the prediction of slope, 
instead reducing the significance of the model (R = 0.22, R2 = 0.05, R2 Adjusted = 0.03; 
F(3,137) = 2.24, p = 0.08). It is, therefore, apparent from the data that neither AQ score nor 
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TAS score predict slope values for the happy/sad condition and hence, an increase in 
autism-like traits or alexithymia is not associated with poorer emotion discrimination for 
happy and sad faces.  
4.3.3.2 Slope disgust/anger condition 
As above, the same MRA process was applied to slope values from the disgust/anger 
condition. Firstly slope values were compared to all 13 IVs. Second, only the IVs that were 
found to have a significant, or approach a significant, individual contribution to the model 
were incorporated in the MRA and thirdly AQ and TAS were applied in separate steps to 
the model in order to assess any possible contribution from them. The first analysis 
revealed that the model provided a significant prediction of slope (R = 0.48, R2 = 0.23, 
Adjusted R2 = 0.13; F(13,117) = 2.40, p < 0.01). IVs were assessed for their individual 
contribution to the model, revealing that age was a significant predictor of slope (B = 
0.002, beta = 0.24, t = 2.45 p = 0.02) (increase in age reflected better emotion 
discrimination) and period of unhappiness > 2 weeks approached significance: (B = 0.01, 
beta = 0.20, t = 1.99 p = 0.05) (indicating ‘yes’ to having a period of unhappiness for 
greater than 2 weeks reflected better emotion discrimination). In order to assess the 
contribution of AQ and TAS to the model, each was added to a new model, which only 
implemented age and period of unhappiness. When age and period of unhappiness were 
entered into the MRA as a model, they significantly predicted slope (R = 0.35, R2 = 0.12, 
Adjusted R2 = 0.110; F(2,136) = 9.281, p < 0.01). When AQ was added to this model it did 
not improved the fit of the model (R = 0.35, R2 = 0.12, Adjusted R2 = 0.11; F(3,136) = 6.32, p 
< 0.01) with the contribution of AQ being: B = 0.00, beta = 0.05, t = 0.55, p = 0.58). AQ 
was then removed form the model, and TAS was added. Results revealed that TAS did not 
improve the fit of the model (R = 0.35, R2 = 0.12, Adjusted R2 = 0.10; F(3,136) = 6.32, p < 
0.01;  contribution of TAS: B = 0.00, beta = 0.00, t = 0.00, p = 0.99). These findings 
provide further evidence that neither AQ nor TAS show any indication of predicting slope 
values.  
4.3.3.3 Slope surprise/fear condition 
As above, three separate multiple regression analyses were conducted in order to further 
explore the contribution of AQ and TAS to slope and also to unpick possible contributors, 
which may have otherwise being missed. As before, surprise/fear slope values were firstly 
compared to all 13 IVs. Second, only the IVs that were found to have a significant, or close 
to significant, individual contribution to the model were implemented in the MRA. 
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Thirdly, AQ and TAS were added to the MRA in separate steps in order to assess any 
possible contribution from them. The first analysis revealed that the model provided a 
significant prediction of slope (R = 0.46, R2 = 0.21, Adjusted R2 = 0.11; F13,117 = 2.12 p = 
0.02). Age was found to be a significant individual contributor (B = 0.002, beta = 0.34, t = 
3.48, p < 0.01; VIF = 1.25), meaning that as age increased so did slope and therefore 
emotion discrimination was better for those who were older. No other IVs were indicated 
as being significant individual contributors to the MRA model. However, the next most 
significant predictor was Period of Unhappiness > 2 weeks which approached significance 
(B = 0.008, beta = 0.18, t = 1.79, p = 0.08; VIF = 1.35). This suggested that individuals 
who indicated that they had had a period of unhappiness for greater than 2 weeks may have 
been slightly better at emotion discrimination. Overall, these results suggest that neither 
AQ nor TAS predicted emotion discrimination for surprise and fearful faces. In addition to 
this, MRA results suggested that being older or having had a period of unhappiness may 
predict emotion discrimination ability. 
For all conditions, neither AQ nor TAS predicted slope values. On the contrary, age was 
found to be a significant predictor of slope (as age increased so did emotion discrimination 
ability for all conditions). Also, having had a period of irritability of greater than 2 weeks 
may inhibit emotion discrimination ability (in the happy/sad condition only). In addition to 
this the data moved towards, but did not reach significance level p = 0.05, for period of 
unhappiness for greater than 2 weeks, giving a slight indication that emotion 
discrimination ability may be better if an individual reports a period of unhappiness.  
4.3.4 Slope: highest and lowest 10% 
It could be asserted that, by randomly sampling from the typical population, the 
aforementioned results are biased due to a large number of ‘intermediate’ individuals who 
have neither high nor low AQ scores. In order to assess the difference between those that 
had the very lowest and those that had the very highest AQ scores a t-test was performed 
on the top and bottom 10% of participants. Thus, the slope values of the lowest 10% AQ 
scorers (n = 14, mean AQ = 5.36, std. error =0.44) and the highest 10% AQ scorers (n = 
14, mean AQ = 31.71, std. error =1.07) were compared using an independent samples t-
test. No significant differences were found for happy/sad, disgust/anger or surprise/fear 
conditions. These results indicate that no significant difference was found in emotion 
discrimination ability for participants with very high autism-like traits compared to very 
low autism-like traits.  
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As highlighted above, it was hypothesised that despite a non-significant result between AQ 
score and slope, alexithymia (TAS score) may, none-the-less contribute in its own right. 
Therefore, the above analysis was repeated for TAS scores. Hence, the slope values of the 
lowest 10% TAS scorers (n = 14, mean TAS = 30.93, std. error = 0.99) and the highest 
10% TAS scorers (mean TAS = 66.71, std. error = 1.23) were compared using an 
independent samples t-test. No significant differences were found for happy/sad, 
disgust/anger or surprise/fear conditions. These results indicate that relatively high 
alexithymic individuals did not significantly differ from relatively low alexithymic 
individuals in their ability to discrimination facial expressions of emotion.  
4.4 Point of Subjective Equivalence (PSE) 
Point of subjective equivalence (PSE) is the point at which the participant was equally 
likely to select either emotion label option in response to the stimulus. For example, in the 
happy/sad condition PSE value is the morph value (i.e. % of happy content in the face 
stimulus) when the participants selected happy 50% of the time. PSE is, therefore a 
measure of how biased the participant was to either of the emotion labels. For example, if 
the participant selected ‘happy’ 50% of the time and ‘sad’ 50% of the time when the 
stimulus displayed a 30% happy/70% sad morph then the individual would be biased 
towards happy emotion. i.e. although the stimulus was predominantly sad looking, the 
participant was equally likely to report it as happy than sad.  
In addition to looking at discrimination (slope), the current study also measured perceptual 
bias (as measured using PSE). PSE values were compared using an independent samples t-
test: between the highest 10% and lowest 10% AQ scores and the highest 10% and lowest 
10% TAS scores. Therefore, for the lowest 10% AQ scorers (n = 14, mean = 5.36, std. 
error =0.44) and the highest 10% AQ scorers (n = 14, mean =31.71, std. error =1.07), a t-
test was performed for PSE values of all three conditions. A significant difference was 
found between high and low AQ scorers for the happy/sad condition t(26) = -2.16, p = 
0.04, where for the high AQ scorers the mean PSE was 58.25 (SD: 7.89, St. error of the 
mean: 2.11) and for low AQ scorers was 51.37 (SD: 8.98, St. error of the mean: 2.40). This 
suggested that the high AQ group was biased towards sad, meaning that they needed a 
higher proportion of ‘happy’ content in the face in order to classify it as ‘happy’, however 
it is noted that even for the low AQ scorers PSE is greater than 50, i.e. slightly biased 
towards sad. Therefore although a slight bias towards sad is found in low scorers this is 
significantly more pronounced in high AQ scorers.  
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A t-test was also performed on the lowest 10% TAS scorers (n = 14, mean = 30.93, std. 
error = 0.99) and the highest 10% TAS scorers (n = 14, mean = 66.71, std. error = 1.23) 
and, again, a significant difference was found for the happy/sad condition, with high TAS 
scorers having a bias towards happy t (26) = -2.51, p = 0.02, no significant difference was 
found for disgust/anger or surprise/fear. For the happy/sad condition, high TAS scorers had 
a mean PSE of 58.45 (SD: 10.10, St error of the mean: 2.70) and low TAS scorers had a 
mean PSE of 48.99 (SD: 9.81, St. error of the mean: 2.62), hence individuals who where 
more alexithymic were significantly more biased towards the sad emotion.  
In order to assess the potential contribution of PSE further, a correlation of PSE with AQ 
was performed. A significant correlation was not found for the disgust/anger condition (r = 
0.048, n = 141, p = 0.57; see Figure 4–13) or the surprise/fear condition (r = 0.06, n = 141, 
p = 0.51; see Figure 4–14), suggesting that AQ score did not influence being biased to one 
emotion or the other. However, for the happy/sad condition the correlation between AQ 
and PSE values approached significance (r = 0.16, n = 141, p = 0.06; see Figure 4–15) 
indicating that having a higher AQ score may slightly bias the individual towards selecting 
‘sad’ more than ‘happy’. 
 
Figure 4–13 Pearson's correlation between PSE values and AQ score (disgust/anger 
condition) 
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Figure 4–14 Pearson's correlation between PSE values and AQ score (surprise/fear 
condition) 
 
Figure 4–15 Pearson's correlation between PSE values and AQ score (happy/sad condition) 
In order to assess the potential relationship between alexithymia and perceptual bias, a 
correlation between PSE and TAS was performed. A significant correlation was found 
between TAS and PSE for the happy/sad condition (r = 0.19, n = 141, p = 0.02; see Figure 
4–16). No significant correlation was found between TAS and PSE for the disgust/anger 
condition (r = 0.01, n = 141, p = 0.92; see Figure 4–17) or for the surprise/fear condition (r 
= -.01, n = 141, p = 0.97; see Figure 4–18). Hence, these analyses suggest that participants 
who were more alexithymic were biased to the emotion ‘sad’ in the happy/sad condition 
but not for the disgust/anger or surprise/fear conditions.  
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Figure 4–16 Pearson's correlation between PSE values and TAS score (happy/sad condition) 
 
Figure 4–17 Pearson's correlation between PSE values and TAS score (disgust/anger 
condition) 
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Figure 4–18 Pearson's correlation between PSE values and TAS score (surprise/fear 
condition) 
 
4.5 Discussion 
The current study assessed facial expression recognition ability and its relationship with 
autism-like traits and alexithymia in an adult population. The current study employed a 
procedure that carefully equated stimuli for luminance, contrast and visual angle, ensuring 
that group differences were not driven by the low-level visual characteristics of the stimuli. 
By fitting a cumulative normal function to each participant’s dataset, a measure of emotion 
discrimination ability (slope) as well as perceptual bias (PSE) was obtained. These 
measures reflected an ability to discriminate between the emotions of happy and sad; 
disgust and anger; surprise and fear.  
No relationship between level of autism-like traits and emotion discrimination ability was 
found in the current study. This is surprising given that there is much evidence to suggest 
that individuals with ASD have difficulty with emotion recognition (Harms et al., 2010), 
with some studies even suggesting particular confusions between disgust and anger, and 
fear and surprise (Jones et al., 2011). Poljac et al (2012) assessed emotion recognition in 
high and low AQ scorers and reported a significant difference between these groups for 
anger, disgust and sadness. Results from the current study are not consistent with this, 
instead finding no significant difference between high and low scorers in their emotion 
discrimination ability. Cook et al. (2013), on the other hand, found that autism severity in 
adults with ASD, as measured by AQ score, did not correlate with emotion discrimination 
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ability, a result that was reflected in the current study. However, Cook et al. (2013) also 
reported that, alexithymia, as measured by TAS score, correlated with emotion 
discrimination ability in the same sample of individuals, concluding that alexithymia, not 
AQ, predicted poor emotion discrimination. On the contrary, the current study found no 
significant correlation between alexithymia and emotion discrimination. Further, multiple 
regression analyses ratified the finding that neither AQ nor alexithymia score predicted 
emotion discrimination ability. Cook et al reported that TAS contributed to emotion 
discrimination ability over and above that of AQ because, when entered into a multiple 
regression analysis, AQ failed to significantly improve the model whereas TAS was 
successful in improving the model. The current study similarly assessed the relative 
contribution of AQ and TAS in improving the model of emotion discrimination ability, 
however neither AQ nor TAS significantly improved the model. Hence, the current study 
provides evidence against the proposal from Cook et al. (2013) that ‘alexithymia, not 
autism, predicts poor recognition of emotional facial expressions’.  
The interplay between emotion perception, ASD and alexithymia is a growing area of 
research, with several studies in support of the notion that alexithymia, not autism, predicts 
emotion difficulties in ASD, e.g. (Bird & Cook, 2013; Bird, Press, & Richardson, 2011; P. 
Shah et al., 2016). The idea that alexithymia, not autism itself, predicts poor FER is 
compelling given that current literature in this area report conflicting findings. In other 
words, it is apparent that the research field is looking for an explanation as to why these 
conflicting results have arisen, and so, a co-morbid condition of alexithymia, present in 
some individuals with ASD but not others, would fit nicely as the missing piece to this 
puzzle. However, if this is true, is it unclear why alexithymia did not play a part in the 
participants’ ability to discriminate emotions in the current study. If alexithymia was the 
true reason for some individuals with ASD being impaired in FER and others not, then an 
obvious correlation between TAS score and FER ability would be expected. This study did 
not find that alexithymia score predicted FER ability and so it is apparent that more 
empirical evidence is needed in order to test this theory.  
This study also aimed to explore the assertions that extraneous variables are often not 
accounted for in FER ASD research (Harms et al., 2010). A consistent predictor of 
emotion discrimination ability, across all three conditions, was age. It could be argued that 
participants who were older may have been more likely to pay close attention to the task, 
or perhaps took more time to consider their responses to each stimulus, but since reaction 
time was not measured this cannot be objectively assessed. Period of irritability also 
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emerged as a significant predictor of discrimination ability, but only for happy/sad faces, 
suggesting that individuals who have a tendency towards feeling irritable find it more 
difficult to discriminate between happy and sad faces. Period of unhappiness approached 
significance as a predictor of emotion discrimination ability (slope) for disgust/anger and 
surprise/fear. This suggests that individuals who have a tendency towards feelings of 
unhappiness may be more sensitive to subtle differences in these emotions. Despite ‘period 
of unhappiness’ emerging as a contributing independent variable to slope, a diagnosis of 
depression did not. It could be suggested that individuals who reported having a period of 
unhappiness may be more sensitive to the emotional affect of negative emotions, as has 
been found in neurotic vs. extrovert individuals (Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991). However, as 
these results only approached a significance level, more data would be needed in order to 
substantiate this suggestion.  
In addition to the above findings, the present study also indicated that a perceptual bias 
towards sad faces in the happy/sad condition was found for individuals with high levels of 
autism-like traits. Similarly, a perceptual bias towards sad faces was found for participants 
who had greater alexithymia scores. This additional insight into perceptual bias adds to the 
aforementioned results because, although neither AQ not alexithymia predicted differences 
in emotion discrimination, an atypical difficulty in perception of happy and sad faces 
emerged for those who had high AQ or high alexithymia scores. For example, Poljac et al. 
(2013) found high AQ scorers to be significantly worse than low AQ scorers for sad 
emotions, however, no measure of bias was assessed, hence results may have been 
indicative of a bias to sad as opposed to being ‘better’ at emotion detection. The present 
study was also careful to control for response bias, by requiring participants to switch 
response keys for half of the trials, which was not assessed in Poljac et al. (2013). Taken 
together, these results suggest that emotion discrimination ability is not predicted by 
autism-like traits or by alexithymia. However, nuances in perception of happy and sad 
faces indicate that those with high levels of autism-like traits and high levels of 
alexithymia may be biased towards sad emotions.  
Overall, results from the present study suggest that neither AQ nor alexithymia predict 
facial expression discrimination. However, individuals who have high AQ traits (and 
therefore more likely to have ASD) cannot be considered equivalent to low AQ individuals 
because a perceptual bias towards sad was found for those with high levels of autism-like 
traits or alexithymia.  
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There are limitations to the current study which may have impacted the results described 
above, for example, overall, slope values were generally relatively low (all falling below 
0.2) suggesting that the experimental task may have been somewhat difficult. The task 
itself required participants to discriminate between emotions after viewing them for a short 
period of time and therefore, some individuals may have found this challenging. It could be 
possible that, if floor effects were found, participants may have relied upon visual aspects 
of the stimulus and not the emotional affect itself. In comparison to similar studies (e.g. 
Poljac et al. (2013)), this study did not assess ‘accuracy’, so it could be suggested that the 
more complex design of this study may also have contributed to floor effects. Future 
studies would need to explore whether the present result could be replicated with a simpler 
design. Additionally, the present study could be improved by administering a more 
extensive measure of depression, for example the patient health questionnaire (PHQ-9; 
Kroenke, Spitzer, and Williams (2001)). In the present study, time constraints did not 
allow for the administration of established questionnaires on depression and so the general 
mood questions (e.g. ‘have you had a period of sadness for longer than two weeks?’) were 
used instead. These measures were considered as placeholders, with aims to assess 
depression measures in further detail in future studies. It could also be suggested that 
because the current study sampled from the ‘typical’ population (i.e. no participant had a 
known diagnosis of ASD), levels of autism may not have been high enough to facilitate 
difficulties in emotion perception. Future studies would also aim to incorporate a 
population of individuals with a diagnosis of ASD. 
The current study explored the notion that alexithymia, not AQ may predict FER. 
Consequently, results indicated that neither alexithymia nor AQ score predict FER, based 
on evidence from an emotion discrimination task. Moreover, age was found to significantly 
predict emotion discrimination and so future research would benefit from considering 
covariates that may have otherwise been ignored. Overall, these data assert that neither AQ 
nor TAS predict emotion discrimination ability in a sample of non-ASD adults and hence 
expanding current research on autism like traits in the typical population as well as the 
relative contribution of alexithymia as a predictor of FER ability.  
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Chapter 5 General Discussion 
5.1 Overview of general discussion 
This thesis aimed to address the confusion in the literature surrounding facial expression 
recognition in individuals with ASD. To do this, a novel method of measuring FER was 
applied to a sample of adults (Chapter 2) and children with ASD (Chapter 3). Additionally, 
a sensitive measure of emotion discrimination was applied to typical adults, from which 
the contribution of autism-like traits and alexithymia to FER ability was explored (Chapter 
4). The main findings of the thesis will be summarised regarding FER as measured by 
facial AUs, amplitude, latency and response patterns in adults with ASD and in children 
with ASD. Next, the contribution of alexithymia and autism-like traits to FER in the 
typical population will be discussed. Then, the contribution of these results to the field of 
facial expression processing in ASD will be evaluated and will be related to the theoretical 
accounts of FER in ASD. This will be followed by a discussion of the implications of these 
findings. General limitations of the research will be examined and, lastly, future directions 
of research will be suggested.  
5.1.1 Summary of findings 
5.1.1.1 Atypicality of AUs 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 use a novel psychophysics technique (Generative Face Grammar 
(Yu et al., 2012)) to assess the recognition of facial expressions of emotion. By using this 
technique, a model, depicting the specific AUs that were used for FER, was drawn from a 
participant’s response to the GFG stimuli. Hence, a rich dataset was provided, depicting 
the specific AUs that were meaningful for each emotion categorization (for adults: happy, 
surprise, fear, disgust, anger and sadness; for children: happy and anger). It was expected 
that the AUs used by individuals with ASD (children and adults) would differ (or be 
‘atypical’) compared to TD indivdiuals. 
The results described in section 2.3.2 indicated that, as a group, adults with ASD were not 
significantly different from TD adults when both groups were compared to a reference 
dataset. This goes against our original hypothesis that adults with ASD would have 
atypical perception of AUs and also provides evidence against a basic FER ‘impairment’ in 
adults with ASD that has been presented in many research papers (S. Baron-Cohen et al., 
1997; Clark, Winkielman, & McIntosh, 2008; Humphreys et al., 2007; Kennedy & 
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Adolphs, 2012; Philip et al., 2010). Further analysis suggested that specific individuals 
were different from the other members of their group, and hence suggest that: a) 
individuals with ASD vary in FER ability and b) reporting between-group differences 
alone may mask nuanced heterogeneity of FER ability across individuals with ASD. It was 
also found, in Chapter 2 that those individuals who were most ‘atypical’ had either the 
highest ADOS scores (in the ASD group) or the highest AQ scores (in the TD group). 
These results are tentative given that only two participants followed this trend, however, 
these results are meaningful given that previous research has found FER ability to be 
negatively correlated with measures of autism ‘severity’ (B. T. Williams & Gray, 2013). 
As described later in the text, further research would aim to ratify this relationship between 
ADOS/AQ scores and FER ability.  
5.1.1.2 Amplitude 
Previous research has suggested that stimuli with greater ‘intensity’ (i.e. amplitude of the 
facial expression) elicit better accuracy in FER tasks compared to less intense stimuli (Law 
Smith et al., 2010). The results presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 tested this in adults 
and children with ASD and revealed no connection between FER ability and intensity 
when the models were assessed as a whole. When the amplitude of the AUs were assessed 
separately for the eye and the mouth region, it emerged that the TD adults had significantly 
higher amplitude values for the eye region and the mouth region compared to adults with 
ASD. This provides evidence against claims that individuals with ASD require more 
intensity in a facial expression in order to accurately categorise (Law Smith et al., 2010) 
and also, somewhat surprisingly, provides evidence against the assertion that individuals 
with ASD utilise information from the mouth area over and above the eye area (Joseph & 
Tanaka, 2003; Spezio et al., 2007a). 
5.1.1.3 Latency 
In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 no significant differences in FER relative to timing were found 
for children or adults with ASD compared to TD individuals. This counters previous 
research that has suggested that timing is an important, and often overlooked, component 
of FER that influences the ability to accurately recognise emotions (Lerner et al., 2013; 
Philip et al., 2010; Sato et al., 2013). Lerner et al., (2013) argued for a ‘delayed social 
information processing speed’, indicating that individuals with ASD required additional 
time in order to processes facial expressions and accurately recognise their emotion. The 
data presented in this thesis do not support this finding, instead suggesting equivalence in 
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this skill between ASD and TD groups for both adults and children. It could be suggested, 
therefore, that including a dynamic element to the stimuli (and hence making them more 
life-like), FER becomes somewhat easier. These sentiments resonate with the results 
discussed in several papers such as (Gepner et al., 2001; Loveland et al., 1997) and perhaps 
support Enticott et al. (2014), who argued that including a dynamic aspect to facial 
expression stimuli improves FER performance in individuals with ASD.  
5.1.1.4 Response patterns  
Previous research such as Leung et al. (2013) found children with ASD to be slower in RT 
compared to TD children when categorizing facial expressions of emotion. It was 
expected, therefore, that in Chapter 3, children with ASD would have been slower in 
comparison to TD children. However, as described in section 3.3.1.1, the data indicated no 
RT bias in children with ASD as compared to TD children. These findings were, therefore, 
somewhat surprising. It could be argued that children with ASD are equivalent to TD 
children in their RT, despite some children responding in a relatively ‘atypical’ manner. In 
addition to this, it should be noted that the very nature of the task used in Chapter 3 might 
have influenced RTs between groups. For example, the task (unlike Leung et al. (2013)) 
required a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response. Because of this, it could be argued that regardless of FER 
ability, reaction time would be quicker because participants did not have the increased 
cognitive demand of choosing between several emotion label options. In certain types of 
visual tasks, children with ASD have been found to be faster in RT compared to TD 
children (Plaisted, O'Riordan, & Baron-Cohen, 1998). Hence, it could also be argued that 
experimental designs that require less cognitive demand, in terms of decision-making, may 
override RT differences. Therefore, the findings reported here (that children with ASD 
were equivalent to TD children in RT to facial expression categorization) are, perhaps, not 
as surprising as first suggested.  
Chapter 3 also indicated that children with ASD were more bias to the selection of ‘yes’ in 
their judgment of whether stimuli were ‘angry’ or not, compared to the TD group. TD 
children were more likely to select ‘no’ to random-looking stimuli when asked ‘is this 
person angry?’ However, both groups were equally ‘conservative’ in their judgment of 
‘happy’. For adults (see Chapter 2), the task was slightly more taxing because instead of 
‘yes’/’no’ responses, participants responded from a selection of seven choices: ‘happy’, 
‘surprise’, ‘fear’, ‘disgust’, ‘anger’, ‘sadness’ or ‘other’. For these participants, results 
indicated that the ASD group were more likely to select ‘other’ out of the seven options, 
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while the TD group were more likely to select ‘surprise’. This could indicate firstly that 
children with ASD may have greater difficulty with the emotion anger than typically 
developing children. It could also suggest that FER ability improves with age because 
while children with ASD appeared to be much less conservative to selecting the stimuli as 
‘angry’, adults with ASD were significantly more conservative than TD adults for all 
emotions, favouring to choose ‘other’ instead of the six basic emotion labels. 
5.1.1.5 The contribution of age group, AQ and alexithymia 
Chapter 2 indicated that, although autism ‘severity’ was linked with FER ability, 
alexithymia scores were not. In an investigation of a larger sample of participants (Chapter 
4), no evidence was found for a correlation between alexithymia score and FER ability. 
This provides evidence against the theory that alexithymia predicts FER ability over and 
above ASD, as suggested by Bird and Cook (2013). In addition to this, no correlation was 
found between AQ score and FER ability in this sample, however AQ score was linked to 
FER ability in typical individuals in Chapter 2. It could be argued that the tasks used in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 were more demanding (i.e. required greater cognitive effort and 
FER skill), and, hence, may have produced AQ-dependent, FER atypicalities more so than 
in Chapter 4.  
In addition to this, individual differences within groups were found to be informative about 
FER in ASD. In section 2.3.2 results indicated that, although no significant differences 
were presented group-wise, individual differences were found within groups. Hence, the 
particular ‘atypical’ individuals would not have been picked up in a group-wise analysis. 
The evidence given in this thesis for individual differences in adults with ASD suggests 
that assessing group differences alone may overshadow individual differences in some 
cases and, therefore, the proportion of studies that have shown a significant difference 
between ASD and TD groups in FER ability may be overestimated (Nuske et al., 2013; 
Uljarevic & Hamilton, 2013). It is also striking that the individuals who were found to be 
the most ‘atypical’ had the highest ADOS scores, hence suggesting that FER ability may 
be directly related to autism severity and thus supporting the notion that FER ability is 
negatively correlated with autism severity (Lerner et al., 2013; Uono et al., 2013; B. T. 
Williams & Gray, 2013). Also, it could be argued that some individuals may be at different 
stages in ‘social training’ (e.g. FER interventions), and so may be more skilled in 
compensatory strategies than others, depending on the resources that have been available 
to them (Rutherford & McIntosh, 2007; Walsh et al., 2014)  
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5.1.2 Condensed summary of findings 
In a sample of adults with ASD, results indicated relatively equivalent FER abilities 
compared to TD adults. No differences were found in the timing of the models, suggesting 
that adults with ASD do not have a delayed social information processing speed. FER was 
also assessed in children with ASD and TD children using a similar, but simplified 
technique. Here, relatively equivalent results were also found between ASD and TD 
groups. Hence, both of these studies do not support theories of an ‘impairment’ in basic 
emotion recognition. These data also do not support the idea that facial expressions of 
greater ‘intensity’ are easier for people with ASD to recognise.AQ was found to be linked 
to FER in the adult TD group (Chapter 2), however alexithymia was not. The contributions 
of AQ and alexithymia were explored further in a facial expression discrimination task 
with TD adults (Chapter 4), which revealed that alexithymia did not predict FER ability 
more so than AQ.  
5.2 Contributions to the field  
As reviewed in Chapter 1, FER has been studied extensively in individuals with ASD. 
However, there are many conflicting results in the literature, which have been attributed to 
several factors, including methodological limitations. The studies reported in this thesis 
(Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) employ a novel technique, allowing for simultaneous 
measurement of the identity, activation level and relative timing of the facial action units 
contributing to FER in an individual with ASD, a method that has never previously been 
applied to the field of ASD. Results obtained with this technique revealed that individuals 
with ASD and TD individuals (both adults and children) were relatively similar in terms of 
the AUs and intensity that were associated with their recognition of facial expressions, 
however timing was atypical in the adult ASD group and, in particular, timing of FER was 
late in comparison to TD individuals. In addition, these methods provided an insight into 
individual differences within groups, suggesting that particular individuals struggled with 
the FER task more than others (which may have been overlooked if only group data were 
assessed). Hence, the studies presented in this thesis also provide a novel approach to 
assessing FER in individuals with ASD because FER can be modelled at the individual 
level. Additionally, this thesis assessed FER from a ‘modern’ perspective by assessing the 
contribution of AQ and alexithymia (Chapter 4), revealing that neither of these is 
consistently predictive of FER abilities.  
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5.3 Theoretical perspectives 
Theory of Mind (ToM), first applied to ASD research by S. Baron-Cohen et al. (1985), 
proposes that the characteristics of ASD could be explained via an underlying cognitive 
impairment in the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and to others. The research 
presented in this thesis can be related to ToM insofar as accurate FER requires, by its very 
nature, proficient skills in attributing mental states to others. The results presented in this 
thesis suggest that adults with ASD are somewhat similar in FER as compared to TD 
individuals. This suggests that adults with ASD may have intact ToM, as they are able to 
attribute appropriate emotional affect from facial expression based on some components of 
the face. However it is difficult to separate recognition of facial expressions (in the 
perceptual sense) from the understanding of emotional affect (in the cognitive sense). This 
is also reflected in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 and so ToM is only able to explain the results 
presented in this thesis to a partial extent. The Central Coherence (CC) theory also 
provides a useful framework to conceptualise the results presented in this thesis. CC posits 
that individuals with ASD have superior abilities to TD individuals in processing the 
‘local’ aspects (i.e. small parts) of a visual scene. Results presented in this thesis indicated 
that adults and children with ASD were relatively typical in terms of the AUs, amplitude 
and timing that were present in their models. It could be argued that individuals with ASD 
may have intact visual perception of the face, but have difficulty with deriving social 
meaning from such stimuli (as suggested by Weigelt et al. (2013)) which would be 
consistent with CC theory.  
5.4 Implications of these findings 
Studies found in the FER in ASD literature have generally been split between two camps 
based on their conclusions: 1) individuals with ASD have a core difficulty with FER and 2) 
individuals with ASD have no difficulty with FER (Harms et al., 2010; Simmons et al., 
2009; Uljarevic & Hamilton, 2013). The research presented in this thesis presented a range 
of abilities in FER, which vary across individuals with ASD due to a variety of different 
factors, including age and autism severity. However, this thesis argues that, overall, 
individuals with ASD are relatively typical in FER. It could be argued that each individual 
holds a unique internal representation of FER, observable through the methods used in this 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. The data suggest that each individual’s mental representation of 
an emotion is likely to vary, in differing degrees, to the mental representations experienced 
by TD individuals. In addition to this, it was apparent from the research presented in this 
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thesis that children with ASD are also relatively typical in their FER ability. Further, 
research presented in this thesis provided no evidence to support the idea that alexithymia 
predicts FER ability better than ASD or AQ score. This provides evidence against the 
notion that FER difficulty, instead of being a core characteristic of ASD, can be explained 
as co-morbid alexithymia.  
In terms of implications for clinical practice, it was initially thought that the technique 
presented in Chapter 2 could be applied as a therapeutic tool for the improvement of FER 
skills. This was based on the notion that internal representations of facial expressions could 
be modelled at an individual level, and hence, these data could be used in a training setting 
to reinforce particular FER difficulties experienced by an individual. It was expected, 
therefore that an individually tailored intervention experience could be produced from this 
technique. However, it is not clear from the research presented in this thesis if this 
technique would be appropriate as an intervention for FER in individuals with ASD. 
Results have suggested that an individual model can be obtained for individuals with ASD, 
however the procedures specific to this method have proved somewhat challenging for 
individuals with ASD (e.g. difficulties in maintaining attention in children with ASD). 
Hence, this technique has implications for improving individually tailored interventions 
but is slightly hindered in terms of a clinical practicality due to the time and concentration 
commitments required by each individual.  
5.5 General limitations 
A tricky aspect of FER research is obtaining a balance between stimuli that are ‘life-like’ 
while retaining a high level of control over the presentation of the stimuli and the 
sensitivity of the measure. The stimuli used in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 allow for a very 
high level of stimulus control as well as high sensitivity of measurement. However this 
requires a slight trade-off in terms of the ‘life-like’ quality of the stimuli, of which real, 
face-to-face interaction would be best. The stimuli are limited insofar as they lack eye-
movements. Research has suggested that children with ASD label facial expression stimuli 
as more intense when the stimuli have directed (i.e. looking straight ahead) eye gaze (Tell 
et al., 2014). Hence, fixed gaze of the stimuli may have influenced some of the results 
presented in this thesis. The stimuli used in these chapters are currently being updated to 
include movements of the eyes and more realistic representations of the teeth, and so future 
research with these stimuli would involve an even higher level of ecological validity.  
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The studies presented in this text were in collaboration with Universities in North America. 
Because of this, a proportion of participants from each study were recruited in North 
American countries. The advantages of conducting research in this collaborative way 
include: access to facilities, access to clinical populations (i.e. children and adults with 
ASD) and research expertise. However, the drawbacks of using this method are that 
potential cultural differences between UK and North American participants cannot be 
completely accounted for. Efforts were made to display detailed demographic information 
about the participant groups, however the inclusion of both UK and North American 
participants is, naturally, a limitation to the studies presented in this thesis.  
The studies presented in this thesis also recruited only individuals with average, or above 
average IQ. It was assumed that individuals on the spectrum with low IQ, complex needs 
or learning disabilities would not have been able to complete the tasks. Consequently, the 
data presented in this thesis do not reflect the ASD population as a whole. Due to the 
cognitive demands of the tasks presented in this thesis, adaptations would have been 
needed to be made in order to assess FER in individuals with ASD who had below average 
IQ. Future research would benefit from recruiting a wider population of individuals across 
the autism spectrum. 
5.6 Future directions 
As highlighted in this thesis, few studies have assessed FER in ASD using novel 
techniques. This thesis presented the first application of the Generative Face Grammar (Yu 
et al., 2012) to individuals with ASD and is the first study in this field to simultaneously 
measure the contribution of AUs, timing and intensity to FER. Future research could build 
upon this by producing a replication of the study presented in Chapter 2. This would be 
useful in order to reveal any consistent atypicalities across individuals with ASD, if such 
consistencies exist. Also, further research would aim to ratify the relationship between 
ADOS/AQ scores and FER ability. 
In addition to this, future research could build upon the findings reported in Chapter 4 by 
assessing the contribution of alexithymia and AQ score to the recognition of complex 
emotions. This would shed light on whether individuals who are high in alexithymic traits 
or autism-like traits have difficulty with FER in a more complicated facial recognition task.  
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This thesis was somewhat exploratory in nature, in part assessing the effectiveness of a 
novel technique and its ability to be applied practically to a clinical population. The 
research presented in this thesis may provide a platform for similar techniques to be 
applied to different groups of clinical populations, for example, as applied in a case study 
of an individual with prosopagnosia (Richoz et al., 2015). 
5.7 Conclusions 
This thesis aimed to assess FER in individuals with ASD and its relationship to AQ and 
alexithymia. The research presented in this thesis revealed that children and adults with 
ASD were relatively typical in their FER ability. Hence, these data provide little evidence 
in support of a universal ‘impairment’ of FER. The research presented in this thesis also 
provide evidence against the notion that alexithymia predicts FER over and above ASD 
symptoms and revealed little evidence of a link between levels of autism-like traits and 
FER ability in the typical population. Hence, this thesis adds to current scientific 
knowledge by employing a new and innovative method to assess FER in individuals with 
ASD. From this, a rich tapestry of data has indicated that there are no obvious differences 
between ASD and TD individuals in their FER abilities. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Videos of stimuli generation 
A dynamic figure of how the stimuli were generated from Yu et al. (2012) can be viewed 
or downloaded using the following link: 
https://owncloud.gla.ac.uk/cloud/s/I1SVFfPuGqWCSNZ 
Appendix 2: Videos of reverse correlation models for each participant 
Dynamic models for each participant can be displayed in video format, which can be 
viewed online or downloaded using the following link:  
https://owncloud.gla.ac.uk/cloud/s/AYiUgnoh32qxIDy 
Appendix 3: Videos of group models  
Group models, i.e. depicting the AUs and temporal dynamics as averaged for each group, 
can be displayed in video format, which can be viewed or downloaded using the following 
link:  
https://owncloud.gla.ac.uk/cloud/s/pv3lKH1AVxwHIEb 
Appendix 4: Videos of NMF decompositions 
Decompositions, rendered into a video format can be viewed or downloaded using the 
following link: 
https://owncloud.gla.ac.uk/cloud/s/17KGhEwbrIomN8i 
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